

M E S S A G E

OF THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

COMMUNICATING,

In compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 8th instant, information concerning recent transactions in the region of the La Plata, affecting the political relations of the United States with Paraguay, the Argentine Republic, Uruguay, and Brazil.

DECEMBER 17, 1868.—Read, ordered to lie on the table and be printed.

To the Senate of the United States:

In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 8th instant, concerning recent transactions in the region of the La Plata, affecting the political relations of the United States with Paraguay, the Argentine Republic, Uruguay, and Brazil, I transmit a report of the Secretary of State, which is accompanied by a copy of the papers called for by the resolution.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1868.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, December 16, 1868.

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the resolution of the Senate of the 8th of December, requesting the President to communicate to that house, if not incompatible with the public interest, "any information possessed by the Department of State concerning recent transactions in the region of the La Plata, affecting the political relations of the United States with the republic of Paraguay, the Argentine Republic, the Oriental Republic, and the Empire of Brazil," has the honor to lay before the President the papers mentioned in the subjoined list.

It is to be observed that Mr. Washburn has given notice to this department that he would without unnecessary delay furnish a full copy of his late official correspondence with the government of Paraguay. The correspondence thus promised has not yet been received. A supplemental report will be submitted when the correspondence shall have reached this department.

Respectfully submitted.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

The PRESIDENT.

List of the accompanying papers.

ARGENTINE REPUBLIC.

- Mr. Asboth to Mr. Seward, No. 48, October 19, 1867.
 Same to same, No. 49, November 10, 1868. (Extract with an accompaniment.)
 Mr. Seward to Mr. Worthington, No. 2, August 19, 1868. (With an accompaniment.)
 Mr. Worthington to Mr. Seward, No. 2, September 11, 1868. (Extract.)
 Same to same, No. 3, September 12, 1868. (With accompaniments.)
 Same to same, No. 4, October 13, 1868. (Extract.)

BRAZIL.

- Mr. Webb to Mr. Seward, No. 57, January 27, 1868. (Extract with an accompaniment.)
 Same to same, No. 58, February 6, 1868. (Extract with accompaniments.)
 Same to same, No. 60, February 24, 1868. (Extract.)
 Same to same, No. 61, March 9, 1868. (Extract with an accompaniment.)
 Mr. Seward to Mr. Webb, No. 226, March 23, 1867.
 Same to same, No. 227, March 23, 1868.
 Mr. Webb to Mr. Seward, No. 65, April 25, 1868. (Extract with accompaniments.)
 Same to same, No. 68, July, 1868. (Extract with accompaniments.)
 Same to same, No. 70, July 22, 1868. (Extract with accompaniments.)
 Same to same, No. —, August 7, 1868. (Extract with accompaniments.)
 Mr. Seward to Mr. Webb, No. 223, August 17, 1868.
 Same to same, No. 235, September 15, 1868.
 Same to same, No. —, October 8, 1868. (Extract with accompaniments.)
 Same to same, No. 75, October 24. (Extract with an accompaniment.)
 Mr. Seward to Mr. Webb, No. 238, November 17, 1868. (With an accompaniment.)

GREAT BRITAIN.

- Mr. Moran to Mr. Seward, No. 88, August 4, 1868. (Extract with accompaniments.)
 Mr. Seward to Mr. Johnson, No. 6, August 25, 1868. (With an accompaniment.)

PARAGUAY.

- Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward, No. 92, October 14, 1867.
 Same to same, No. 95, January 13, 1868.
 Mr. Seward to Mr. Washburn, No. 75, January 14, 1868. (With an accompaniment.)
 Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward, No. 96, January 17, 1868.

- Mr. Seward to Mr. Washburn, No. 76, June 2, 1868.
 Mr. Seward to Mr. McMahon, No. 3, September 2, 1868.
 Same to same, No. 4, September 3, 1868.
 Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward, September 26, 1868. (Extract.)
 Same to same, No. 101, October 5, 1868. (With an accompaniment.)
 Same to same, No. 102, October 13, 1868. (Extract.)
 Mr. McMahon to Mr. Seward, No. 6, October 26, 1868. (Extract.)
 Mr. Seward to Mr. Washburn, No. 78, November 17, 1868. (With an accompaniment.)
 Mr. Seward to Mr. McMahon, No. 6, November 18, 1868. (With accompaniments.)
 Same to same, No. 7, November 21, 1868. (With accompaniments.)
 Same to same, No. 8, November 27, 1868.
 Same to same, No. 9, November 27, 1868.

ARGENTINE REPUBLIC.

Mr. Asboth to Mr. Seward.

No. 48.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Buenos Ayres, October 19, 1867.

SIR: I had the consoling gratification to receive on the 4th September ultimo, your despatch of May 27, No. 36, in which you are pleased to honor me with a general approval of all the action taken by me in the offer of mediation for the termination of the Paraguayan war, and especially of my note addressed on the 10th April to Señor de Elizalde, then minister of foreign affairs here, renewing the offer of mediation, with a request for its reconsideration. This approval I view as an additional proof of the kind forbearance with which my government judges my humble efforts to follow up the humane spirit of its instructions, and I beg leave to offer herewith to you, sir, and through you to the President of the United States, my most sincere thanks.

With the same mail I had also the honor to receive your despatch No. 39, dated July 11, wherein reference is made to a copy of a communication which was addressed to your department on the 9th of the same month, by Mr. B. Mitre y Vedia, chargé d'affaires of the Argentine Republic near the United States government, with special instructions for me to treat upon the subject presented by Mr. Mitre y Vedia here in Buenos Ayres, and to put into the hands of Señor de Elizalde a copy of your above alluded to despatch No. 36, with the information that the said despatch furnishes what you trust will be sufficient explanation of the views of the President concerning the matter brought to the attention of the United States government by Mr. Mitre y Vedia.

The copy of the note on which you instruct me to act not having been enclosed with your despatch No. 39, I was obliged to postpone my action in the matter until the receipt of the missing document. As soon, however, as I had succeeded in securing an official copy of it, through the good offices of Señor Dr. Don Marcelino Ugarte, who has relieved Señor de Elizalde as minister of foreign affairs, and had thus ascertained the nature of Mr. Mitre y Vedia's note in question, which was nothing less than an official complaint against certain proceedings on the part of the American agents in the river Plate with regard to the offer made by the

United States to mediate for the termination of the war waging between the allies and Paraguay, I hastened, in obedience to the instructions contained in your despatch No. 39, to bring the subject before the Argentine government in an official note in the following terms:

No. 23.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Buenos Ayres, October 22, 1867.

SIR: I beg leave to inform your excellency that I have received from my government a communication which was addressed to the State Department at Washington on the 9th July ultimo, by Mr. B. Mitre y Vedia, chargé d'affaires of the Argentine Republic near the government of the United States of America. Introductory to this note, Mr. B. Mitre y Vedia says that, in accordance with instructions lately received, he intends to give in it some explanation relative to the conduct observed by the Argentine government on the mediation offered by the United States in the war with Paraguay, and at the same time to call the attention of the State Department to certain proceedings on the part of the American agents in the river Plate, which not only deviate from the usages and practices that regulate diplomacy, but which also compromise the impartial spirit which it was undoubtedly the intention of his Excellency the President of the United States to give to the proffered mediation.

Well aware of the fact that your excellency is in possession of a copy of Mr. B. Mitre y Vedia's note in question, I deem it superfluous to give here its full contents, but will refer only to that portion of it which complains of the steps taken officially by me as representative of the United States near the Argentine government, in the offer of mediation. That portion is as follows, viz:

"The Argentine government, after consulting together on the subject of the mediation initiated on the 4th January ultimo by the President of the United States of America, at the request of the House of Representatives, and after discussing the matter with its allies, communicated to Mr. A. Asboth, minister resident of the United States in Buenos Ayres, together with its expressions of gratitude, its regret at being obliged, by powerful motives, to decline the good offices of his government.

"But Mr. Asboth, perhaps animated by a strong desire to see the hopes of his own government fulfilled, and thinking that the declaration of the Argentine government was not sufficient to conclude the question, renewed his offer in a note dated the 10th of April.

"This step, under different circumstances, might have appeared as a laudable excess of zeal to see the termination of a strife which has already cost so many and such painful sacrifices; but it has been taken in so extraordinary a manner that my government has thought it its duty not to let it pass unnoticed.

"The American minister, in the despatch alluded to, does not limit himself, as was to have been hoped, to insisting on the acceptance of his government's good offices and to making evident the advantages of peace, but has thought it proper to enter into appreciations with regard to the war, to home politics, to the state of public opinion and of the finances of the country, which, he ought to have supposed, had been duly studied and taken into consideration by the Argentine government.

"The Argentine government thinks that the minister of the United States did not require, in order to carry out his noble desire, to review the situation of the country, painting it in such dark colors as he does in the above-mentioned note. Were so unusual a proceeding to be passed over in silence, it would imply that Mr. Asboth, notwithstanding his very short residence in this country, was a better judge of its condition and necessities than the government elected by the people, and whose duty it is to be cognizant of that very condition and provide for those very necessities.

"Even admitting that the Argentine government was in the wrong, it surely would not belong to the diplomatic agent of a foreign nation to call its attention to the fact; the most ardent desire to promote the happiness and welfare of the country near whose government he might be accredited would not justify such a proceeding."

Further on Mr. Mitre y Vedia continues:

"The Argentine government, while desiring me to submit these remarks to your excellency's enlightened consideration, does not for an instant doubt that they will be received as a proof of its ardent desire to preserve unaltered the close bonds of friendship and sympathy which unite it with the government of the United States. It therefore confidently that the United States government, which has given such signal proofs of the interest by which it is animated in not permitting that its agents should go beyond their assigned sphere of duty, will be able to give full credit to the justice of these remarks."

Such are the complaints, relative to my humble self, contained in Mr. Mitre y Vedia's communication, laid before my government pursuant to instructions received from Señor de Elizalde, your excellency's distinguished predecessor in office; and the Secretary of State instructs me, in his before-mentioned despatch, that, in reply, he advised Mr. Mitre y Vedia "that the subject which he had presented could be treated of more profitably in Buenos Ayres than in Washington, and that instructions would be given to me for that purpose."

Accordingly, I was authorized and directed to put into the hands of Señor de Elizalde, then minister for foreign affairs, a copy of a despatch, marked "No. 36," previously addressed

to me from the State Department at Washington, and to inform him, at the same time, "that the said despatch No. 36 furnishes what the Secretary of State trusts will be a sufficient explanation of the views of the President concerning the matter brought to the attention of the State Department by Mr. Mitre y Vedia."

I am further instructed by my chief, the honorable Secretary of State, to say to Mr. Elizalde "that it is difficult to conduct a correspondence of mediation between belligerents without inadvertently giving offence to one or other of the parties, and that, considering that every care has been taken by the United States government to avoid misapprehension, the Secretary of State begs to be excused from entering unnecessarily into collateral discussion."

In obedience to these instructions, I have now the honor to append a full copy of the despatch No. 36, with which I was honored by my government in reference to the note addressed by me on the 10th April ultimo, under No. 20, to Señor de Elizalde, requesting the reconsideration by the Argentine government of the mediation offered by the United States of America to the contending parties for the termination of the Paraguayan war and the restoration of peace in the countries washed by the river Plate and its tributaries, viz:

No. 36.]

"DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, May 27, 1867.

"SIR: Your despatches of April 10, No. 20, and of April 12, No. 21, have been duly received and submitted to the President, together with the important documents accompanying the same. From these papers the President has learned with profound regret that the Argentine Republic disallows the propositions made by the United States to the several belligerents for the termination of hostilities and the restoration of peace in the valley of the Parana and its tributaries. I have carefully read the note which you addressed to Mr. Elizalde, on receiving his announcement of the decision of his government. What you have written in that note is very discreetly expressed, and is in entire harmony with the views of this government, since its proceedings have been inspired by a sincere friendship to all the South American states, and an earnest solicitude for the restoration of peace and harmony on the American continent. Your note is therefore approved.

"At the same time I think it proper to remind you that earnestness for the restoration of peace is not to be carried to the extent of invading the sovereignty or the dignity of the belligerents. Whether they would accept our well-intentioned and friendly good offices was left to their own intelligent free choice. Nothing could be further from the President's purpose than an idea of imposing any constraint or bringing any material pressure to bear upon that choice.

"Under these circumstances you will not be expected to press with undue importunity, at the present time, the tender of the good offices of this government to the Argentine Republic, or to that of Uruguay. Retaining the same attitude, however, you will wait further instructions, unless some new and unforeseen conjuncture shall seem to render it likely that our good offices will then have become more acceptable.

"I am, sir, your obedient servant,

"WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

"ALEXANDER ASBOTH, Esq., &c., &c., &c."

Having thus fulfilled the orders of my government, I beg leave to express to your excellency my deep regret that your distinguished predecessor in office should have thought it proper to complain to my government respecting a note of mine, which was dictated by the most sincere sympathies and best wishes for the vital interests of the Argentine Republic, and in reference to which the above despatch of my chief, the honorable Secretary of State, says that all that I have written in it is very discreetly expressed, and is in entire harmony with the views of my government, since its proceedings have been inspired by a sincere friendship towards all the South American states, and an earnest solicitude for the restoration of peace on the American continent. Your excellency will appreciate the consoling gratification which I derive from so emphatic an approval by my government of all my action in the offer of mediation, and especially of my note complained of by Señor de Elizalde, the more so as the progress of events subsequent to my said note has fully demonstrated that all to which I therein alluded and referred relative to the internal affairs of the Argentine Republic was the true reflection of the sad reality.

In the confident belief and trust that, while your excellency continues to preside over the foreign affairs of the Argentine confederation, the representatives of a sister republic, the United States of America, will be spared similar misapprehensions, I seize the opportunity to renew to your excellency the assurance of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be your excellency's obedient servant,

A. ASBOTH.

His Excellency Dr. Don MARCELINO UGARTE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

It was my endeavor to bring this lengthy note in accord with the instructions received from your department on the subject, and I beg leave to assure you, in conclusion, of my most grateful appreciation of

the generous manner in which you were pleased fully to vindicate before the Argentine government my official action in the mediation question, assailed in Mr. Mitre y Vedia's note addressed to your department on the 9th July ultimo, pursuant to instructions received from Señor de Elizalde.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. ASBOTH.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State.

[Extract.]

Mr. Asboth to Mr. Seward.

No. 49.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Buenos Ayres, November 10, 1867.

SIR: In connection with my report No. 47, dated 14th October last, I have the honor to inform you that the French war steamer Decidee returned on the 4th instant from Paraguay, with Mr. Laurent Cochelet, late French consul at Asuncion. Mr. Cochelet brought me two despatches from our minister at Paraguay, addressed to your department, which I beg to forward herewith.

* * * * *

At the seat of war there prevailed, during the last fortnight, unusual activity. The several battles fought were of the most sanguinary nature, indicating, evidently, an increased hatred and revenge, leading to mutual extermination, which, if persisted in, must necessarily soon result, on the part of Paraguay, in those unmistakable signs of final exhaustion which become, in the natural course of events, the fate of the weaker part.

The Standard of to-day, in its review for Europe, gives, as far as I am able to judge, an impartially correct statement of these military events in Paraguay, as well as of the advices received from the disturbed interior Argentine provinces, which I beg to submit here in the following extracts, viz:

REVIEW FOR EUROPE.

The military events of the fortnight are of a most stirring nature. Several sanguinary battles have been fought; the allies have advanced and are still advancing. The lines around Humaita are being slowly but steadily tightened, and the cause of Lopez each day becomes more desperate. The full details of all these engagements will be found in another column. The losses on both sides have been severe, but the allies have not only invariably held their ground, but have, after each encounter, advanced still further into the enemy's country. We await advices per next steamer of a powerful division at present traversing the enemy's country. Possibly ere this the important town of Villa Rica, and even the capital itself, Asuncion, have been occupied by the allies. As it is known that all the male population of the unfortunate country is centred in Humaita and in the interior, the allies will have nothing to contend with save the natural character of the country. The occupation of Asuncion will, doubtless, have a great moral effect on the Paraguayan people, and, unless Lopez is much stronger than is generally supposed, will lead to a prompt conclusion of this prolonged campaign. The last fight at Tuyuti was probably the most sanguinary since the war began. The Paraguayans fell upon Porto Alegre's encampment without the slightest warning. The surprise could hardly be more complete, and had the Paraguayan commander been able to restrain his men, the Brazilian position must have been inevitably lost; but the Paraguayans getting into the rear obtained possession of all the sutler's stores, army contractor's deposits, and the pillage was fearful. Port Alegre, the Brazilian commander, who had been beaten back in the morning, with the eye of an experienced officer saw that the moment had arrived when he might strike the decisive blow and regain the day, and General Paranhos having come up with some re-enforcements, they charged the enemy, who, completely disorganized by the pillage and plunder going on in the tents, could offer but a faint resistance. Para-

guayans were cut down in the very tents which they had captured, and the day gained by the heroic Port Alegre. Since this terrible fight we have received no new advices from Paraguav. Marshall Caxias has at last outflanked Humaita, and by holding Tayi, a commanding position on the river Tayi, cut off Lopez from Asuncion and the interior of Paraguay. On the same day that the terrible battle at Tuyuti took place another sanguinary engagement occurred. The Paraguayans, landing from three steamers, attempted to take the place by storm, but they were repulsed with great loss and the steamers sunk.

Such constant fighting indicates that at last the campaign is drawing to a close, and from the position of the belligerents we feel justified in assuring our foreign readers that there is every probability peace will be restored in the Plate about the commencement of the new year.

Our advices from the Argentine provinces are a little more favorable; the rebels in Salta have been again defeated, and their leader is said to be prisoner. The mooted invasion from Chili has proved destitute of the slightest authenticity, and there can be little doubt on the conclusion of the Paraguayan war the provinces will acquire a more favorable aspect. Santa Fé is probably the only one of the provinces which shows signs of progress and vitality. Rosario is fast becoming the great centre of Argentine trade. The streets are being well paved, and will shortly be lighted with gas, the agent of the new company being at present in England purchasing the pipes and other material. A new line of railway is projected, and being surveyed from Rosario to the Esperanza colony. This road will be private property, built by Sr. Cabal. Several important sales of real estate have been made during the month, but mostly city property. The speculation in building sites has considerably fallen off of late since the general impression is that Rosario will not be the future capital of the republic, and should Dr. Adolfo Alsina, the governor of Buenos Ayres, be elected president, which is every way probable, Buenos Ayres will, doubtless, remain the capital of the republic. The provisional chambers were formally closed last week, the legal period of the session having elapsed, but the governor has reassembled the legislators to despatch some railway and other schemes of much importance.

THE WAR IN THE NORTH.—SINBAD'S ACCOUNT OF THE LATE BATTLE.

CORRIENTES, November 5.

GENTLEMEN: I left Itapiru on the 1st instant, in order to be in time for the mail. On the 29th a formal fight took place at Potrero Obello, situated on the coast of the river Paraguay, between Pilar and Humaita. Mena Barreto, at the head of 5,000 men of all arms, attacked and put to rout a superior force of Paraguayans. The published Brazilian account of the enemy's loss is 70 killed and 30 prisoners; the Brazilians own a loss of 302 *hors de combat*. On the 2d instant a strong Brazilian force, under the same command, took possession of Tayi, routing ten battalions of the enemy protected by three steamers, which were sunk, their crews taken prisoners or drowned; 160 are the reported numbers of the captives, and as many more killed or drowned. The allied statement of their loss is *muy pocas*. On the 3d a deplorable calamity befell the allies at Tuyuti. Early in the morning of that day a convoy was to have left the encampment for Tuyu-Cue, escorted by four battalions of Brazilian troops. The draught cattle were at hand, ready to be yoked; the escort was also prepared to move, waiting the order to march with the carts, when a great noise was heard in the encampment from numberless voices, such as *gauchos* are wont to make when driving a herd of cattle. Those who shouted were supposed to be conductors of a drove meant for the supply of the army, (this was in the gray of the morning;) the true character of the imagined drovers was not discovered until they had passed the lines and got within the intrenchments, when they were found to be many battalions of Paraguayan infantry and cavalry, who at once commenced a furious assault. The four battalions that were to have been the escort were the only troops ready at the moment to make resistance, which they stoutly but ineffectually did, with great slaughter. The enemy soon became master of the Tuyuti camp, (supposed to have a garrison of 10,000 men,) and doing a murderous work, killing without mercy, pillaging and firing everything that could burn. The sutlers' shanties after being sacked, the Argentine parque, hospital, and commissariat, the large depot of Mr. Lanuz, (who has suffered severely,) the convoy of loaded carts—in fine, I have said, all that would burn was committed to the flames. The Paraguayans for a time did pretty much as they liked, owing to a general panic throughout the encampment. The fire and fight continued until 9 a. m., when the approach of a column, under the command of Osorio, made it advisable for the Paraguayans to retreat, which they did, carrying away, some accounts state, from two to twelve pieces of artillery; other reports make the number of guns carried off to be 28, as well as a number of prisoners. Mr. Vigari, the purser of the Pingo, was at the camp in three hours after the enemy retreated; he estimated the number, (made at a cursory view,) he said, to be 1,500. The road going from Tuyuti to Itapiru was filled with Brazilian soldiers, fugitives, who threw away their guns and knapsacks to facilitate their flight; they never halted in their race till they reached the shipping. Hundreds of these were subsequently collected and sent back to Tuyuti. What else might be expected from new recruits, slaves fresh from plantations, many of whom would

as soon be shot at as to fire a musket themselves? The number of Paraguayans killed are much more than those of the allies, owing to their conduct while sacking, by getting helplessly drunk, thus made incapable in the retreat to keep pace with their comrades. When the panic was over, little mercy was shown to the inebriated assailants. Among the wounded officers brought here is Major Tobson, who had his arm badly shattered, which has since been amputated.

The routed sutlers from Tuyuti complain of the Brazilian soldiers making a final finish of such goods as the Paraguayans or the flames had spared. Bad stories are told of the Paraguay legion in the allied service. At the time of the surprise they were posted at an advanced point; it is reported that, instead of giving notice of the enemy's coming, most of them joined their countrymen. Some Correntino troops are also reported to have behaved in a like manner. Nothing more is said for the present of the cholera, a proof that it has passed away. There have been two arrivals of hay. A Brazilian transport with a contingent passed upward yesterday. The river is rapidly rising.

Yours, truly,

SINBAD.

We refer our readers to our friend Sinbad's version of the Tuyuti victory. With all the different accounts before us it is difficult to arrive at the truth in regard either to the object or the result of the late vigorous attack of Paraguayans. But the prominent facts are that there are grave suspicions of treachery in the allied outposts; that Lopez's attack meant more perhaps than a raid on the stores of the allies; but to the fact of the Paraguayans stumbling on the liquors they owe their own defeat. The Brazilian officers, particularly Paranhos, Mattos, and Andrade, appear to have behaved like heroes.

The Argentine and Correntino cavalry, under General Hornos, contributed nobly to the final retreat of the enemy, and Hornos was made brigadier on the spot by General Mitre. The loss in men to Lopez, if not amounting to 2,500 as reported, must have been sufficiently severe in his present circumstances, and probably the main object of the attack was frustrated, which was to prepare a more serious attempt on Tuyucue.

For further particulars, I beg respectfully to refer to my enclosed daily memoranda of political events on the river Plate, marked D.

The fate threatening at the present crisis the unfortunate country and people of Paraguay is certainly of the most melancholy nature. Paraguay would seem to be morally, politically and materially on the verge of ruin and bereft of all hope of any friendly powers being able to save it from the horrors of the wildest anarchy.

In case Lopez should lose Asuncion, this capital would no doubt be destroyed by himself or by his orders, it being his determined policy to leave nothing but ruins in the hands of the allies. In such an emergency not only would all property in the capital be lost, but the lives of the inhabitants, especially of foreigners, would be seriously endangered—exposed as they would be either to the fury of the retreating Paraguayan bands of the interior, who consider all foreigners the enemies and invaders of their country, or to the bayonets of the Brazilian soldiers, who for the most part just emerging from slavery, if once in power, could hardly be restrained from robbery and butchery.

The interior of Paraguay would not, and desolated as it must be, could not afford any support to Lopez after his prestige had gone with his defeat, neither would it be any safe shelter to the hated fugitive foreigners.

Under these circumstances the foreigners in Paraguay can look only to their respective governments for protection, and it would be very desirable that the war steamers of all the foreign powers represented here, in Buenas Ayres, should afford such protection to their distressed countrymen in that country.

I had the honor respectfully to request in my report No. 29, under date June 17, 1867, that a war steamer be temporarily placed at my disposa

with reference to the present complications in Paraguay, and should this request be granted I should at the present emergency feel bound in duty to station it near the blockading squadron, with the view to join the first Brazilian ship of war up to Asuncion, and to give full protection to our minister and fellow citizens there, as well as, in the interests of humanity to any other foreigner whose life and property were jeopardized in the only too probable sway of anarchy.

I have the honor to be sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. ASBOTH.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

DAILY MEMORANDA OF POLITICAL EVENTS IN THE RIVER PLATA, FROM
OCTOBER 13 TO NOVEMBER 9, 1867.

October 13.—The Tribuna of to-day says:

The extracts from a correspondence of the *Semanario* we publish in another column show that in Lopez's own ranks there is a prevalent conviction of the speedy termination of the war. Although this correspondent expects it will be brought about by a victory of our enemy's arms, it is easy to perceive that these are only consolatory words, indicating the last flicker of the light that is going out.

October 14.—According to the budget of the Argentine finance minister, a sum of 1,000,000 hard dollars has been voted for public works, and \$500,000 for contingent expenses.

A Brazilian steamer has arrived at Montevideo laden with arms and ammunition for the forces in Paraguay.

October 15.—The *Diario*, the official organ in Rio Janeiro, formally contradicts the statement that Colonel Fonseca was the bearer of the proposals of peace, consequent upon the attempted mediation of Mr. Gould, the British secretary of legation.

The Tribuna of to-day devotes several of its columns to the publication of documents connected with the proposed extension to Mendoza of the present Western railway, which now only reaches a place called Chirileoy, about 30 leagues from Buenos Ayres, and eventually across the Cordillera of the Andes by the Planchon Pass to the Pacific coast. The idea of connecting the interior provinces to the litoral by means of a railway has been lately seriously entertained, but some people wish it to be a prolongation of the Central Argentine from Villanueva, whilst others are anxious that it should be a continuation of the Buenos Ayres Western railway. The Buenos Ayres provincial government, jealous of the influence and importance Rosario would acquire if the former project were carried out, are straining every nerve in support of the latter project, and are ready to subscribe a considerable part of the capital necessary for an undertaking that will connect this city by a direct line of railway with the interior provinces and eventually with Chili.

October 16.—The *Espigador*, arrived yesterday, brought dates from the seat of war to the 11th instant. A partial encounter between the Brazilian vanguard and a body of Paraguayan cavalry took place on the 4th, in which the latter were repulsed. Cholera is making fearful ravages in both camps, and up to the 11th there had been among the Argentine forces 300 cases of cholera, of which 100 had proved fatal. General Dominguez, Colonel Artiz, and other officers, had fallen victims to the epidemic. The disease is likely to be aggravated by the reported refusal of Lopez to allow the dead bodies on the field of the late encounter to be buried, and to grant an armistice for that humane purpose. The

following extracts from the Standard's correspondent at the seat of war give fuller details of the last action and also of the ravages of cholera:

ITAPIRU, *October 11, 1867.*

GENTLEMEN: On the 4th a partial fight took place between Arroyo Hondo and Humaita. About six regiments of Paraguayan cavalry issued from their entrenchments evidently for the purpose of pasturing their horses, which are in a miserable condition. They were not, however, allowed to continue this peaceful operation.

The Brazilian vanguard, under Rivas, divided in two bodies, one proceeded to attack them whilst the other remained in ambush. The attacking party made a sham retreat, drawing out the Paraguayans, who closely followed the supposed flying enemy until they came beyond the troops in ambush. The latter sallying out completely routed them, and pursued them to the trenches of Humaita, killing 600 and taking 200 prisoners. The allied loss is officially stated to be 100 killed and wounded. The customary cannonade was kept up in the direction of Carupaity during the night with redoubled fury, the Paraguayans doubtless smarting from their recent defeat.

October 9.—The cholera in a malignant form is making fearful havoc in Tuyuti; it entered first into the battalion of Pipo, (known as the foreign legion,) where it remained fixed for a few days, it then spread to the rest of the first corps d'armée with much virulence. Three days ago it commenced with great violence in the second corps, which had until then been exempt, causing very great loss in officers (among their numbers are Dominguez, Benites, and a long list of others) and men. In the first corps yesterday's accounts says that it is somewhat diminishing, but continues gaining force in the second. The Brazilians also have it diffusely spreading on all sides. It is known to be making ravages in the Paraguayan camp; it is supposed that from thence the contagion was communicated to Tuyuti. Persons well qualified to judge are of an unanimous opinion that a few days or perhaps hours to come the pestilence will be doing its work of destruction here. What else might be expected from a miscellaneous population, composed of military, inmates of hospitals, boatmen, sutlers, peons, or dissolute women, the greater part of whom have always been accustomed to live among dirt, eating lean tired meat or any trash, drinking impure water, sleeping in damp places surrounded by puddles of mud, and yet feel no inconvenience from this method of living.

The following Paraguayan version of the fall of Pilar seems sufficiently interesting to merit insertion:

THE FALL OF PILAR.—PARAGUAYAN VERSION.

CAMP OF PASO PUCU, *September 21, 1867.*

We understand that numbers of vessels are lying off the mouth of the river awaiting the arrangement of peace to bring their valuable cargoes; but the most important item on this head is that after Mr. Gould's visit to the enemy the Marquis Caxiar despatched his chief of staff to Rio in the swiftest boat, the San Paulo, with instructions to proceed direct without touching at any port and return within 22 days. This gave rise to the report in Corrientes that the San Paulo was bearer of peace propositions, and that the war was terminated. As I do not know how far true this may be, I confine myself to the simple rumors current here since the arrival of the English gunboat Doterel, in search of Mr. Secretary Gould, then our guest. Without questioning the authenticity of these rumors, which probably emanate from the desires of the enemy and the kind offices of a disinterested friend, I may be permitted to express my private conviction that no peace can be arrived at before some great and decisive feat of arms has taken place; in other words, notwithstanding the sentiment of the belligerents and the good will of our mutual friends, "peace just now is very improbable," for our haughty enemy, not yet brought to a full sense of his impotency, will always be throwing some ambitious hints in the way, thus rendering the conditions quite unacceptable to a noble, patriotic people.

The latest deserters to us report the enemy suffering frightfully from hunger. Our victorious legions have cut off the supplies, and so hard pushed are the Brazilians now that dried hides are sparingly distributed among them as rations. This stupid predicament it was which impelled them to make the most hopeless movement of the 19th. At daybreak on that auspicious day we observed a strong body of horse advance from San Solano toward the Arroyo Hondo. It was in reality nothing more than a foraging raid, an oft-repeated attempt to cut off our supplies. Not succeeding they pushed on to Pilar, which they attacked the same evening, but were driven off with great slaughter; but if unable for us in arms they are our superiors in limbs, otherwise many more must have fallen in the retreat; as it was, the most our victors could lay hold of were the disregarded clothes, weapons, &c., &c.

This slight action, in displaying the cowardice of the enemy and the certain triumph of determined valor, ought to have inspired our men against any odds. Unfortunately it had a different effect. The brave garrison, while regaling themselves after victory, made but little allowance for the pangs of hunger on the half-starved imperialists.

With the morning the enemy returned to the charge, and quickly wrested victory from the disordered ranks of the defenders. They were not destined to enjoy long the fruits of victory. Commander Saturnino Garcia, coming up in the *Birabebe*, opened fire on the enemy, and compelled them to evacuate the town. At first the Brazilians manifested a decided disinclination to stir, until the valiant Garcia landed, at the head of fifty marines, and charged the hostile masses then engaged pillaging. The gunboat meantime kept up a brisk fire, one shell bursting into the Brazilian general's coach. At sight of this the streets became suddenly cleared of the marauders, except such as had already fallen victims to their valor; but the real difficulty was to root them out of the houses, where they had stowed themselves in every hole and corner, to escape the fall of their comrades below.

Lieutenant Galon has behaved well and merits the decorations with which our Marshal President has been pleased to requite him. To his determination and valor the country owes this glorious victory, the inhabitants their property, and the enemy a memorable defeat. While I write the enemy are scouring the country some leagues off. I would not give them much for their chance of getting anything in those sterile wastes; and after all the loss of men, horses and honor, they will return as hungry as they came.

Marshal Lopez's plan has been supremely strategic, for, by surrounding the enemy with our trenches, there is no way left for him but to march through boundless deserts, or by remaining as he is, to be decimated by our guns or disease. Such is the history of the whole campaign, and with the failure of the exploring expedition we may hope the allied commanders will change the tactics, and by trying their fortune in our trenches give us an opportunity of creating in our country's history another day like that of Curupaity.

October 17.—The mail from Rosario yesterday brought news that the alarm about cholera has led to sanitary regulations, special committees having been named and every precautionary measure possible adopted.

In Montevideo, also, urgent steps have been taken by the municipal board to protect the city against the possible approach of cholera. In Buenos Ayres alone nothing has been done, and the press clamors loudly for all vessels coming from the seat of war to be placed in quarantine.

October 18.—The provincial senate of Buenos Ayres has passed the bill for the Mendoza railway, in prolongation of the Buenos Ayres western railway. By this bill it is proposed to raise the funds necessary for this great undertaking by the emission of six per cent. provincial bonds at 75. The bill goes now before the deputies, where it is rumored the measure is likely to meet with some opposition.

The Standard of to-day says:

The steady arrival of Brazilian transports in Montevideo, with re-enforcements for the army, shows that the Rio cabinet is straining every nerve to carry on the war with redoubled vigor. Within the last four days four transports have arrived.

October 19.—There is no further news from the seat of war, but the Standard has the following, relative to a new difficulty which the Paraguayans have to contend against, viz: want of salt:

Our own advices from Paraguay are of a character which inspires a conviction in the immediate termination of war. The great want in Paraguay is salt. Some of the English doctors in Paraguay have now a splendid opportunity of gathering the most interesting data in this respect. Salt seems to be as necessary to life as air; disease and sickness defeat all skill, owing to the primary want of salt. Extraordinary diseases are said to exist in Paraguay, owing to the want of salt.

From the time that the national government withdrew its subsidy from the *Nacion Argentina*, which at once began a series of attacks on the private life of Vice-President Paz, a fierce polemic has been raging between that paper and the *Tribuna*. On this subject the Standard makes the following remarks:

The wars of the roses were nothing in comparison to the tremendous battle between the *Tribuna* and *Nacion*. Few of our readers take any interest in such intensely political subjects; in fact, none but a native would understand them. The gist of the question is to make out Don Marcos Paz the head rebel in the republic. The *Nacion* has each day powerful articles and fiery leaders, impeaching the vice-president. The *Tribuna* takes up cudgels for the government and replies. Each day the attack and rejoinder are becoming more and more acrimonious. The Americans have a very apt expression for such matters—"fighting for spoils." The only possible result for such a polemic is the disclosure of much scandal which, for many reasons, it is desirable to avoid.

The same paper publishes in its to-day's number the following relative to the rebel movements in Salta:

REBEL MOVEMENTS IN SALTA.

SALTA, *Sept mber* 15.

The traitors, Varela and Elizondo, are sacking the country in all directions. Nothing escapes the lawless marauders. Everything portable is swept off to the Chilian markets, and such as cannot be conveniently moved are destroyed on the spot. We live in a perfect chaos; but what else can be expected, when the place is entirely in the hands of banditti? The inhabitants are powerless, and the government takes no steps to prevent the depredations; so that Varela, with a dozen men, may at any moment take the capital, and then God help the unfortunate citizens, the most resolute of whom have long since learned the utter futility of attempting any resistance.

About the middle of August we heard of the arrival of Varela, and the government at once despatched a force under Don Pepe Frias to confront him. This gentleman spoke in such a pompous manner of whipping the rebels, even did they muster double their actual strength, that our authorities were content to trust all to his honor, without taking any measures for possible emergencies. On the 31st ultimo we received intelligence that a party of 300 montoneras, under Elizondo, had routed a corps of 700, led by the redoubtable Frias. The disgrace of the defeat was heightened by the shameful nature of the fight. On the approach of the enemy Frias displayed the most cowardly indecision, neither forming to receive or attack; the men were impatient to meet the foe, but Frias assured them 'twas no use, as odds were too heavy against them, and that their only chance lay in flight. Some add that he was bribed to this. Certain it is that he returned to this city without his corps, and endeavored to raise another; but as we had already lost 700 men, with a large quantity of arms and ammunition, the authorities did not like to trust themselves again to Mr. Frias; so seizing all the fighting materials they could lay their hands on, they enrolled all the men, about 400 in number, marched off for Tucuman—governor, ministers, (with their families and treasurer,) and all, leaving only women and children in the town. In this way we awaited for their return with Tucumanos, but they are not forthcoming, and there is nothing for it but that the women and infirm left shall perch themselves on the house-tops, and assail the rebels when they come, with broken bottles, stones, boiling water and oil.

October 20.—In noticing the attacks made upon Dr. Rawson, minister of the interior, by the press of Buenos Ayres, which, while criticising his public acts, have outstepped the limits of fair discussion by imputing to him interested motives, the Standard of to-day says:

Although we make it our general rule to abstain as much as possible from taking any part in local politics, we cannot avoid noticing with sincere regret the very unbecoming manner in which the leading organs of the Liberal press here treat our distinguished minister, Dr. Rawson. We must emphatically deprecate the disparaging insinuations touching the private motives of a gentleman, who is not only devoting his time and energies to the service of his country, but whose character has ever enjoyed a spotless reputation. Dr. Rawson's chief fault in the eyes of his countrymen is his pedigree, and this alone would entitle him to a prior claim on our support; but independently from this, we can assure him that whilst we are ever fearless in denouncing abuses, we also pride ourselves in being foremost in doing justice where justice is due, and that in the name of our country we shall ever be too glad to bear our testimony to his liberal and enlightened policy, which entitles him to the rank of one of the most distinguished and disinterested of Argentine statesmen.

October 21.—The Cisne and Rosa steamers, from Corrientes, have been placed under sanitary surveillance for three days, and only the mails brought by them, after being duly fumigated, have been allowed to be landed.

October 22.—The news from the seat of war is of no great importance. Cholera had diminished in the Argentine camp, but was still prevalent among the Brazilians.

The national government has ordered the formation of two lazarettos, with their proper staff of medical attendants, &c.: one in the island of Martin Garcia, and the other at the Tigre, the terminus of the northern railway on one of the channels of the Parana river.

The documents connected with the resignation of General Martinez of the post of minister of war are published to-day. It appears that the general addressed a letter to the vice-president from Rosario, dated 24th of September, shortly after his liberation from the hands of the

rebels in Cordova, tendering his resignation, which was not attended to. On his arrival in Buenos Ayres he addressed a second note to the vice-president under date of the 9th instant, insisting upon his previously announced determination to resign. The vice-president, after having ineffectually endeavored to induce him to alter his mind, was obliged to accept the general's resignation. In the note which Minister Rawson addresses under date of the 19th instant, to General Martinez, informing him that his resignation has been accepted, he expresses the lively regret of the vice-president at the loss of his services, for which he tenders to the general the best thanks of government.

Señor Don José Maria Moreno, the present under secretary for the war department, who has been acting minister during General Martinez's protracted absence, has been offered the vacant portfolio, which he, however, is said to have peremptorily refused.

October 23.—The steamer Wasiman has arrived in Montevideo, having on board a locomotive engine and other railway materials, destined for a railway which the Brazilians are about to construct between Tuyuti and Tuyu-Cué, in Paraguay.

October 24.—The Provender arrived yesterday from Corrientes; brings no news of interest from the seat of war, save that the cholera appears to be greatly on the decline. It was rumored that an important movement was about to be made by the allies on Tayi, an important position on the river Paraguay, above Humaita.

The following correspondence, translated from the Republica, contains some interesting information relative to the Brazilian iron-clads:

LETTERS FROM THE SEAT OF WAR—THE IRON-CLADS—HUMAITA.

On the 9th I started from Tuyu-Cué, and on the morning of the 10th I arrived at Tuyuti; from there I went to the Paso de la Patria, and embarked at 1 o'clock in the afternoon for the island of Avisto. Then I put myself on board a small steamer which took me to the Princesa de Joinville, bearing the flag of Commodore Elisario de Santos, who had the politeness to place at my disposal a steam launch, which carried me to the Chaco by the river Quio. At the expiration of one hour I found myself landed at the port of Quio, where Admiral Joaquin José Ignacio has established a depot of provisions and munitions of war. From the port of Quio I rode to Elisario, on the Paraguay. The distance between these ports is about six miles. At Elisario is stationed the second division of iron-clads, under the command of Commodore Albin. Thence to Humaita the distance is about one league. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon I went in the steam tender Lindoya to the Colombo, which is stationed between the first and second divisions of the fleet. At 4:30 we anchored alongside of the Brazil, which I boarded to pay my respects to the admiral.

Admiral Ignacio appears to me to be about 60 years of age. He is of low stature, and has all the rough but frank characteristics of an old salt. The admiral did all in his power to facilitate the object of my mission, which was to make a nearer examination of the fortress, whose name is now so famous. The first division of iron-clads is anchored about 300 yards from the London battery, which is the first that presents itself after rounding the elbow of the river. The iron-clad Bahia is stationed about 230 yards from the same battery, which is rectangular in shape, and has eight casemated embrasures on each side. The Bahia is under the enemy's fire. The Lynch battery crosses its fire with the 16 guns of the London battery in the first bend of the channel. The water being low, a sand bank is visible in the middle of the river in front of the batteries, and we can discover three recently made roads leading to the river from behind the Lynch battery. Any vessel attempting to force a passage would have to sail within 10 yards of the Paraguayan batteries, receiving on the beam the fire of the eight guns of the London battery parallel to the river, whilst ahead she would be exposed to the fire of the Lynch and three other batteries to the north, and to the horizontal fire of the London battery from astern; and not only that, for if she touched the chain laid obliquely across the river she would swing on to the bank with the current and remain a helpless target for the enemy's artillery. The channel of Humaita is now so low that all the pilots are agreed that the iron-clad Brazil from the breadth of beam would be unable to manœuvre or obey her helm with sufficient rapidity to get through a pass not more at this moment than 40 rods wide. The channel is not only obstructed by sunken ships, but to the naked eye there is distinctly visible a whole line of torpedoes. The squadron is daily employed, it is true, in fishing them up, but this does not much diminish the danger. Your

readers may have often asked why do they not cut the chain? A few words will convince them of the impossibility of doing so at a spot upon which the seven batteries of Humaita converge, and watched, moreover, by a guard on the Chaco. The Chaco is swampy, and the whole extent of its banks, with the exception of the place where the guard is stationed, is protected by the guns of Humaita. To attempt to capture the guard and cut the chains with boats' crews, under the fire of the batteries, is simply an impossibility. The vessel in the vanguard have fired at the obstruction with cannon, but as it contains no wood-work the balls glance off and harmlessly bury themselves in the river or the mud banks.

For a long time past men competent in the art of war, and distinguished naval men of all nations, have been of opinion that the fortress of Humaita was impregnable. It is thus unjust to accuse the Brazilian iron-clad squadron of failing in its duties, for, on the contrary, it is little less than rash to expose the Bahia within pistol-shot, as she now is, of the enemy's fortress.

As for the effects of the bombardment from the squadron, it is known positively that it has caused considerable injury and losses to the enemy. On the 12th instant the squadron bombarded Humaita, and the division abreast of Curuzu directed its fires on the headquarters at Paso Pucu, where, upon the same day, there happened to be on a visit Messrs. De Couverville and De Libertad.

REPUBLICA.

The annexed extract, translated from the "Comercio del Parana," an Entre Riano newspaper, leads one to believe that the allies cannot boast much of their reputed victories over the Paraguayans:

I am quite certain you have all heard of the grand victories we have obtained in the last few days. Oh, what victories! Precisely like all the rest we have obtained upon the present, costing as dear as that of the 24th September, and the taking of Pilar, the former of which cost the Brazilians some 2,500 men, and the latter not much less. A friend who writes to me from Tuyuti says: "I was present at that massacre, for I can call it nothing else. The engagement was brought about by the Paraguayans endeavoring to rescue 44 prisoners taken at Pilar. A regiment of allied cavalry in attacking the enemy fell into a puntano or swamp, their ammunition got wet, and the whole of them remained at the mercy of the foe."

In Tuyuti there exists the most frightful misery among the Brazilians, who are, as you may probably have heard, the best cared for. I do not exaggerate in telling you that not only are they reduced to begging from the shop-keepers in the camp, but from the passers by. It seems that our respectable allies, the gentry of the Chaco, are reappearing on the scene. Three days ago I met a party of them, Guaicurus. It consisted of a lieutenant, armed with a sabre, two sergeants, with muskets, and five rank and file, with long knives. I had the curiosity to ask the chief where he was going, and, with indescribable coolness, he answered, "to Humaita." Great hopes we must have of reducing the fortress with such contingents.

Notwithstanding the unfavorable result of the first negotiations for peace, there are many who believe that the negotiations will be resumed.

The "Standard" to-day gives the accompanying item of news from the seat of war. The scarcity of meat, both in the allied and Paraguayan camp, seems to be a fact beyond doubt:

By a private letter from the army we learn that, owing to the prevalence of cholera, coffee and caña are now given to the Brazilian soldiers. The meat is so poor that officers and men, for the most part, live on biscuits, rice, and farina. The Brazilian hospitals are well cared for and upon a splendid footing. The allied strength in Tuyuti is 12,000 Brazilians and 2,000 Argentines, including the Paraguayan legion.

October 25.—The last news received from the provinces respecting Juan Saa is of a less alarming character. It appears that this celebrated rebel leader has found no support and little sympathy in Bolivia, and well-informed parties give the assurance that the Argentine Republic has nothing to fear from Bolivia.

General Paunero, who applied some time ago and obtained leave from the government to absent himself from his command and come to Buenos Ayres on account of a family affliction, but would not avail himself of it until affairs in the interior were in a more settled state, is now preparing to return, and it is rumored that he is likely to be appointed to the vacant post of minister of war.

The following extract from the Standard, giving the number of vessels aground in the Parana river, proves the difficulties in navigating its waters:

Vessels aground in the Parana—17th.—A Brazilian gunboat, with some troops on board, was aground some 15 leagues below Corrientes, cargo trimmed to port to assist to get her off.

18th. There are a great many vessels aground below Goya. American bark, T. C. Cushing, Captain Rogers, laden with horses, is aground below Yaquarite, on the left bank of the river.

19th. The British bark Quickstep and British brig Adelaide were at anchor at La Paz, having no water to pass the shallows.

20th. An Italian gunboat under sail was passed, just above Rosario, proceeding down the river.

21st. British brig Albion, of Liverpool, was at the Boca Guarzu, bound for Liverpool, British three-masted schooner, E. Shun, was at anchor on the bar below Martin Garcia.

There are about 30 sailing vessels aground or at anchor waiting for water between La Paz and Goya.

October 26.—The question of the future presidency of the Argentine Republic is every day more and more engaging the attention of the public. The local papers both in this city and in the rest of the confederation devote a great deal of their space to this important subject. The Tribuna, which is undoubtedly the most influential organ of the River Plata press, has boldly proclaimed Señor Sarmiento as its candidate, whilst the Nacion Argentina attacks this candidate without openly proposing any other, although it is well known that it is determined to support Señor Elizalde's pretensions. The press of Entre Rios, as was to have been expected is unanimous in writing in favor of General Urquiza, as the fittest candidate for the presidency. Besides these there are other names that have been mentioned as likely to be brought forward as competitors for the highest magistracy in the republic, such as Señor Alsina, governor of Buenos Ayres, Señor Velez Sarsfield, Dr. Rawson, General Taboada, and others. Of these, however, only the first is believed to have any chance of success. Indeed it has been asserted and very currently repeated that the Tribuna is only using the name of Señor Sarmiento as a mask, and that its candidate in reality is Governor Alsina. Nothing, however, has appeared that could substantiate this assertion. On the contrary, the Tribuna evinces every day more zeal in defending Señor Sarmiento's cause. In its number of yesterday, it published a letter addressed to its editor by Colonel Mansilla from the allied camp, a translation of which is given below. Colonel Mansilla, although a nephew of the celebrated dictator Rosas, is an influential member of the liberal party, and has succeeded in establishing for himself a high reputation, not only as a brave soldier and good officer, but also as an accomplished writer. His advocating, therefore, so warmly Señor Sarmiento's nomination cannot fail to have considerable weight; and the statement he moreover makes that Sarmiento is the favorite candidate in the army, if true, is of considerable significance. Colonel Mansilla's letter to the editor of the Tribuna is as follows:

CAMP TUYU CUÈ, *October 20, 1867.*

You are aware, ever since I was in Buenos Ayres, that my candidate for the future presidency of the republic is the same as the Tribuna's—Sarmiento. For the honor and glory of our country the man whom I pointed out as the ideal candidate when we talked over the subject, is becoming every day more a possible, a real candidate. I, who do not insult you by harboring the supposition that you advocate this candidate insincerely, and who, in my sphere, and within the compass of my limited resources, am working for it and anxious for its success by means analogous to the end and to the principles it symbolizes, am happy to inform you that our candidate can rely upon the support and sympathy of many of our most notable officers in the army, who are all individually ready to work for him.

By and by, I will write to you more at length on this subject. In the mean time, I am anxious that this letter should be published.

Yours truly,

L. V. MANSILLA.

October 27.—A fraud involving the loss to government of the rather large sum of seven millions of paper dollars (\$280,000) has been discovered in the custom-house here. The authors appear to have been one or two employés of the custom-house in league with several clerks of differ-

ent commercial houses of high standing and respectability in this city. The matter is under judicial investigation, but the guilty parties are said to have escaped before their evil doings were discovered.

The news brought by the last mail from the interior provinces shows that tranquillity is far from having been restored. The Tribuna publishes a letter dated Santiago, 15th instant, announcing that official intelligence had just been received of the rebel chief Varela having attacked the town of Salta and taken it after a short resistance. Although General Navarro hurried up with a respectable force and obliged the rebels to abandon the city only a few hours afterwards, Varela and his men committed unheard-of excesses in the few hours they remained in Salta, murdering and pillaging its inhabitants and carrying off an enormous booty.

Just before the mail steamer left Rosario news arrived that Governor Luque of Cordova had resigned his post.

The Banda Oriental seems also to be on the eve of new troubles. The papers report that a certain Colonel Aparicio, one of the principal leaders of the Blanco party, has crossed from Entre Rios to the left margin of the Uruguay, somewhere between Paysanda and Salta, accompanied by a few followers, with the avowed intention of raising the standard of revolt against General Flores' government. It is also reported that General Urquiza and the Entre Rios government have endeavored to frustrate Colonel Aparicio's expedition, and given timely warning of it to the authorities of Paysanda.

October 28.—The news of Colonel Aparicio's intended invasion of the Banda Oriental, communicated from here by telegraph to Montevideo, has caused there considerable excitement. It is, however, believed that the move is an isolated attempt, which, if discountenanced by General Urquiza, will be easily put down.

October 29.—The regular steamer from Corrientes, due yesterday, did not arrive, and there is in consequence a dearth of news to-day.

The Standard has the following in regard to Colonel Aparicio:

Yesterday we heard that Aparicio is one of the greatest Blanco Caudillos of the day. He it was who, when Flores entered Montevideo in 1865, made a great raid into Rio Grande, carried off prisoners of war, and liberated slaves by the hundred. Respecting his pedigree, there is much obscurity: at an humble mud rancho on the wayside in the Florida district, it appears, he first saw light. He has figured in most of the unhappy broils of his country. Profound political observers regard him as the creature, the tool of others, who, now that the elections are approaching, find it convenient to have him running about the country. What truth there may be in this version it is difficult to say; but the calling out of the national guards is inevitable, as is also the result of the elections under such circumstances.

October 30.—The Espigador steamer from Corrientes arrived yesterday, and brought the news of some partial fighting in Paraguay, in which the allies, as usual, according to their own account, have obtained another success. The following is the Standard's version, which agrees with what is given by the other papers:

SUCCESS OF THE ALLIES.

The following telegram was received from the the Tigre yesterday, at 3.15 p.m.: On the morning of the 21st instant a Brazilian ambuscade, composed of three divisions of cavalry, on the right of the line of the allies, surprised 800 Paraguayans, taking 200 prisoners and killing 300. The Brazilians lost 70 to 80, rank and file, and one cornet killed and one captain wounded.

On the same morning, on the left of the line, an Argentine ambuscade, composed of two divisions of cavalry, were hotly engaged with the enemy; and at the moment when victory was still doubtful, Colonel Videla arrived with a squadron of the 3d regiment of cavalry, which charged furiously, completely defeating the Paraguayans, who left 80 dead on the field. The Argentine loss was 16 rank and file and three officers wounded and one officer killed. At the last moment it was reported that a picket of 100 men, with its commander, had passed over to the Argentine camp.

The Tribuna of to-day publishes a long letter of Señor Hector S. Varela, co-proprietor of that paper, from Paris, giving an account of a brilliant speech made by him at the peace congress, held at Geneva, in defence of republican institutions, and more particularly of the United States and the republics of South America, which had been virulently attacked by a M. Dupasquier.

From Cordova the news of Governor Luque's resignation is confirmed. It appears that when he sent it in to the legislature the latter showed some disinclination to accept it, and Governor Luque then informed that body that he had delegated the governorship into the hands of a Señor Peña, an extreme liberal, until his successor should be duly elected.

October 31.—With reference to the last news from the seat of war, the following letter of the Standard's correspondent contains some interesting details:

THE WAR IN THE NORTH.

CORRIENTES, October 25, 1867.

GENTLEMEN: All I can communicate with certainty respecting the last battle is that the Paraguayans sought the combat and got worsted, leaving 400 killed or badly hurt, and 200 prisoners. The allied loss is reported to have been very insignificant. Other versions state the loss on either side to be nearly equal. Caxias was to have marched from Tuyu-Cué, on the 24th, to take a position at Tayi. It is not known here if he has effected the desired purpose. If he can accomplish it, and maintain himself at that point, the reduction of Humaita must soon follow. The cholera is on the decline at the different encampments; still, it is far from being extinct. Every precaution is being taken to prevent the further spread of the plague; the sale of all conserves, no matter if of flesh, fruit or fish, is strictly prohibited. Due attention is given to cleanliness, while all care is bestowed on those that are convalescent; four and five patacones are paid for fowls for the sick. At Itapiru measures are in progress to remove the garbage. Here no preventive steps will be thought of until the plague is widely disseminated, when "*saue qui peut*" will be the watchword—people flying in all directions to escape perdition. Till now the authorities and denizens in general are indifferent as to what may come—Brazilian gold absorbing every other consideration. An extensive conflagration of hay has been going on at Isla de Itapiru for the past three days; many hundreds of bales, said to be the property of Mr. Dufour, have been consumed. It is supposed to have been purposely set on fire, which is probable, as the flames, when first discovered, were seen to issue from different parts of the pile. The loss is a serious one, as much of the provender was in a sound condition. Holders of the article here, since the fire, have advanced their prices.

Yesterday the steamer Paysander passed upwards, with a brig in tow; both vessels were loaded with horses. Other remittances of horses are daily arriving at Paso de la Patria, from all parts of this province, as well as Entre Rios, notwithstanding the prohibitory decree. Most of the animals are stolen ones; however, few questions are asked as to how the sellers became possessed of the horses. The brute, as soon as sold, has its ear clipped, which at once determines the ownership in an indisputable manner. It is to be hoped the allies will bestir themselves and bring the wretched war to a conclusion, now that they have a good supply of sound horses, in all respects fit for the campaign; while those of the enemy are known to be utterly unfit for service. The Sisters of Mercy have arrived, and proceeded to their destination. Here has been a large sale of every description of goods: the value of the amount sold was 55,000 patacones. Many of the articles sold would have brought more in Buenos Ayres.

I remain yours, truly,

SINBAD.

Colonel Aparicio, whose invasion of the Banda Oriental has been already alluded to, appears to have retraced his steps and crossed over again to Entre Rios territory. He has been subsequently arrested at Concordia by the jefe politico of that department, Don Justo Carmen Urquiza.

November 1.—The following, relative to proceedings in the Santa Fé legislature, is an extract from the Standard's Rosario correspondent:

The legislature of Santa Fé will meet again for the despatch of business on Friday next. Dr. Quintana intends presenting a project of a minute, to be addressed to the national government, praying them to conclude the war by arranging a peace with Paraguay. I have no

doubt but that it will pass with a large majority. The communication commences with this strong language:—

“As no voice has been raised within the precincts of the national assembly (to urge for peace) it falls upon the people to do it, to the shame of those who have not fulfilled their duty.”

New governors have been elected in the provinces of Mendoza and San Juan, in the first a Señor Villanueva, and in the second a Señor Zaralla. They both belong to the liberal party, and enjoy a good reputation.

A lieutenant colonel and a major of the late Confederate States service are reported by the papers to have arrived here from the headquarters of the allied army in Paraguay, recommended to the national government by President Mitre, to whom they have proposed to raise a foreign legion composed if possible of North Americans and Englishmen, for service in Paraguay. The name of the first of them is McTuor.

November 2.—On account of yesterday being a closed holiday, no papers appeared this morning, and there is no news.

November 3.—The Tribuna publishes a translation in Spanish of a note which I addressed to Don Luis Varela, brother of its proprietors, Don Hector and Don Mariano Varela, congratulating him upon the remarkable oratorical triumph of his brother Hector at the peace congress of Geneva, in its session of the 11th September last, in defence of assailed progress and civilization under republican institutions in this hemisphere.

The news from Montevideo are not very satisfactory. General Flores, eldest son of Colonel Fortunato Flores, whose brutal behavior obliged his father to send him to Europe about three or four months ago, has just returned to Montevideo from Paris, to the great disgust of his fellow citizens in general. It is reported that in consequence of this Señor Flangini will resign the portfolio of foreign affairs, and his successor is likely to be Señor Bustamante. With reference to this the Standard of to-day, says:

Things in Montevideo look rather stormy again; the government has notified General Suarez that for the present he must remain in the city and abandon his proposed excursion to the camp. This is doubtless on account of some information received respecting the squashed-up invasion on the Uruguay; but even in the city affairs are in an unsettled state. Minister Flangini has sent in his resignation, also many of the officers of the liberated battalion; all this is said to be owing to the premature return from Paris of Fortunato Flores, the son of the governor. It is thought that Señor Bustamante will succeed Flangini; his promotion will be a loss to Montevideo, since he has made an excellent chief of police, and it will be difficult to get any one so well qualified to fill this important post.

November 4.—A great public open air meeting took place yesterday, in one of the principal squares of this city, in accordance with a printed invitation, as a public manifestation in honor of Señor Hector Varela for his great success at Geneva. The meeting was well attended, several speeches were made, and funds collected to present an album and a gold medal to Senor Varela.

The French gunboat *Decidée* arrived yesterday from Corrientes, having on board M. Cochelet, late French consul in Asuncion. She has also brought despatches for this legation from the United States legation in Paraguay.

November 5.—A telegram from Montevideo announces the arrival there of the Marcelo Diaz, a Brazilian transport, direct from the seat of war, with news that on the 29th ultimo an action took place between the Paraguayans and Porto Alegre's forces at Tuyuti, which resulted in the latter occupying three of the enemy's trenches on the right flank, the loss on both sides are reported to have been considerable.

The published correspondence from the seat of war reaches only to the 27th, up to which date the only news of importance was the assurance that cholera had completely disappeared.

A file of Paraguayan papers to the 5th of last month has come to

hand. If any credit is to be attached to the statements of the *Semana-rio*, it would appear that the most patriotic and indomitable spirit of resistance pervades all classes of Paraguayans, who are animated by unbounded confidence in their ruler, and in the ultimate triumph of the Paraguayan arms in this sanguinary war of independence. These papers teem with accounts of public meetings held by the Paraguayan ladies, and eloquent speeches made by them for the purpose of raising contributions of jewelry and other objects towards the expenses of the war.

They also contain some interesting data on the commerce between Paraguay and Bolivia, which seems to be so much on the increase that the latter republic has appointed a consul general in Asuncion.

November 6.—General Mitre's official report to Vice-President Paez of the action of the 29th ultimo is published in to-day's papers. This action, which had been erroneously reported to have taken place at Tuyuti, happened near a place to the north of Humaita, called the "Potrero Ovella." This Potrero Ovella is the converging point of all the roads that lead from the interior to Humaita, a position strong by nature and rendered more so by the fortifications raised by Lopez to protect it. It would only be approached by a narrow causeway, along which the Brazilians, under the immediate orders of General Mena Barreto, charged with the bayonet, and, after suffering considerable losses, succeeded in carrying the position. Marquis de Caxias's official report to General Mitre of this action is herewith appended.

POTRERO OVELLA.—TAYI.

[Official despatch from the Marquis de Caxias to General Mitre.]

HEADQUARTERS TUYU-CUÉ,
November 1, 1867.

I have to inform you that, according to information received from Brigadier J. M. M. Barreto, charged by me with the operation already known to your excellency, he marched on the morning of the 29th ultimo at the head of a force composed of the 1st, 2d, 7th, 8th, and 9th battalions of infantry of the line, and 23d and 24th of volunteers, four pieces of artillery, 54 sappers, and 1st and 2d divisions of cavalry, arriving at the bridge of the Arroyo Hondo, when he left one of the cavalry divisions to guard that position and the rear of the expeditionary force. Continuing his march and approaching the Potrero Ovella, he received information from the vanguard that a line of skirmishers was in sight, supposed to be the vanguard of a superior force. He then ordered his own skirmishers to advance, protected by the 1st and 3d regiments of cavalry, he following with the bulk of the column.

He might have advanced about half a league, when Colonel Manuel de Oliviera Bueno, who was engaged in watching the movements of the enemy, sent word that he was in possession of a pass leading to a redoubt, which, after the action, he found to be defended by two deep ditches, and in the flank covered by marshes, and in front by a narrow and deep lake. He then ordered the before-mentioned brigadier to advance with two pieces of artillery, protected by two columns of cavalry in echelon, supported by a battalion of infantry, masked by a line of skirmishers, which kept up a fire with those of the enemy. He sent two battalions to the right and left of the pass, and two others in the direction of the redoubt, followed by the cavalry and artillery in the rear. The column thus proceeded in the form of a half-moon, and were soon engaged in a bloody contest, resulting in the retreat of the enemy not only from their first lines already described, but from the others, equally well protected by extensive and deep swamps. The lines were carried successively by our troops at the point of the bayonet. I have much pleasure in saying that General Mena Barreto reports that officers and men alike distinguished themselves.

The enemy then endeavored to retreat within the fortifications of Humaita, but were pursued and completely cut to pieces by our cavalry. We have buried 80 Paraguayan corpses, and have taken 56 prisoners, besides a quantity of ammunition and arms. Our loss in killed and wounded amounts to 370 men.

According to my instructions, General Mena Barreto marched yesterday at 5.30 in the morning, with a strong force and two pieces of artillery, to reconnoitre the barranca of Tayi. He halted there at 7.30, sending forward a picquet of carbineers to explore it. It was discovered that there were no entrenchments.

Our two guns then fired upon a steamer in the river Paraguay. She replied with two shots that did not reach the barranca, and then steamed away towards Humaita. We made two

prisoners, one of them a sergeant, who formed part of the guard at Tayi, which had fled, leaving a few lances and fortification tools in our possession.

At 11.30 Brigadier Mena Barreto returned to the Potrero Ovella, leaving a regiment of cavalry at Tayi.

Afterwards I received news that the before-mentioned steamer had returned, accompanied by another. They commenced to bombard Tayi, and succeeded in burning some carts I had placed there to imitate pieces of artillery. They fired also at the brushwood on the banks of the river, thinking naturally we had infantry concealed there. A third steamer was seen, but she passed up the river. One of their steamers and an armed raft remained all the day in the port of Tayi.

From what we have hitherto ascertained, there exists a road by the coast of the river Paraguay to Humaita. The Potrero Ovella is, we find, about three leagues in extent, and composed of woods, lakes and marshes, all of which we have explored. There is roaming within it a number of scattered cattle, which we shall collect on the first opportunity.

The town of Pilar was explored, and it was found that there exists neither garrison nor fortification of any kind. The few people who were there on our arrival had embarked in rafts, and remained in the centre of the river.

Congratulating your excellency on this new triumph over the enemy, I have only to communicate that orders have been given to the general in command of the expeditionary force to retain the present positions until further instructions.

The Tribune of to-day, in its telegraphic news from Montevideo, says:

It is beyond doubt that Flangini will shortly withdraw from the foreign office. Señor Bustamente is to be named prime minister, and will also discharge *ad interim* the duties of foreign minister, until the return from Europe of Señor Hector Varela, who is to succeed Flangini.

November 7.—The Standard publishes to-day my note to Señor Don Luis Varela, alluded to under date of the 3d of this month; it is herewith appended:

THE UNITED STATES LEGATION AND MR. L. VARELA.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Buenos Ayres, November 1, 1867.

MY DEAR SIR: It affords me great pleasure to congratulate you upon the signal success which your distinguished brother, Señor Don Hector F. Varela, has achieved in his masterly speech, delivered in the most worthy and eloquent manner at the peace congress, in Geneva, during its session of the 11th September ultimo, in defence of assailed progress and civilization under republican institutions in this hemisphere. This manly and noble defence will live as a lasting monument of respect and sincere gratitude in the hearts of all the American people north and south.

I am, with sincere regard, your obedient servant,

A. ASBOTH.

Señor DON LUIS VARELA, *Buenos Ayres.*

The last mail from Paraguay has brought the intelligence of the death of President Lopez's eldest son, killed in a late cavalry engagement.

Certain of the native local papers having given currency to some absurd information about President Lopez, said to have been communicated by the French consul, the Standard of this morning makes the following remarks:

Respecting the assertions ascribed to the French consul some have foundation. The imprisonment and ill treatment of Mr. Capdevila is, for instance, too true, and the general complexion of the gossip from Humaita may be more or less well painted; but the absurd history of the caged tigers, to which Lopez, like a second Caligula, flings his human victims to be devoured, is an abominable falsehood. And the circumstance that M. Cochelet was lodged in a part of the fortress of Humaita exposed to the fire of the allies, is easily explained by the fact that there is no part of that fortress which is thus not exposed. It is a pity that our colleagues should go out of their way to publish silly exaggerations, as the state of affairs in the interior of Humaita is doubtless quite bad enough, and we are all pretty well disposed to believe that the resources of the ruler of Paraguay are well nigh exhausted. Let the allies push on their reinforcements and be above calumny. Marshal Caxias is at least better employed, and we find on the 29th of October General Mena Barreto, under his orders, took possession of a very important position, which may lead to final results.

November 8.—The Standard of to-day has the following leader on the position of the allies:

THE POSITION OF THE ALLIES.

Never since the commencement of the Paraguayan war has the campaign possessed so much interest for the general reader as at present; the allies, profiting by dearly bought experience, are at last adopting tactics which must result in either hemming in the Paraguay army at Humaita or forcing the enemy to attack on disadvantageous terms. It is much to be regretted that we have no book or guide at our command to describe the country in the neighborhood of the present operations, but as far as we can judge from the hasty sketches in the *Semanario*, the allies are entering localities every way dangerous to an invader. At Tayi, a commanding position on the Paraguayan river just a stretch above Humaita, there is an immense isleta or jungle, in the vicinity of which already a sanguinary battle has been fought; according to the Paraguayan version, the Brazilians were driven back here on the 3d with great loss, while the allies claim a great victory on the occasion. The subsequent operations, however, remove all doubt as to this fight, for we find, on the 27th, a regular hand to hand fight at a point midway called Potrero Ovello. This potrero occupies a very commanding position a little out of Humaita and on the road to Asuncion; here were posted the abastecedores of the army, and since the move of Caxias to Tuyu-Cué, Lopez has had hundreds of his soldiers digging trenches and strengthening the position. Up to the 3d ultimo, Caxias, it appears, knew nothing of this place, but the fights at the isleta taught him the topography of the ground, and on the 27th ultimo a powerful division was despatched to take the place by storm. The brave cossacks of Rio Grande, under General Andrade Neves, and seven battalions of infantry, under Salustiano, marched in single file through a tortuous path from the allied encampment. The road passes through a glen, where a handful of Paraguayans, if well posted, might have held the pass and checked the invaders; but the Brazilians encountered no opposition until they came face to face with the enemy at the Potrero. The enemy seemed to trust more to the strength of their position and their bravery than to numbers. Two hundred and fifty Paraguayans held the place undismayed at the splendid charge of the Brazilians; there was nothing for it but the bayonet; the fire of the enemy was steady, well directed and concentrated; but the Brazilians with equal heroism charged up to the very ditches at double-quick step. The Rio Grande cavalry won new laurels, and dashing up to the very trenches of the Paraguayans sabred the gunners. The Paraguayans never flinched an inch until they saw the Brazilians at their flank; they then retreated in good order to Humaita, the nature of the country being such as to impede pursuit.

Important as is this position in a strategic point, it costs the Brazilians dearly, and those who know the difficulties attending the attack of an intrenched position will not read with surprise that the Brazilians had over 500 *hors de combat*, whilst the enemy did not lose a tenth of that number. A very sad episode occurred during the fight. Colonel Oliveira, who but the day previously had been promoted, was shot dead by a subaltern officer, owing to some high words passing between them. The position once gained by the Brazilians was occupied, and the Marquis Caxias, in person, inspected the place, and ordered the cavalry to hover about Tayi, whilst the artillery mounted some brass pieces to command the river. The Paraguayan guard at Tayi only numbered a sergeant and a few men. From the wilful weakness of the place it is thought that Lopez wishes to get the Brazilians in this dangerous spot, but lines of the allies are so extended that if Lopez adopts the first Napoleon's tactics the allies will find out their error. The allies at present stretch over an immense extent of country, and the only feature in their favor is that the enemy may be said to be without cavalry. During the last month the allies have invariably attacked with success, and a summary of the various engagements shows great advantages gained by the allies and heavy losses by the enemy. This has led to a complete change of tactics on the part of the allies; large divisions are at present penetrating the country and very possibly ere long we shall hear of the crossing the Tebicuari and the occupation of Villa Rica. Porto Alegre has been ordered to move to the right and thus, in fact, form the rear-guard near Tuyu-Cué; the evident object of this move is to strengthen the allied line which shuts Lopez in the peninsula, but all these movements and tactics can only have one result, a terrible and sanguinary battle has to be fought. Ten thousand desperate Paraguayans have to force their way into the country, the allies under no circumstances can avoid this, and the sooner it comes to pass the better for friend and foe; the base of operations will evidently be the Villa Pilar, when Porto Algere evacuates that most useless of all positions, the fens of Tuyuti.

The telegraph wires from the Tigre announce the arrival of the Uruguay steamer with dates from the allied camp to the 3d instant. Great fighting has been going on. On the 2d the Paraguayans made an attempt by land and water to retake the positions of Potrero Ovella and Tayi to the north of Humaita, but were repulsed with great loss on both sides, whilst the next morning before dawn they surprised the

allies in their rear at Tuyuti, and very nearly succeeded in taking possession of Porto Alegre's whole encampment; here, too, they were eventually repulsed, but although they suffered great losses they contrived to inflict even greater losses on the allies, and carried off several pieces of artillery, after setting fire to the Argentine sutler's camp.

To-day's Standard has the following leader, implying a covert threat to Lopez, which I have reason to believe has been inspired in an official quarter:

ENGLISHMEN IN PARAGUAY.

If President Lopez has ever speculated on the chances of intervention in his favor from abroad, or of domestic changes in the states now hostile to him, he must by this time be thoroughly undeceived. It is in the highest degree improbable that his position will be altered by any occurrence extraneous to the natural course of the campaign. We may take it for granted that he must rest the issue of the contest on his own military resources. What may be the strength of these it is difficult for us to form any reliable estimate; but the latest reports, after careful sifting of *ex parte* statements, present unmistakable signs of that gradual exhaustion so long predicted.

On the other hand, it may be doubted whether, since the war commenced, the bonds of the triple alliance have been more firmly knit than at this moment. The primary stipulation of the treaty of alliance, that Lopez shall abdicate his power, runs more chance than ever of being exacted to the letter. The Brazilian empire, it is certain, will shrink before no sacrifice of men or money to attain that object.

As far, then, as we can judge from appearances, Lopez is either obstinately fencing with his fate, or he is the dupe of parties personally interested in the continuance of the war. Neither of these alternatives is very creditable to his sagacity.

We may say safely that we have never been the political advocates of General Lopez. We have always considered his system of government as an anachronism, and, even more, as an impossibility, confronted as it must be by the steady advance of European ideas in these regions. But in common with many of our fellow-countrymen, we have sometimes closed our eyes to his political acts, and have chosen to contemplate him only in the light of a ruler who, on the margin of a desert, and surrounded by an indigenous population, has made great efforts to foment industry and introduce the mechanical arts. In fostering these he has employed the revenue of the country with an uprightness which defeats calumny, and has patronized and well-treated the English and other foreigners who have aided him in the attempt.

What sympathy we may still entertain towards General Lopez we cannot better expend than in cautioning him against information which, for mercenary ends, may be given him to disguise the real truth of his position. If his position is such as it is now commonly represented, he may be sure that his enemies are not sanguinary, and that they will be only too glad to give him the opportunity to escape, if he chooses to accept it. Impartial spectators of the events now in progress would advise him to do so with all convenient speed.

But it is possible that other counsellors of President Marshal Lopez may ridicule this officious advice, as well as the views which seem to prevail as to the position of a potentate who, far from being in the straits we speak of, is secure, they would tell us, in the assurance of ultimate triumph. In that case, we have even greater reason for now adverting to a question of more serious import to us than mere speculation as to the result of a contest in which we are neutral.

There are still Englishmen in the employ of General Lopez; and were we not averse to parallels that might be thoughtlessly drawn between him and another distant potentate, with whom Great Britain is now about to cast up accounts, we would say there are still certain Englishmen forcibly detained in captivity by General Lopez. But we prefer to consider them as foreigners, who from choice or interest have entered his service, and who have hitherto faithfully served him. From the nature of their callings, civil rather than military, we can yet hope that, *proprio motu*, he will be inclined to accept their resignation, although he may have lately refused that boon to a direct demand in their behalf.

President Marshal Lopez must be aware that, as far as Europe is concerned, his future reputation is bound up in the safety and honorable treatment of foreign residents in Paraguay, and we can scarcely believe the too commonly-expressed opinion, that Lopez, now brought to bay, is callous to praise or censure, present or posthumous; and that the safety of the foreigners in his clutches has no other guarantee but the immediate personal ends, the caprices of a barbarian.

On the contrary, we see in his diplomatic notes that he makes some sacrifice, even of veracity, to give a plausible coloring to his acts, when they are to be judged in distant countries, or where, in his own almost pathetic words, "his voice cannot reach." We know, also, that he spends large sums for no other purpose than to enable his agents in London or Paris to represent his proceedings favorably to the civilized world. We may, therefore, reasonably conclude that, as it has been remarked of the rest of us, he is neither so great a philosopher to be above censure, nor so great a beast as to be beneath it.

And, moreover, when he reflects on the responsibility of holding in his hands the lives of a few innocent foreigners, he will probably hesitate before he permits any wilful injury to them, either in the hour of his triumph or of his fall. In the former case, he would risk the fruits of his success by incurring the vindictive and instant chastisement which we can positively assure him powerful European nations are preparing to inflict; and in the latter case, whilst permitted to live, he would be branded as a monster, or would subject his memory uselessly and gratuitously to the execration not only of his immediate enemies but of the world in general.

With reference to the new British minister near this government the Standard says:

Mr. William Lowther, whose appointment as minister plenipotentiary to the Argentine Republic has been announced by the telegram from Montevideo, is the youngest son of Colonel the Hon. Henry Cecil Lowther, (M. P. for Westmoreland,) brother to the Earl of Lonsdale. Mr. Lowther was born in 1821, and married in 1853 Charlotte, youngest and only surviving daughter of Lord Wensleydale, by whom he has a large family. He is one of the oldest secretaries of embassy in our diplomatic service.

November 9.—The papers to-day publish full details and official reports of the late fighting in Paraguay. The battle of Tuyuti, viewed in any light, is a bloody and ugly business, and shows the danger the allies incur in having their line stretched too far to be safe from attacks such as the one they suffered at Tuyuti on the 3d instant. In the action of Tayi there seems to be no question that the Paraguayans were worsted. They landed in three steamers, attacked and got repulsed completely, and of the three steamers one was sunk by the Brazilian artillery, the other burnt, and the third entirely disabled. The following detailed account of the Tuyuti business, as well as Marquis de Caxias's official report of the affair at Tayi, are from to-day's Standard:

THE LATE BATTLES OF TUYUTI AND TAYI.

TUYUTI, *November 4, 1867.*

At daybreak (4½ a. m.) yesterday morning the Paraguayans made a fearful onslaught on our position. The sutlers and camp followers suffered heavily at the hands of the cowardly enemy, who plundered and murdered all before them. From one of the runaway merchants I gleaned the following, which I hasten to communicate, knowing your anxiety to have a full and true account of the engagement.

Scarcely had the sun peeped above the horizon, dispelling the dark shades of night and lighting up the neighboring woods and valleys with its million rays, when we were startled by the ring of musketry on our right; presently the war clang increased and it became evident that the Johnson battery, held by the Correntino division, was being assailed. The rapid discharge of two heavy guns, followed by a deadly silence, too plainly proclaimed the issue of the fight, at least so I felt, knowing that the few Correntinos left there could never hold out against any formidable attacking column. My conviction was shared by the Brazilian generals, who hurried forward their men on the first sound of alarm. While all around was bustle and excitement, General Porto Alegre, with becoming serenity, scanned from a slight eminence in front the whole line, adopting instantaneously the most energetic means of defence.

The enemy must have numbered 8,000 bayonets, for the most infantry. They advanced in loose file, quick pace, but good order, and extended over our entire front line. The column approached in two divisions, the first of which fell deliberately on our right as if to carry all before them, while the second or reserve, from a little to the rear, practiced a series of harassing assaults on the Brazilian left. The combat deepens around our ramparts, of which the enemy boldly endeavored to possess themselves; the Brazilian reserves dispute their own hand to hand with the assailants, whose numbers at length prevail over valor and discipline; the Paraguayan banner waves triumphantly over the heaps of slain as the Brazilians fall back on Porto Alegre's headquarters, here they concentrated and awaited the advance of their comrades.

This slight incident was the turning point of the whole day, and this early repulse it was which threw the final victory into the hands of the allies.

For while the enemy, unable permanently to occupy the position, were actually impeded in their retreat by the trenches they had so dearly won, our retrograde movement, without entailing disorder, had so contracted our line of defence that we were enabled, with a small force, to hold at bay the fiercest assaults of the enemy until our reserves came up, which quickly changed the fortune of the day. Nothing but the stern determination of our veterans could withstand the hairbrained daring of the enemy; and as each column advanced large gaps were opened in their massive lines by our own incomparable gunners. We had now time to load and take deliberate aim with our field pieces, for, as the Paraguayans were

unprovided with artillery, they could not get at us except with the bayonet, no easy matter either, behind stone walls. It may be Lopez had calculated on capturing our guns and ammunition, and in this he was not out, for two fine rifled pieces were left behind by the Brazilians; but in future the gallant marshal would do well to instruct his braves in the use of "spiked cannon," he would doubtless find it of great service in concluding a campaign with men who "never give up the ship." I am more inclined to believe, however, that the marshy and wooded nature of the country through which they marched would not permit of a long carriage train, otherwise it was a grievous error, and entirely blasted the fruit which, with a little judgment, might have ripened under the dazzling rays of their early success.

In this critical moment the rapacity of our savage enemy proved our best friend. During one of those occasional lulls whilst the enemy were organizing a fresh attack, and we preparing to receive them, dense volumes of thick black smoke commingled with flames were wafted by on the morning breeze; overcome by the suffocating vapor we stood motionless on our arms until aroused by the commotion among the camp followers. It was indeed a life and death struggle for these defenceless wretches; all who could not fly were butchered as they stood, their goods robbed, and houses burned. When Porto Alegre saw this he charged at the head of a picked corps, driving back the enemy with dreadful carnage. From this dates the enemy's repulse, which, as the day wore on, was followed by increased disorder.

General Hornos coming up with the San Martin 3d of the line and Correntino divisions, charged home on the broken masses, retaking the lost trenches and compelling the pursued to leave behind all their booty except two light guns, which, despite the noble efforts of the allied horse, were carried off to Lopez, the scanty trophies of that bloody day.

The enemy's loss must have been fearfully heavy; more than 2,000 of their dead were buried by the victor. The trenches, streets, and even the huts of the little village are filled with slain, so as to render it impracticable to pass on horseback. Our own loss may be laid down at 700 to 800, including many Argentine and Brazilian officers. The valiant Porto Alegre had two horses shot under him, and was finally disabled by a wound in the left arm. Major Castilla led the Paraguayan charge, and was killed by Alegre whilst tearing down the Brazilian flag from the battlements in front of the imperial commander's tent.

[Second despatch.]

HEADQUARTERS, TUYU CUÉ, *November 2, 1867.*

I hasten to inform you that in accordance with my instructions, Brigadier J. M. M. Barreto attacked Tayi with the infantry under his orders.

Disposed in parallel lines, supported by three columns of attack, one on the right, one in the centre, and one on the left, they charged with the bayonet, with the greatest intrepidity, and advanced up to the intrenchments which the enemy had raised with incredible celerity, and not only did our troops take these, but they completely defeated two battallions of infantry, 800 strong, without firing a shot, killing 500 and taking 60 prisoners. Many of the enemy in escaping threw themselves from the banks of the river into the water.

Our 4-pounders fired with such certainty at the three steamers in front of Tayi, (and which no doubt had conveyed thither the forces engaged,) that one of them was sunk, another burned, and the third moved off with her paddle-wheels damaged.

It is satisfactory to me to be able to transmit such favorable intelligence, and the more so that Brigadier Barreto informs me our loss did not exceed 30 men in killed and wounded.

MARQUES DE CAXIAS.

A. ASBOTH.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Worthington.

No. 2.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 19, 1868.

SIR: I transmit herewith for your information a copy of an instruction* addressed by this department to James Watson Webb, esq., United States minister to Rio de Janeiro, relative to the recent refusal of the Brazilian commander on the Parana river to allow the United States ship of war Wasp to pass the blockade of that river for the purpose of conveying Mr. Washburn on his return to the United States.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

HENRY G. WORTHINGTON, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

*For this enclosure see instruction No. 233, August 17, 1868, to the United States minister to Brazil.

Mr. Worthington to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

No. 2.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Buenos Ayres, September 11, 1868.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you of my arrival at this place on the 29th of August, having sailed with my family from New York on the 23d of July, and proceeded directly to my post of duty. On Monday, August 31, I communicated with Señor Rufino de Elizalde, minister of foreign affairs, enclosing with said communication copy of my letter of credence, and the remarks I would make upon the occasion of my presentation, and requested the appointment of the time when such presentation to the President of the Argentine Republic could be had. On the evening of the 31st I received a reply, designating the 2d of September for such ceremony. On Tuesday, the 1st, I was taken violently sick, and being confined to my bed, at my request the presentation was deferred until this day at 1 o'clock, and which will take place, not, however, in time for me to write my despatches for the steamer, which leaves here at the hour fixed for this ceremony. I will therefore defer transmitting to the department copies of the correspondence until my next despatch, so as better to preserve system and regularity in my correspondence.

As we sailed from New York, it was my good fortune to become acquainted with Señor Domingo F. Sarmiento, who was returning to his country from his diplomatic mission to the United States, in anticipation of his election to the presidency of this republic. We cultivated with and for each other a most friendly feeling, and it gave me pleasure to find him so imbued with the spirit of our institutions. On our arrival at Bahia, Brazil, he received positive information of his election, and communicated said information to me. The flag-ship of the South Atlantic squadron, Admiral Davis commanding, being in that port, honored him with a salute as we left that harbor for Rio de Janeiro. The same compliment was paid him by our ships as we left the harbor of Rio de Janeiro.

* * * * *

The general opinion prevails now that the war is rapidly approaching its conclusion. I can hardly share in that conclusion. By recent news (yesterday's boat) the allies have free navigation to Tebicuary, but it is a noticeable fact that every fortification occupied by the allies had been abandoned by Lopez, who has retired to the interior at the head, it is said, of about 16,000 men, and fortified himself at Villeta, where it is said he will give battle to the armies of the alliance. The allies do not relax in their determination to continue the war until Lopez and his power is destroyed, and this resolution has been strengthened by the news brought by yesterday's boat, which created a profound sensation in this city. This news is regarded as most reliable. You will discover from the same the insecurity of life and property in that country. The outrage to the American minister has developed the feeling of hostility which all Americans residing in this city entertain towards Lopez. I have no definite news relative to the Wasp.

The news above referred to, and which I add to this sheet, has been published in all the papers.

I have taken this from the Standard, which is an English paper, dated this day:

THE WAR IN THE NORTH—ARRIVAL OF THE PARANA.

The mail steamer from Paraguay has brought news of much importance and advices of the most afflicting character. At first we refused to believe the accounts of the wholesale butcheries in the Paraguayan camp which our colleagues published. We had hoped, for the sake of common humanity, that the stories from the mouths of deserters and prisoners of war were but a tissue of falsehoods; but we deplore the fact that subsequent advices confirm the sad narrative, and this desperate war is about to wind up with one of the bloodiest chapters that has defaced South American history.

The onward march of the allied army seems unchecked by a single *contretemps*. General Osorio, at the head of the vanguard, has crossed the Tebicuari without meeting the enemy.

It appears that the commander-in-chief ordered the squadron to pass up the river, enter the Tebicuari, and bombard the enemy. To this mandate the admiral replied that it was impossible to enter the Tebicuari for want of water; but Caxias consulted with some skilled Paraguayan pilots, who insisted that there was sufficient water for the ironclads, whereupon Caxias repeated the order, informing the admiral of what the pilots said. The admiral at once weighed anchor and got up to the appointed place and commenced shelling away; but soon he was acquainted with the fact that the enemy had long since fled, and had marched to the headquarters at Villeta. Upon Caxias being informed of this, he at once ordered Osorio to advance with the vanguard, swim the Tebicuari with his troopers, and establish his quarters on the right bank of the Tebicuari, all of which this brave officer did without a moment's delay. A general order for the whole allied army to advance on the morning of the 8th was then given, and all the steamers in the river—even the transports—were ordered up to ferry the troops across the river.

Timbo is razed; it never was a place of any strength; but the little fortress which the Paraguayans had constructed has been dismantled, and will not be occupied by the allies.

The little town of Pilar is now crowded with shipping. When the allies entered the place they found the inhabitants were all fled, and every thing of worth or value carried off. A kind friend who, it appears, would stop at nothing to help the Standard, entered the church and carried off one of the figures for the Standard museum. Although most anxious to enrich our museum, which has cost us many years to get to its present position, we confess that we lament any subscriber of ours should presume in this way to obtain an article of pious *virtu*; and we receive the gift only on the strict understanding that when the war terminates we shall be at full liberty to restore it to the little chapel in question.

Humaita will soon be deserted; the Argentine troops under Gelly have received orders to march, and the few dealers who had temporarily established themselves there now move up in the wake of the army.

Lanuz and Lezica, the army contractors, keep a remarkably small stock on hand. They seem to think that the war may collapse at a day's warning, and they wish therefore to be on the right side. All their stores are kept afloat. Mr. Riestra keeps almost nothing on shore. The supply of forage has fallen off of late, and arrivals of hay and corn are now looked for.

Gelly Obes has obtained very important advices from a Paraguayan officer who has been taken prisoner by the Brazilian forces whilst marching along the left bank of the Tebicuari. He stated that the picquet which he held was stormed and taken by the Brazilians on the 27th, and that on the 28th ultimo the remnant of the garrison swam across the Tebicuari to the opposite bank, where horses were in waiting to convey them to Lopez's encampment. That some 10 or 12 days previously Lopez with the bulk of his army had marched for Villeta, where, according to all accounts, Lopez intended to make a stand, having fortified the place. That his whole force numbered 9,000 men, with a "parque" of light artillery, numbering over 60 pieces. That Lopez had rewarded all troops that had escaped from Humaita with a medal. Some soldiers with these medals have been taken prisoners.

That the battle in the Chaco is claimed by Lopez as a splendid victory, over 2,000 Argentines having perished according to the Cabichuy.

That Gaspar Campos is alive, but Colonel Martinez de Hoz was killed in the fight; his body was recovered and sent to Lopez, who had it buried with military honors on the lonely banks of the Tebicuari. The grave has since been identified.

This officer fully confirms the report about the revolution, which, it appears, was got up in Asuncion, and most of the principal men took part in it. On the 1st of July Lopez got information of it. He at once ordered the arrest of Captain Gomez, the commander of Asuncion, who was sent prisoner to headquarters. It is stated that this unfortunate man was tortured in order to make him divulge; he died in torture. Colonel Denis, commander of Cerro-Leon, was next arrested with all his subordinates. They were all shot. On the same day Venancio and Benigno Lopez, brothers of President Lopez, and Captain Hermosa, Venancio's aide-de-camp, arrived in irons from Asuncion. Hermosa was at once shot.

For several days prisoners from Asuncion kept arriving by steamer. Amongst these were Carreras, Rodriguez, Telmo Lopez, Pereira, and all the Argentines and Orientales in Asun-

cion. All shot. Laguna, Garay, Costa, and Lucero, also shot. Sinforoso Caceres also shot. Two Correntinos made their escape.

Whilst this lasted it was indeed a reign of terror in Paraguay. Men feared to speak even to their most intimate friends. Several parties took refuge in Mr. Washburn's (the American minister's) house, but the rude soldiery rushed into the rooms and dragged the unfortunates out, heedless of the consequences. Mr. Washburn, as a matter of course, protested against the outrage, and notes have been interchanged.

There is no positive evidence that Berges has been shot. He has been arrested and removed from office. Gumeciundo Benitez, the editor of the *Semanario*, was named his successor, as minister of foreign affairs; but Benitez has been arrested since, and will be tried for treason. This same officer declares that Lopez, having reason to believe that the bishop and some of the clergy were implicated in the conspiracy, a guard was placed on the bishop's residence, and three clergymen arrested; some of them, he states, were put to the torture. His description of the executions is, indeed, too horrible to relate. The first batch numbered nearly 50, amongst whom were General Bragues, Colonel Nunez, Majors Mesla and Haedo, and Captain Rojas, all the first and best people in Paraguay. The family of Rojas is one of the oldest, and was the richest in the country, and we deplore the fate of this talented young man.

These wholesale executions lasted for eight or ten days, the ruffian soldiery vying with each other in heaping insults on these unfortunates. But their hour is fast approaching, and blessed be the hand that shatters at a blow the accursed and savage despotism of a rabble and shoeless soldiery.

We throw down the affidavit of this prisoner of war, too shocked to continue such a chapter of horrors. Further details would be repugnant to our readers. Whatever sympathy the heroism of the Paraguayans may have secured from an impartial public, the awful butchery which surrounds the impotent throes of their tottering ruler calls for execration. Common humanity shudders at the picture which this officer discloses. It may be that such terrible episodes are necessary to uproot the power which Francia planted; but the lesson should not be lost sight of, and the allies should push on at once to finish the chapter.

* * * * *

I cannot close this despatch without adding, that I have received every assurance of good feeling towards my government, and I know it to be the desire and purpose of the President elect to cultivate the most friendly and intimate commercial relations between the two governments, in which I will most heartily co-operate.

With great respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
H. G. WORTHINGTON.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Worthington to Mr. Seward.

No. 3.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Buenos Ayres, September 12, 1868.

SIR: The unexpected departure of a mail from this port to-morrow affords me an opportunity of communicating to the department the correspondence and circumstances attending my presentation and reception as minister resident of the United States to the Argentine Republic. On the 31st of August I addressed to Señor Rufino de Elizalde, minister of foreign affairs, a letter informing him of my arrival, and requesting the appointment of a time for my presentation to the President of the Argentine Republic, a copy of which said letter is hereto annexed, marked A. On the evening of the same day I received a reply to the same, a copy of which, together with a translation of the same, is hereto annexed, both of which are marked B. As I informed you in my despatch No. 2, dated the 11th instant, my presentation was deferred, in consequence of my sickness, by mutual verbal understanding until the 11th instant, at which time I was waited upon by Señor Delfin B. Huergo, sub-secretary of state, in company with an aide-de-camp of the President in

the government carriage, which the President very kindly put at my disposition, and conducted, in company with Mr. Hollister, United States consul, whom I invited to be present at the ceremony, to the governor's mansion, where was provided a band of music and the usual military display, which is part of a custom of the country attending this ceremony.

On reaching the governor's mansion I was most courteously received and taken charge of by Señor Rufino de Elizalde, by whom I was presented to his excellency the President, to whom I addressed the remarks hereto annexed, marked C, a copy of which I had previously transmitted to the minister of foreign affairs. I was received by the President, both in my official as well as in my personal character, with every manifestation of regard and good will, as indicated in his reply to my address, which is hereto attached, with a translation of the same, marked D. The President was surrounded by his entire cabinet, in the uniform of their highest military rank, as well as by a large concourse of citizens who had assembled to witness the ceremony.

After the exchange of remarks between the President and myself, which was followed by a short personal conversation, I was presented to the several members of his cabinet, from all of whom I received expressions of admiration for our government, and their great desire to see cultivated more intimately, if possible, the good relations between the two governments. These ceremonies being concluded I returned, accompanied by the same escort, to my hotel, after which I made the usual visits to the various officers of the government and members of the diplomatic corps resident here.

All the circumstances attending this ceremony afford the most gratifying assurance of the happy relation existing between the two governments, and I feel confident that I will encounter no difficulty in preserving this good correspondence.

Nothing of any consequence has developed itself since my last despatch, except the speculation indulged in by the press as to who will succeed Señor Sarmiento as minister to the United States. There seems to be considerable unanimity in the belief that this distinction will be accorded to President Mitre, a gentleman of fine martial bearing, and, I learn, of fine cultivation and ability, and, withal, having a high appreciation of the superior excellence and advantage of our system of government and its institutions.

I have the honor to be very truly yours,

H. G. WORTHINGTON.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

A.

Mr. Worthington to H. E. Rufino de Elizalde.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Buenos Ayres, August 31, 1868.

I have the honor to communicate my arrival here as the minister of the United States to reside near this government, and herewith transmit a copy of a letter from the President of the United States accrediting me as such, and respectfully request the appointment of a time and place at which I may be admitted to present personally a sealed letter of credence addressed by my government to his excellency the President

of the Argentine Republic. I also have the honor to enclose herein the remarks which I shall address to the President of the Argentine Republic in behalf of my government at said presentation.

With great consideration, permit me to subscribe myself, very truly and respectfully yours,

HENRY G. WORTHINGTON.

His Excellency RUFINO DE ELIZALDE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

B.

His Excellency Rufino de Elizalde to General H. G. Worthington.

[Translation.]

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Buenos Ayres, August 31, 1868.

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your despatch of this date, by which you please to inform me of your arrival, and to enclose a copy of the letter of his Excellency the President of the United States, which credits you in the character of minister resident to this government.

The President, to whom I have delivered the enclosed copy of the speech you propose to address on presenting the credentials, has fixed the 2d instant, at 1 o'clock p. m., in order to receive your excellency with that purpose in the government house.

It is with pleasure that I avail myself of this occasion to offer Mr. Worthington the assurance of my highest consideration.

RUFINO DE ELIZALDE.

His Excellency General HENRY G. WORTHINGTON,
Minister Resident of the United States of America.

C.

MR. PRESIDENT: In presenting myself near your government as the minister of the United States, I am especially charged by the President of my government to communicate to you the great satisfaction with which he regards the harmony and the good understanding which has existed and which has been so successfully maintained between the two governments. He therefore has authorized me to express, in behalf of the Great Republic of the North to her sisters of the South, the best wishes of my government for the development of your resources, for the prosperity of your people, and for the stability of our systems of government, which so eminently testifies the excellence of republican institutions.

In commencing, Mr. President, my official relations with the Argentine Republic, I am inspired with a confidence that those relations which have been so pleasantly maintained by my distinguished predecessors, and which I shall be so careful to preserve during my residence in your country, will conduce to the benefit of both governments by a preservation of the happy correspondence, and I assure your excellency that both, in my personal efforts, as in my official relation, nothing shall be left undone to contribute to that result.

And now I have the honor of presenting a letter from the President of the United States to your excellency, accrediting me as minister to reside near this government.

D.

[Translation.]

SIR: I am pleased with receiving the letter which credits you as minister resident of the United States of America to the government of the Argentine Republic; and I acknowledge the fraternal wishes you express in her name for our prosperity and aggrandizement.

The analogy of our respective institutions and the common interests of both countries will powerfully contribute, sir, as the result of your mission, to render even stronger, if it be possible, the bonds of perfect friendship which happily link them, testifying at the same time the excellency of the republican principles they both profess.

The people and government of the Argentine Republic do not forget what they are indebted for to the Great Republic in the recognition of their independence, and bearing in mind the high examples given them by her on the trace they follow, I greet in their name, through your distinguished person, the people and government of the United States, praying for their happiness.

Mr. Worthington to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

No. 4.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Buenos Ayres, Argentine Republic, October 13, 1868.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt, on the 3d of this month, of despatch No. 2, dated August 19, 1868, enclosing copy of despatch No. 233, dated August 17, 1868, addressed to James Watson Webb, esquire, United States minister to Rio de Janeiro. It is a source of congratulation that this question has reached a solution by the passage of the Wasp, as ordered by the government, and her return to this place on the 20th of September, with Charles H. Washburn, United States minister to Paraguay, and his family on board. Mr. Washburn having informed me that he had transmitted elaborate despatches by this steamer, I am relieved of the duty or necessity of writing much about the condition of affairs in Paraguay, or the movements of the allied armies. It is well to observe, however, that no important progress is being made, the situation being the same as mentioned in my despatch No. 2. Yesterday, Mr. Sarmiento was duly and formally inaugurated President, and Dr. Alfonsa Alsina, vice-president of the Argentine Republic. The ceremonies were impressive and orderly, nothing of an insubordinate or revolutionary tendency developing itself. The inaugural address of the President was well received. The diplomatic corps was fully represented, and after the ceremonies were over we called on the new President in a body and offered our congratulations. The cabinet or ministry is composed of able and, said to be, just men, and is as follows: Minister of the interior, Señor Delamacio Velez Sarsfield; minister of foreign affairs, Señor Mariano Varela; minister of agriculture and public instruction, Señor Nicholay Avellanda; minister of finance, Señor Ben-

jamine Gorostiago; minister of war, Senor D. Martin Gainza, all of whom share largely the feelings of the President toward our government and people.

A magnificent demonstration was spontaneously accorded ex-President General Mitre, by the citizens of this city, on the occasion of the retirement from his high position; and it is at least suggestive of some improvement, that after the expiration of his constitutional term of office he handed over to his successor the government intact, the treasury comparatively full, and, though engaged in a war, the people enjoying a prosperity they never before realized; and in whatever position General Mitre may be called, I feel confident our government will always find in him a reliable friend. The question of the seat of the national government is again exciting much interest. Before the last session of the national congress adjourned they located it at Rosario, but it did not receive the sanction of President Mitre. In my judgment there is no reasonable probability there will be any change for some years to come.

* * * * *

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

H. G. WORTHINGTON.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

BRAZIL.

Mr. Webb to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

No. 57.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Petropolis, Monday, January 27, 1868.

SIR:

* * * * *

This country is greatly agitated in consequence of the continuance of the fruitless war against Paraguay, and I have, therefore, to-day addressed a note to the minister of foreign affairs, a copy of which you will find enclosed, marked A.

* * * * *

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Petropolis, January 27, 1868.

X The undersigned, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from the United States, has the honor to inform his excellency Joao Lustoza da Cunha Paranaguá, counsellor to his Imperial Majesty the Emperor, minister and secretary of state for foreign affairs, that he is in receipt of a despatch from the Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, in relation to the war still pending between Brazil and her allies, against the republic of Paraguay, which declares that "the continuance of the war on the La Plata is a subject of deep concern in the United States."

In conformity with instructions to that effect, the undersigned again

tenders to the belligerents the good offices of his government, and renews the proposals for mediation which he had the honor to submit on a previous occasion. And he is instructed to add, that while renewing the proposals therefore submitted by the government of the United States in the interest of peace, the United States is neither tenacious of its own views nor jealous of the good offices of others. It belongs to the belligerent sovereign powers, not only to choose the terms of peace, but the forms which should be adopted to secure it.

The undersigned is exceedingly desirous of avoiding everything which might, by possibility, be construed into a desire on the part of his government to intervene in the affairs of the different governments on the American continent. But the people of the United States have declared, through their representatives in Congress, that the pending war in the La Plata "is destructive of commerce and injurious and prejudicial to republican institutions," and the government of the United States, in obedience to instructions from Congress, renewed in February last, in the most formal manner, the tender of its good offices. When those good offices were declined the undersigned was directed to "express to the imperial government the regret of the President and people of the United States, that the allies do not find it compatible with their rights and interests to avail themselves of the good offices of the United States, which were conceived in a spirit of entire respect and friendship for the several belligerents, and an earnest desire for the restoration of peace throughout the American continent." And Mr. Seward added :

Not at all wedded to their own proposition, which has thus been disallowed, the United States will yet indulge a hope that the wisdom of the belligerent states will be competent to devise means, within a reasonable period, which may enable them to *afford to their people the advantages and benefits of peace*. Such measures being devised, any good offices that may be at any time required of the United States will be cheerfully rendered.

Another year of war has elapsed without apparently bringing the contest any nearer to a termination, and again the undersigned is instructed to tender the good offices of his government, and to inform Brazil "that the continuance of the war on the La Plata is the subject of deep concern in the United States."

The undersigned perceives with great regret the injurious effects of the pending war upon the labor, the commerce, the finances, and the general resources of the Brazilian empire, and he would be neglectful of his duty if he did not keep the government of Washington advised of these matters, and of the tone of public sentiment in regard to the war, at the same time that he fully exonerates Brazil from all responsibility in its occurrence, and most earnestly sympathizes with her in its continued protraction and most disastrous consequences. Deeply impressed with the expediency, if not the necessity, of an early termination of the war to Brazil, the undersigned experiences great satisfaction in renewing to Brazil the offer of the good offices of the government of the United States and the personal services of the undersigned, whenever they "may be at any time required," to bring to a successful issue any "measures devised" in the interest of peace, and calculated to benefit the people of the belligerents to this most disastrous war on the La Plata. The dangers to all parties from a continuance of the struggle are palpable, while the very serious consequences to the finances, commerce, labor, and future prosperity of Brazil are no longer matters of conjecture, but monstrous evils, absolutely present and brought home to the daily experience of all. That Brazil is, and has been, right from the beginning, no candid and intelligent man can for a moment doubt. But whether right or wrong, the tax of this war upon the labor of Brazil, which is her one great *want*, cannot fail to check her prosperity for

years to come; while its exhaustive strain upon her finances and future resources demands its termination at the earliest day compatible with the honor of the empire.

There are other considerations in favor of an early termination of the war, obvious to your excellency and the statesmen of Brazil, but to which it would be unbecoming to the undersigned to refer. It is manifest, however, that the people and the governments of the great commercial nations of the world are getting restive at the too probable continuance of a state of things in this region which promises no results. And while the government of the United States disclaims the remotest intentions of any, the slightest, interference with the purposes and actions of the belligerents, it may not shrink from conveying to Brazil the voice of its people, proclaimed through their Congress, that "the continuance of this war is a subject of deep concern," and that it is absolutely "destructive to commerce, and injurious and prejudicial to republican institutions."

The undersigned is happy to avail himself of this occasion to renew to your excellency the expression of his great personal esteem and most distinguished consideration.

J. WATSON WEBB.

His Excellency JOAO LUSTOZA DA CUNHA PARANAGUÁ,
Councillor to his Imperial Majesty, Minister and Secretary
of State for War, acting as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Webb to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

No. 58.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Petropolis, February 6, 1868.

SIR: General Asboth, the United States minister resident at Buenos Ayres, died on the 21st January.

* * * * *

I sent to the Presidents of the Argentine and Uruguayan Republics copies of my communication to the government of Brazil, renewing the tender of good offices. You will find a copy of my letter enclosed, marked B.

* * * * *

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Webb to Mr. Hollister.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN BRAZIL,
Petropolis, February 1, 1868.

SIR: In consequence of the impossibility of the late General Asboth's having received instructions from Washington, which left here on the day of his death, it has become my duty to renew to the Argentine and Uruguayan Republics the tender of the good offices of the United States,

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in connection with the war in the river Plate, which were rejected last year. You will oblige me, therefore, on the receipt of this, by delivering in person the letter addressed to the President of the Argentine Republic, and by mailing for Montevideo the one addressed to the President of Uruguay.

* * * * *

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. WATSON WEBB.

MADISON E. HOLLISTER, Esq.,

Consul of the United States, Buenos Ayres.

Mr. Webb to the President of the Argentine Republic.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN BRAZIL,
Pretropolis, February 1, 1868.

The undersigned, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from the United States, accredited to his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, has just been apprised of the death of the minister resident of the United States accredited to the Argentine Republic. This melancholy event leaves the United States without any representative near your excellency, invested with the necessary diplomatic powers, to convey to the Presidents of the Argentine and Uruguayan Republics a renewal of the tender of good offices made by the United States, in 1867, for the termination of the pending war between the allies and the republic of Paraguay. And in consequence it becomes the duty of the undersigned to transmit to your excellency a copy of a communication made by him to the government of Brazil on the 27th ultimo.

If the late minister to the Argentine Republic had been alive when the mail from Washington, of the 25th of December, 1867, reached Buenos Ayres, beyond all doubt, he would have conveyed to your excellency a similar communication. But Providence having interposed to prevent such a proceeding, it devolves upon the undersigned to convey to your excellency the earnest desire of the people of the United States to see peace restored on the La Plata, and the tender of the good offices of their government, to aid in bringing to a close the pending war between the allies and Paraguay.

The undersigned therefore, in transmitting to your excellency a copy of his communication to the government of Brazil, has the honor to request that you will be pleased to consider it addressed also to the government of the Argentine Republic. And the undersigned is most happy to avail himself of the opportunity thus presented of conveying to your excellency the expression of his personal esteem and most distinguished consideration.

J. WATSON WEBB.

His Excellency the PRESIDENT *of the Argentine Republic.*

N. B.—I addressed a precisely similar note to the President of Uruguay.

* * * * *

WEBB.

Mr. Webb to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

No. 60.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Petropolis, February 24, 1868.

SIR:

Great excitement, attended with very great exasperation against the government, exists among all classes in Rio de Janeiro, in consequence of its neglect to accept of the renewed tender of our good offices. I studiously conceded the fact of our having renewed the offer previously rejected; but they deemed it expedient to proclaim through their official journal that such renewed tender of "good offices" had been made, and the subject referred to the consideration of their allies. In the mean time they promised the public an immediate triumph of their arms.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Webb to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

No. 61.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Petropolis, March 9, 1868.

SIR: I am happy to announce that the allied army and navy have achieved a great triumph over the dictator of Paraguay, and that in all probability the war in the river Plata is rapidly drawing to a close. Six of the iron-clads belonging to Brazil passed the fortress of Humaita on the 19th of February, and at the same time a combined attack was made by the army, which resulted in a complete victory over the enemy and the capture of all the strongholds except Humaita, together with an enormous amount of munitions of war.

A revolution has broken out in the republic of Uruguay, and General Flores, the dictator, who had just abdicated in order that a President might be elected by the people, was assassinated in the streets by the leaders of the Blanco party. The outrage was followed by the slaying of one hundred and eighty of the Blancos; and thereupon order was restored in the city of Montevideo, where the Blancos are in a minority. In the country, however, they are in a large majority; and it would be idle to predict the final termination of this proceeding. The success of the allies against Lopez will go far towards restoring order in Uruguay. That success was most timely. Had it been delayed another three weeks at farthest, both Uruguay and the Argentine Republics would have withdrawn from the alliance with Brazil.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

[From the Buenos Ayres Standard, February 25, 1868.]

GREAT NAVAL VICTORY—THE BATTLE OF HUMAITA.

The cannon of the Brazilian iron-clads, as they forced the passage of Humaita, has re-echoed over this continent, and will reverberate through Europe. No event of equal importance has occurred in this part of the world during the present generation; and, to the high honor of the Brazilian flag, it must be said that the naval victory achieved is every way worthy to rank with Aboukir or Trafalgar.

Brazil may well be proud of her victory, for not only will it give her the complete command of the Paraguayan river, and crumble the greatest bulwark of Paraguayan strength, but it has given a birthday to her naval power which posterity will revere.

Party feeling and political rancor may seek to strip this great naval victory of its magnitude, and attribute the success less to the bravery of the Brazilian sailor than to the worn-out and exhausted condition of the enemy; but we have it on the best of authority that the guns of the fortress were fired with the most incessant rapidity, and that such was the terrific effect of this awful discharge of heavy artillery that the earth shook at Itapiru, a distance of seven or eight miles from Humaita, and the river dashed in billows on its banks. This proves that the guns of Humaita were well manned, and that notwithstanding the immense delays the enemy was well prepared to dispute the pass. Experienced American and English and French naval officers, who had seen Humaita, inspected the position and gone through the batteries, all unanimously agreed on its extreme strength. For three years the greatest squadron ever known in these waters has ridden at bay below range of the guns; the difficult navigation of the river, the constant bends in the channel, all tended to convince a doubting and possibly jealous public that Humaita would never be passed by a Brazilian fleet. But Brazil has at last vindicated her honor and established a naval reputation before which the rest of South America must bow.

The passage of Humaita is equally a triumph of science, and we commend it to the attention of our naval men at home, that three Brazilian iron-clads, all built in England, survived for 42 minutes the combined fire of 180 guns, and this for at least half the time within pistol shot range. We have nothing previous in naval history to equal this; on the contrary, naval men, since the memorable battle of Lissa, lost faith in these iron-clads; but we hold that the battle of Humaita establishes forever their supremacy, and Europe may take a lesson from the engagement. No fight in North America, no engagement in the open seas, can be compared with this memorable battle. The ships had to double the projecting headlands to make the canal, when they at once came within range of a raking fire from the London battery. They had to push on under this fire and hug the very shore where the finest artillery in South America were splendidly mounted to riddle them; up almost to the very mouths of the guns they had to steer, all the while enfiladed by 140-pounders from the opposite bank. Doubling again a slight bend in the canal, they came where the chains lay in the river, and the chain batteries facing on the left bank. Iron plates have, indeed, asserted their supremacy, when, for the space of 42 minutes, three monitors could live under such a fire. And let us take nothing from the bravery of the officers and men who dared almost certain death to carry their flag triumphant in such an hour. No, the Brazilian commander has proved the bravest of the brave, and he and his men merit the highest recompense their country can afford.

The fortress of Humaita is not of yesterday's formation. If it took three years to humble, it took ten times that to erect. The earnings of a whole nation—the wealth of a country, aided by the best engineering talents Europe could afford, have all been brought into subserviency to render Humaita impregnable. None who have ever seen the place have questioned its strength. Old President Lopez had such implicit faith in its impregnability that he believed if even Xerxes attacked Paraguay he could not pass Humaita. The same implicit confidence in its strength was inculcated in the minds of the Paraguayan people. Their watch-word was "Humaita!" and possibly to the exaggerated idea of its strength by the present Lopez may be traced the grave political errors which, step by step, led this unfortunate man from the cautious policy of his father to become the great champion of river Plate equilibrium.

Brazil, by this victory, has flung open the navigation of Paraguay to the world. Shall we question the importance of this engagement when such are the results? It may be that the hardy Paraguayans will still cling round the banner of their unconquered leader; it may be that on the hill-tops in their native country they will light watch-fires, and dispute inch by inch their native soil with the invader.

Already this extraordinary people have given proofs of courage and patriotism which wrings, even from their enemies, admiration and respect. But, in the interest of humanity, we now appeal for peace. The chief and great object of the war is at last at hand. Humaita, and not Lopez, was the real stumbling-block in the way; the stupidity of South American politicians tolerated its erection; the blood of thousands has at last washed away its battlements.

The victory, in a political and in a moral light, is complete; and if this war has cost millions of treasure and torrents of blood, we trust that its results to the river Plate and Brazil will be commensurate.

GREAT VICTORY OF THE ALLIES—STORMING OF FORT "ESTABLECIMIENTO."

At dawn on the morning of the 19th the whole allied line advanced and simulated an attack on the enemy's lines at Tuyuti, Tuyucue, and even facing Tayi. The outposts of the Paraguayans returned the fire, but for some time the divisions did not come up. A little after day-break an immense rocket, seen all along the lines, shot into the heavens, the signal that the monitors had passed the Humaita fortress, and heavy guns from the north proved that the iron-clads were shelling Humaita from the north, while the rest of the squadron kept booming from their old position.

Suddenly the shrill Brazilian trumpets were heard to echo in the woods, and a picked force, the finest the Brazilian army could boast of, about 16,000 or 17,000 strong, emerged from the encampment, headed by Marshal Caxias. The men marched in close column, and, when approaching the trenches, came under a tremendous fire; but the Brazilian legions pushed on, nothing daunted, and never halted until they came upon the bristling bayonets of the heroic garrison. The Paraguayans fought with their wonted heroism, but nothing could withstand the charge of the Brazilians; they leaped the ditches, and in an instant poured in on all sides on the strongest fort outside of Humaita.

As might be expected, the carnage was terrific, for before the serried columns of the Brazilians got to the trenches fully 500 men lay stretched on the plain. The Paraguayan officer in command, a young man named

Gill, finding it impossible to hold out, drew off his men in good order, and got into Humaita; but the place is even more important than Curupaiti; it is the key to Humaita. The guns were not spiked, and are now in the hands of the Brazilians. The position is, however, very exposed for the allies, and difficult for Caxias to retain over 24 hours, unless Humaita falls. The adjoining fort, Laureles, it was thought, would surrender, being cut off from Humaita by the allies.

FURTHER PARTICULARS.

ITAPIRU, *February 21, 1868.*

Fighting still going on at all points. Tremendous cannonade in the river. No more iron-clads gone up. Humaita holds out, and this place full of all sorts of rumors. It is asserted that Lopez is in Humaita, and that Barrios and Resquin are there also.

[Per steamer Parana.]

STILL LATER.

CORRIENTES, *February 23—6 a. m.*

Fighting still going on. Two iron-clads gone up to bombard Asuncion, and were attacked by several chatas from the Chaco side.

One of the Brazilian commanders and a pilot blown to pieces in passing Humaita.

Paraguayans still working trenches. Lopez has electric light in the Chaco.

THE WAR IN THE NORTH—ATTACK ON HUMAITA—OFFICIAL
DESPATCH.

FUERTE ESTABLECIMIENTO, *February 19.*

To His Excellency BARON DE HERVAL:

I have the extreme pleasure of informing your excellency that at 5 a. m. this morning I commanded an attack, with part of the troops which had been brought up from Tuyucue, against a fort of the enemy's called Establecimiento, which is a little beyond Laureles, and a place of the greatest importance to Lopez for maintaining communications and facilitating the supply of cattle.

The fort was surrounded by two deep ditches and formidable earth-works, on which were placed at convenient points 15 light field-pieces. The garrison was about 1,600 strong.

Against this formidable battery our men advanced openly, and the bravery of the attack well merited the success with which it was eventually crowned. After a stubborn resistance the garrison were overpowered, and retreated disorderly across the adjacent bogs, pursued by our victorious battalions.

The enemy's loss is from 500 to 600 killed, and leaving in our possession, besides the 15 mounted guns mentioned above, a large quantity of arms and ammunition held in reserve. On our side there were about 600 *hors de combat*, including killed and wounded.

Your excellency will please not fail to forward at once as many carts

as you can secure, even at the expense of commercial interests. These measures are of the utmost importance, so that the wounded and prisoners should not remain long exposed here.

This evening I purpose sending to San Solano the two brigades which suffered most in the attack, the remainder staying to occupy the position.

I purpose leaving immediately for Tuyi, to confer with the Captain del Mar y Guerra, Delfin Carlos de Carvalho, whom, as I have just been informed by Field-Marshal Victorino, forced the passage of Humaita at daybreak to-day with the monitors and iron-clads. My object in conferring with the gallant admiral is to plan our subsequent movements, following up our present successes.

Congratulating your excellency on these glorious events, I have the honor to remain,

CAXIAS.

FURTHER PARTICULARS.

CORRIENTES, *February 20.*

As I announced in my last, the attack on Humaita was inevitable. Time, the great test of all things, has proved the truth of my assertion. The great and long-expected attack on Humaita has taken place. The invincible stronghold of tyranny and the bulwark of the only little corner in free America where haughty oppression ruled has been overcome by the Brazilian iron-clads.

A division of the imperial navy, consisting of three iron-clads under the command of Carvalho, at half-past three yesterday morning forced the passage of Humaita. At the same time the wooden fleet kept up a steady fire on the land batteries at Curupaita and at Piris and Paso Pucú.

The army, from 2 o'clock in the morning, stood ready to attack along the entire line from Tayi to Tuyuti. At 3 a. m. a feint attack was made, and then the squadron commenced to force the pass, which took 42 minutes to effect. The iron-clads suffered very little. The moment Caxias knew of the fleet having passed he ordered the whole line to fall back.

The Brazilians having taken two important fortresses to the north of Humaita, Lopez is cut off from the Gran Chaco; it is impossible, therefore, that Humaita can hold out much longer.

The monitors can run up the Tebicuari, and thus facilitate the crossing of the allied army, in order to attack Lopez's reserved force stationed behind that river. In a few months it is possible, therefore, the war will be over.

Marshal Caxias deserves the highest praise for his tactics, which have led to such an important success.

On the morning of the 17th an ugly fight took place between Paraguayan and Argentine forces; the latter lost 80 men and a commander, and the enemy lost about the same.

E. P.

THE WAR IN THE NORTH.

GRAN CHACO, *February 18.*

GENTLEMEN: On the 13th I left Itapiru in one of Mr. Lanuz's steam transports, loaded with commissariat stores, bound to Curuzu. The recent heavy cannonade heard in that direction impelled me to the undertaking. In due time we arrived at La Guardia Cerrito, where a short stay was made in order to land cargo. Here were four Brazilian gun-

boats, a bomb vessel, five pontoons, six sea-going sailing vessels, (mostly Dutch,) seven transport steamers, besides a number of river craft. Here is also an arsenal well supplied with all the paraphernalia necessary to promote the rapid progress of civilization, and the swift onward march of intellect. Guns, mortars, large piles of cannon balls and shells, explosive shot of every description, iron, timber, and heaps of coals, containing many thousands of tons, and an extensive machine shop; in fine, the Portsmouth of the naval forces stationed in Paraguayan waters. Also may be seen a neat, decent chapel, hotels, billiard tables, not forgetting a photograph concern, a hundred or more stores of sutlers, who have been driven out of their shanties by the freshet, and have taken refuge upon a strip of high ground near at hand, which is overrun with snakes, lizards, rats, toads, spiders, scorpions, ants, and every other species of horrible vermin near at hand. Judging from the numbers of empty brandy casks, the smashed demijohns, and bottles seen in all parts, the consumption of alcoholic drinks must be very large, particularly of Hamburg gin, English ale, or "vin ordinaire." The place is under strict military rule.

Proceeding on the voyage we pass a gunboat anchored at the entrance to the Laguna Piris. Shortly after we passed the Brazilian transport Donna Francisco, which has lately been sunk in consequence of having come in collision with an iron-clad. The transport has since been got afloat, and is now moored to a clump of willow trees upon the coast of an island in company with a gunboat.

Six leagues distance from La Guardia Cerrito we reach the fleet of gunboats at anchor in the stream, abreast of the abandoned works of Curuzu, and go alongside of the commodore's ship for orders. Here were eight gunboats, two bomb-ketches, four sea-going vessels, a floating battery, seven pontoons, and a few river craft.

Opposite the fleet, upon the Chaco side, is the entrance to the Arroyo (Anglice "dirty creek," and a very objectionable place to remain at, even for a short time,) which we enter; it is scarcely twenty yards wide at its mouth, and has the same breadth for five miles, which was as far as we navigated. It inclines to the westward, following a serpentine course. The current is scarcely perceptible; the water is very black, has an offensive smell, brackish, and highly insalubrious. Infamous as are the bogs and fens of the Estero Bellaco, yet there it is a paradise in comparison. At the mouth of the arroyo, upon the left bank, is the starting point of the railroad which goes close to the brink of the creek, following all its sinuosities. For a distance of three miles from the starting place, there is not a trace visible of the railway, other than pieces of floating timber; all else appertaining to the road is deeply submerged, the land on all sides, far and near, covered with stagnant water, a perfect hotbed of pestilence, abounding with tormenting insects. At a league's distance from the main stream the ground is higher, where the rails are in places discernible. Here are numerous abandoned ranchos, (the huts that served the Brazilian soldiers as quarters,) and earthworks partly under water, the garrison of which has been ejected by the *creciente*, and have taken a new position upon higher ground further inland, where they are fortifying themselves again and building new huts with all possible expedition. We perceived two shining bright brass guns in the abandoned works, the water reaching up to their muzzles, a sad proof of the deficiency of mother wit. However, the new works are amply supplied with efficient artillery; still it would be well to remember the fate of the Whitworth gun, that since its capture has caused much mischief to the allies.

From where the railway becomes visible it leaves the creek, taking a northerly course; hence to where the iron-clads are the distance is two miles; in places the ground is miry, the rails sunk in the mud; of course, as a means of transportation the railway is of no avail.

In the meantime the necessities requisite for the beleaguered iron-clads have to be carried upon the backs of mules, or in tumble-down carts, which are continually sticking fast in the pantanos. I must not omit to mention that the sleepers of the track are of hard Brazil wood, a foot broad, of a suitable thickness, and are placed a vara asunder, to which the rails are permanently fixed; a telegraphic line accompanies the track. The Brazilians have explored the arroyo 40 leagues inland, and found it to be navigable thus far, flowing through a well-timbered country, inhabited by a few families of filthy Guaycuru Indians, whose sole shelter from the inclemency of the weather is the branches of trees, being too lazy to build huts; as for planting, they never do it, living upon carpinchos, ostrich eggs, and wild honey. Like all other barbarians, they are exceedingly fond of strong drinks and tobacco.

Upon the right bank of the arroyo, at a mile's distance from its mouth, and a little ways in the interior, are seen the vestiges of the ancient "Mission" of San Fernando, where the Jesuit Dobrizhoffer labored 20 years, and here composed a Latin history of the Alipone Indians, a work which long since has been translated into every European language; quoted by Southey, Sir Woodbine Parish, Commodore Page, and others. Late in the evening of the 13th, the three monitors passed Curupaíta; as soon as perceived, the battery opened a furious cannonade; the only damage done by it was striking the hindmost monitor twice, doing no injury whatever, while the gunboats sent a very storm of shot and shell at the enemy's works, probably without causing much effect. On the 16th one of the Newcome monitors, under the command of Señor Ioquim, passed the obstruction at Humaita, and returned in triumph. Yesterday there was a report of an encounter at Tuyu-Cué; that Pipo, the comandante of the foreign legion, and 100 of his men, had been killed. We do not vouch for the truth of the statement; still, there was much firing in that quarter at the time, and subsequently the distant vessels were seen with colors at half-mast.

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GRAN CHACO, *February 20.*

GENTLEMEN: Yesterday, at 3 a. m., the long-contemplated move to force the passage of Humaita was made, when an unheard-of cannonade commenced, which was truly awful; the heavy artillery of the iron-clads and monitors were fired in rapid succession, while the guns of the fortress were quickly plied. This continued till 10 a. m. without a moment's pause; the reports came faster than one could count; those of the enemy made the loudest sound, as the mouths of their guns were pointed in the direction of the Chaco, while those of the Brazilians were directed in an opposite way. Both parties made a lavish use of shells, explosive shot, and Congreve rockets. A dense cloud of white smoke covered the horizon as the firing was going on. As for the results of the infernal din, all that can be said with certainty is that three iron-clads and three monitors have passed the obstruction and are above Humaita, where they are annoying the enemy from the north, while those that remain below are not inactive. On board of the gunboats there is a grand display of bunting, music, and much glee; nothing is known positively of the affair other than the iron-clads and monitors were maltreated some-

what in the passage, and the fortress badly mauled; it could not be otherwise, as the cannonade was kept up at close quarters.

It is now 12 m.; firing of heavy artillery has been going on at intervals since early dawn. It is the prevalent belief that Humaita will soon surrender. It is out of the question to forward any details at the present moment that may be relied upon. All is wild excitement and bustle. The weather is awfully hot, particularly so for the past few days.

Truly yours,

SINBAD.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Webb.

No. 226.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 23, 1868.

SIR: Your despatch of the 27th of January last, No. 57, has been received.

Your proceeding in renewing the tender of the good offices of the government of the United States to the government of Brazil, with a view to the restoration of the peace on the Parana, is approved and commended.

To guard, however, against possible misapprehension, I think it proper to say that the President is not to be understood as adopting or sanctioning that portion of the communication which you have made to the Brazilian minister and secretary of foreign affairs, in which you remark that you fully exonerate Brazil from all responsibility in the occurrence of the war. This government has at no time thought it necessary or expedient to assume to pronounce on the merits of that unhappy and protracted controversy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

JAMES WATSON WEBB, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Webb.

No. 227.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 23, 1868.

SIR: Your despatch of the 6th of February, No. 58, has been received. It contains our first official or reliable information of the lamented death of the late Major General Asboth, United States minister resident at Buenos Ayres; accredited also in the same capacity to the government of the Oriental Republic. As the deceased had been a gallant and effective soldier at home, so he was an enlightened and indefatigable representative of the country abroad. His death is deplored by the President, and will awaken profound sorrow throughout the United States.

The letter which you addressed to Madison E. Hollister, United States consul at Buenos Ayres, on the occasion of the minister's death, is approved; as also are the letters which you addressed to the President of the Oriental Republic, renewing the tender of the good offices of the United States for the establishment of peace among the nations upon the banks of the Parana.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

JAMES WATSON WEBB, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

Mr. Webb to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

No. 65.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Rio de Janeiro, April 25, 1868.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose the official replies of "the allies" to my renewal of our tender of our "good offices." Circumstances beyond my control render it impossible to furnish translations by this steamer, and therefore I forward the original.

"The allies" assume that the war in the river Plata is virtually at an end. The future call upon them for men and money will be the best commentary upon the accuracy of this assumption.

João Silveira de Souza has been appointed minister of foreign affairs, *vice* Albuquerque deceased.

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Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Senhor Ellauri to Mr. Webb.

[Translation.]

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Montevideo, March, 1868.

MR. MINISTER: The Oriental government had the honor to receive, in due time, your communication, dated the 1st of February last, addressed to the President of the republic, and containing a copy of your note to the minister of foreign affairs for the empire of Brazil, renewing, by order of your government, your good offices for the settlement of the war now carried on by the allied countries against Paraguay, hoping, by an amicable intervention of the United States, to come to a solution that may prove satisfactory to the belligerents.

Recent lamentable events that have occurred in this city, now known to the world, deeply disturbed the government internally, and prevented a more prompt reply to your important communication; but now that the country is restored to its constitutional order, the President thinks this a propitious moment to answer your note, and instructs the undersigned to do so in the following manner:

Some time ago the worthy minister of the United States, in the name of his government, sent to the minister of the republic a communication similar to the one you have just sent, expressing a sincere wish to settle the question now debated between the allied countries and Paraguay in a just and honorable manner.

At that time the provisional government regretted to be obliged, for reasons communicated to your government through its minister, to reject the mediations so freely and sincerely offered.

We are sorry to say, Mr. Minister, that the same reasons still exist for refusing the pacific proposition of your government, and therefore the President, through the undersigned, respectfully informs you that it is impossible to take the note of the United States government into consideration, in such a manner as to receive the proposed result, because the same reasons given to your government by our minister for not accepting the proposal still exist. All we can say in this communication is to

request you to thank your government, in the name of this republic, for the new proof of friendship and interest for the well-being of this country which has just been received from the North American government.

Moreover, Mr. Minister, the latest news from the seat of war, announcing that the Brazilian squadron had passed the battery of Humaita, gives good cause to expect a speedy conclusion of the war.

Having thus replied to your communication, by order of his excellency the President, the undersigned has the honor to present you the assurance of his very high and distinguished consideration.

JOSÉ E. ELLAURI.

His Excellency J. WATSON WEBB,
Envoy Extraordinary, &c., from the United States to Brazil.

Senhor Elizalde to Mr. Webb.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Buenos Ayres, March 24, 1868.

SIR: I had the honor to receive your note of the 1st of February last, making known to his excellency the President the renewal of the proffer of good offices made by the government of the United States of America, to put an end to the war pending between the Argentine Republic, the empire of Brazil, and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, and the government of Paraguay.

In thanking you for that communication, made because your government was without diplomatic representation here, owing to the death of the minister resident accredited to the Argentine government, I have the pleasure to inform you that the allies were consulted in regard to the answer to the friendly offers of the government of the United States, and this was done for want of diplomatic representation, which obliged you to transmit the documents that came to hand in due time.

I am pleased to have this occasion to repeat to you the assurances of my high and distinguished consideration and esteem.

RUFINO DE ELIZALDE.

His Excellency Hon. J. WATSON WEBB,
Minister Plenipotentiary, &c., of the United States to Brazil.

Senhor Paranagua to Mr. Webb.

[Translation.]

RIO DE JANEIRO, DEPARTMENT FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS,
April 8, 1868.

The undersigned, of the council of his Majesty the Emperor, minister and secretary of state for affairs of war, and *ad interim* of foreign affairs, has before him the note which, under date of 27th January last, General James Watson Webb, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America, was pleased to address to him, renewing the offer of good offices of the government of the United States for the termination of the war with Paraguay, and the proposals for mediation, which, with this object, were presented in a note of 21st January, of the year last past.

As I declared to General Webb when I acknowledged the reception of his note of the 27th, I had to hear from the allies of the empire before giving a definitive answer.

This obligation of loyalty discharged, I now have the honor to state

to the general, after thanking him in the name of the imperial government for this fresh proof received of the friendly feelings of the people and government of the United States toward Brazil, that the same reasons continuing which were already explained in the note from this department of the 26th of April of last year, which would prevent the government of Brazil and her allies from accepting, at that time, the first proposition of the United States; and, beyond that, the close of the war approaching, as was to be hoped from the important fact of the passage of Humaita, and the events which have followed, the same government cannot at this day act differently. Thus, therefore, the imperial government thanks, but feels that it cannot accept the generous proffer which is made to it, and trusts that the United States will acknowledge that she is justified in her action.

The undersigned avails of the occasion to offer to General Webb the reiterated assurances of his highest consideration.

JOAO LUSTOSA DE CUNHA PARANAGUA.

General JAMES WATSON WEBB.

Mr. Webb to Mr. Seaward.

[Extract.]

No. 68.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Rio de Janeiro, July, 1868.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a communication from Rear-Admiral Charles H. Davis, commanding the United States South Atlantic squadron, in which he advises me that the United States steamer Wasp, sent by him to Asuncion to bring from there our minister, Mr. Charles A. Washburn, and family, and thereby remove them from this "embarrassing and possibly dangerous situation," has been prevented passing the lines of the allies by the Marquis de Caxias, the Brazilian commander of the allied forces.

You will perceive, from the correspondence accompanying Admiral Davis's communication, that the United States steamer Wasp arrived at Curupaity, the headquarters of the allies, on the 25th of April, and remained there until the 11th of June, *forty-seven days*, when her commander was compelled to return to Montevideo, without accomplishing the object of his visit, in consequence of the persevering refusal of the Marquis de Caxias to permit the steamer Wasp to pass up to Asuncion, although he was very willing to send a Brazilian iron-clad up the river under a flag of truce and the protection of the stars and stripes, to spy out the state of affairs in Paraguay. Nay, he was quite willing that on the return of the iron-clad she should, similarly protected, pass Humaita and land Mr. Washburn and family *below* that fortress, which iron-clad, it is said, cannot repass that stronghold!

The admiral's report of what has occurred on the Paraguay was placed in my hands on the 1st day of July, and on the 2d at 2 p. m. my private secretary and clerk of this legation placed in the hands of the minister of foreign affairs the official note of which enclosure B is a copy.

I assume that your opinions, as expressed in despatches 170, 171, 174, and 180, and the instructions therein in regard to Mr. Washburn's detention in going to his mission—there being no other mode of reaching it than by the Paraguay river—are equally binding upon me in regard to

his *return*, when at your request a national vessel has been sent for him in the well-grounded conviction that "the settlement of this annoying question" in 1866 was a finality. The offence at that time perpetrated against the "sovereignty and honor of the United States" might be palliated on the plea of ignorance, but not so now; and consequently its repetition by the Marquis de Caxias, and the circumstances under which it has taken place, are doubly offensive, and doubtless are intended so to be. Such, at all events, is public opinion here; and as the fact of the *Wasp's* return was officially known to this government, and communicated to the press eight days before the admiral received his despatches from the river, and as up to this time it has not leaked out that I have moved in the matter, the triumph of Brazil is considered complete.

You will perceive by my note to the minister of foreign affairs that I assume the Marquis de Caxias has acted without authority, and that his conduct will be apologized for and disapproved; and thereupon I demand his *censure* in the language you used in instructing me to make a similar demand in reference to the conduct of the President of Maranhão, and consequently I urge the immediate issue of instructions to permit one of our national vessels to proceed to Asunción without delay or hindrance from the allied forces at Curupaity.

* * * * *

I have recently asked for a furlough, and considering the state of my health and that of my family, there are those who, if I demanded my passports, would ascribe my doing so to my desire to return to the United States, even at the sacrifice of the peace of the country. To avoid this imputation, therefore, and at the same time be within reach of instructions from you, I shall, if compelled to demand my passports, repair to Buenos Ayres.

Besides the mail line of steamers to Brazil, England has two commercial or freight lines to Rio. One of these, from Buenos Ayres, will touch here about the 12th instant. By that time the intentions of this government will have been communicated to me, and I shall of course write to our legation in London, the necessary telegram to be transmitted to you by the Atlantic cable.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State.

Mr. Webb to Senhor Silveira de Souza:

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
San Domingo, July 1, 1868.

The undersigned, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from the United States, begs leave to inform his Excellency, João Silveira de Souza, councillor to his Imperial Majesty the Emperor, minister and secretary of state for foreign affairs, that he has this day received a communication from Rear-Admiral Charles H. Davis, commanding the United States South Atlantic squadron, informing him that the United States steamer *Wasp*, sent by him to Asunción for the purpose of bringing from that city the United States minister, Charles A. Washburn, and family, has been prevented by the commander of the allied forces from going to Asunción, as her commanding officer was ordered to do, in the per-

formance of a duty to which he was assigned, by command of Admiral Davis, in obedience to instructions from the Secretary of the Navy, based upon an application from the Hon. William H. Seward, the Secretary of State of the United States, and in consequence of such grave denial of the rights of the United States, the commander of the steamer Wasp, after making repeated applications to pass the lines of the allies engaged in a war against the government of Paraguay, has returned to Montevideo, and reported to the commanding officer of the United States South Atlantic squadron that he has been prevented from executing the duty upon which he was detached, by the peremptory refusal of the commander-in-chief of the allied forces, the Marquis de Caxias, to permit him to pass his lines on the Paraguay.

This very extraordinary and most unjustifiable proceeding on the part of Marquis de Caxias, "commander-in-chief of all the Brazilian forces, and in the interim of the allied armies," as he signs himself, is in open defiance of the rights of the United States, and in view of what transpired between the undersigned and the government of his imperial majesty in August, 1866, an outrage against "the sovereignty and honor of the United States," which calls for prompt and severe censure of the offender.

When, in 1861, the President of Maranhão outraged the feelings of a friendly nation, by admitting the pirate Sumter within his port, and furnished her with the necessary coals and provisions wherewith to continue her depredations upon the unarmed and unprotected commerce of the United States, and when the then minister of foreign affairs justified that act of the President of Maranhão, the Secretary of State of the United States said "the proceedings of the President of Maranhão, and the approval of his conduct by the minister of foreign affairs, is intolerable," and the undersigned was directed to "ask that such measures shall be taken in regard to the case as will make the President of Maranhão sensible of his majesty's displeasure."

The proceedings of the Marquis de Caxias against the "sovereignty and honor of the United States," is far more offensive than was the conduct of the President of Maranhão, because he well knew that in 1866 the United States had formally advised Brazil that she would permit no such violation of her sovereign rights, and that Brazil had thereupon reconsidered and reversed her offensive action. He has therefore acted with full knowledge that he was grossly offending the sovereignty and honor of the United States, and setting at defiance its remonstrances and the recognition of those remonstrances by Brazil.

Rear-Admiral Davis, in his official note to the undersigned, says: "Acting under instructions from the Secretary of the Navy, I recently sent the United States steamer Wasp, of my squadron, to the seat of war, for the purpose of taking Mr. Washburn and family out of Paraguay, in compliance with a request from the Secretary of State to relieve Mr. Washburn from his embarrassing and probably dangerous situation." This humane purpose on the part of the government of Washington has, your excellency well knows, been thwarted by the representative of Brazil on the Paraguay, he well knowing at the time that he was outraging the "sovereignty and honor of the United States," and setting at defiance the explicit understanding at which the United States and Brazil had arrived in 1866.

The undersigned therefore feels it his duty to ask such censure of the Marquis de Caxias as, in the name of his government, he demanded, when the President of Maranhão offensively placed the piratical vessel of parties in rebellion against the United States on a footing of equality

with the national ships of the friendly nation against which they were in rebellion.

That Brazil will promptly and most emphatically repudiate the extraordinary and very unfriendly conduct of the Marquis de Caxias the undersigned does not for a moment doubt, and as his indefensible interference has already caused a delay of at least four months in relieving the United States minister and his family from what his government consider an "embarrassing" and possibly "dangerous situation," the undersigned earnestly entreats that the government of Brazil will, without any unnecessary delay, issue instructions that all hindrance to the United States steamer Wasp passing through the lines of the allies be withdrawn, and promptly advise the undersigned that such hindrance has altogether ceased, in order that he may inform the commanding officer of the United States South Atlantic squadron that there will be no further interference by any representative of Brazil with the performance of his duty to humanity and to his government.

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to his excellency the assurance of his respect and high consideration.

J. WATSON WEBB.

His Excellency JOÃO SILVEIRA DE SOUZA,
*Councillor to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor,
 Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

Admiral Davis to Mr. Webb.

UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP GUERRIERE, (1st rate),
Rio de Janeiro, July 1, 1868.

DEAR SIR: Acting under instructions from the Secretary of the Navy, I recently sent the United States steamer Wasp of my squadron to the seat of war for the purpose of taking Mr. Washburn out of Paraguay, in compliance with a request from the Secretary of State to relieve Mr. Washburn from his embarrassing and probably dangerous situation. The commander-in-chief, Marquis de Caxias, declines to allow the Wasp to go up the Paraguay, and while he professes a desire to facilitate Mr. Washburn's departure, he proposes such methods of accomplishing it as are regarded by Mr. Washburn either as impracticable or illusory. It would be very gratifying to me, as a means of carrying out the wishes of the department, and very acceptable to Mr. Washburn, whose desire to leave Paraguay shows itself plainly in his letters, if you would procure an order from the government here to the commander-in-chief to allow the Wasp to go up the Paraguay to a convenient point of embarkation.

President Lopez offers no obstacles to Mr. Washburn's departure, but, on the contrary, promises to aid it.

The enclosed copies of a correspondence with Mr. Washburn and the Marquis de Caxias will make you acquainted with the relations of the parties, and will save my writing a long letter.

Very respectfully and truly, your friend and obedient servant,
 C. H. DAVIS,

Rear-Admiral, Commanding South Atlantic Squadron.

His Excellency J. WATSON WEBB,
*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
 of the United States in Brazil, Boa Viagem.*

Mr. Washburn to Commander Kirkland.

HEADQUARTERS PARAGUAY ARMY,
San Fernando, May 14, 1868.

SIR: Your two letters of April 26 were received by me in Asuncion on the 7th instant. In your official note you advise me of the arrival of the Wasp, under your command, at Curupaiti, and that you are in readiness to take me, my family, and effects on board, and convey me to such point on the Rio de la Plata as I may prefer. You are probably aware that all land communication between this point and Curupaiti is very difficult, and that it would be impossible or nearly so for my wife, child, and servants to reach the latter place except by way of the river. You are also aware that for military reasons the Paraguay steamers do not go so far down the river. In order therefore that my family may be put on board the Wasp it is necessary that it should come higher up the river. I have therefore come down to this place to consult with his excellency Marshal Lopez, and ascertain if the military situation were such that the Wasp could without risk or difficulty come up the river to near this place. His excellency advises me that there will be no objection made on the part of Paraguay, and that the steamer can come without inconvenience to such point below the mouth of the Tebicuary as may be signaled on her arrival. At such point the transfer of all persons and effects from a Paraguay vessel may be easily made.

His excellency not only interposes no objections to the coming up of the Wasp, but with great kindness and courtesy he has offered me letters to the commanders of the two fortified places on the river between here and Curupaiti, in which he has given orders that on your arrival at those places you will be allowed to pass without molestation. These letters I enclose to you herewith to be delivered by you accordingly as they are addressed. His excellency President Lopez has also offered kindly to provide a pilot for the steamer from Humaita to and above Timba, should it be found necessary. I think therefore you will have no difficulty in coming up to near this place.

With your letter of the 26th April I also received one, dated April 4, from Mr. Hollister, United States consul in Buenos Ayres. In this he advises me that a few days before he had delivered to the honorable Mr. Borges, Brazilian minister in Buenos Ayres, a package of correspondence, including despatches from Washington, from Admiral Davis, and from Minister Webb, besides private letters, and that he had promised to forward them with a letter to the Marquis de Caxias, requesting him to pass them through the military lines. The consul also advised me that he had been presented with a bill against me for some provisions that had been sent some months before, and that he would notify you of the fact, that you might look for them and take them on board if you found them, and bring them up the river to me. But neither the despatches nor the provisions have ever reached me, and you make no mention of having looked for them in your letters. It is very important that I receive everything intended for me before the Wasp returns, and I trust you will try and find all that may have been sent, and bring it with you.

I return immediately to Asuncion to have everything ready on being notified of your arrival near this place. There being constant telegraphic communication between here and the capital, you will probably be detained but a short time before all would be ready for your departure. The point on the river where you will probably come to anchor is off a

place called Tacuaras, where there is a guard-house and some soldiers stationed. It is but a short distance below the Tebicuary.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES A. WASHBURN.

Commander WILLIAM A. KIRKLAND,

Commanding U. S. Steamer Wasp, off Curupaiti.

Mr. Washburn to Lieutenant Commander Kirkland.

HEADQUARTERS PARAGUAY ARMY,

San Fernando, May 15, 1868.

SIR: Since writing my letter of yesterday President Lopez has given me some further information in regard to the navigation of the river above Humaita. His officers, at all points, will be advised beforehand of your coming, and when a little below Humaita you can communicate with the comandante, and deliver to him the order of President Lopez, and he will furnish you with a pilot to take you above Humaita, when you can put him ashore and move on towards Timba. As you approach you will do well to bear a little to the left, though keeping a good distance from the shore. Here you can communicate with the officer in command as at Humaita, and there pass on until you get near the mouth of the Bemajo. At this point it will be necessary to make a particular signal that the guard there may know that it is not an enemy, and that it is the same they have been advised of beforehand, and been ordered not to molest. The signals that the guards will be instructed to look for will be as follows: Astern the American flag as usual, at the fore the Paraguay flag, and an American flag at each of the other two masts; thus having up three American and one Paraguay flags. Another precaution, that probably will not be necessary, will be, in case there should be any signs after passing the Bemajo that the orders given by President Lopez have not been fully understood, to dip the two forward flags, the Paraguayan and the one at the mizzenmast. It is not apprehended, however, that this will be necessary, as orders will be sent to all points describing the steamer and giving the signals. But no special signals from the steamer until you get near the mouth of the Bemajo will be required.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES A. WASHBURN.

Commander WILLIAM A. KIRKLAND,

Commanding U. S. Steamer Wasp, off Curupaiti.

Lieutenant Commander Kirkland to the Marquis de Caxias.

UNITED STATES STEAMER WASP,

Curupaiti, May 22, 1868.

SIR: I have this day received a communication from his excellency Charles A. Washburn, minister resident of the United States at Asuncion, Paraguay, in which he says as follows:

You are probably aware that all land communication between San Fernando (the headquarters of the army of Paraguay) and Curupaiti is very difficult, and that it would be impossible, or nearly so, for my wife, child, and servants, to reach the latter place, except

by way of the river. You are also aware that, for military reasons, the Paraguay steamers do not go so far down the river. In order, therefore, that my family may be put on board the Wasp, it is necessary that it should come higher up the river, and his excellency Marshal Lopez advises me that there will be no objection on the part of Paraguay, and that the steamer can come to such point below the mouth of the Tebicuary as may be signalized on her arrival; at such point the transfer from a Paraguayan vessel may be easily made.

Under the above specified circumstances, therefore, I have the honor to request that your excellency will allow the United States steamer Wasp to pass through the allied fleet anchored below and above Humaita, in order that the said vessel may proceed to Tucuará, below the mouth of the river Tebicuary, for the purpose of embarking his excellency Mr. Washburn, with his family and private effects.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. A. KIRKLAND,

Lieut. Com. U. S. N., Comd'g U. S. S. Wasp.

His Excellency Marquis DE CAXIAS,

Marshal and Commander-in-chief of the Allied Army

in operation against the Government of Paraguay.

The Marquis de Caxias to Lieutenant Commander Kirkland.

[Office of commander-in-chief of all the Brazilian forces, and for the time being of the allied armies operating against the government of Paraguay.]

HEADQUARTERS IN PERA-CUÉ,

Before Humaita, May 23, 1868.

ILLUSTRIOUS SIR: I acknowledge the receipt of the note dated the 22d instant, directed to me by Lieutenant Commander W. A. Kirkland, of the United States steamer Wasp, which reached me yesterday at 7 o'clock p. m.

Lieutenant W. A. Kirkland asks my permission for the steamer under his command to pass the Brazilian squadron, the division lying below Humaita, and that which forced its passage above, and to continue on up as far as Tucuará, below the mouth of the river Tebicuary, in order to receive on board Mr. Washburn with his family and baggage. Commander William A. Kirkland bases his request on the reasons given him by the above-mentioned Minister Washburn, which may be reduced to the following:

1st. The great difficulty which exists at present in the land communication between San Fernando (the headquarters of the army of Paraguay) and Curupaiti, which renders it impossible, or almost so, for his excellency, his family and servants, to arrive at the last-named place, except by water transportation.

2d. That since for military reasons the Paraguayan steamers do not descend the river so far, Minister Washburn infers that in order for himself and family to leave Paraguay, it is necessary that the United States steamer should go to some point below the mouth of the Tebicuary, signalling its arrival there; that Marshal Lopez advises him that there would be no opposition to all this on the part of Paraguay; and that, finally, at the point above mentioned, it would be easy to transfer to the North American steamer Minister Washburn and family, servants, and baggage, arriving there in a Paraguay vessel.

In reply, I will commence by expressing to Lieutenant Commander W. A. Kirkland the great regret I feel at not being able to comply with his request, in which I am governed by considerations of the first importance and of manifest propriety.

Those military reasons of which his excellency Minister Washburn speaks as preventing the Paraguayan steamer from coming so far down the river, and which indeed hardly admit that they should go to the point indicated below the mouth of the river Tebicuary, are the same that govern me and place me in the disagreeable position of not being able to accede to the wishes of his excellency Minister Washburn and of Lieutenant Commander W. A. Kirkland.

Operations and movements of war which shortly have to be carried into effect near the place indicated as the destination of the North American steamer render it less suitable and convenient for the proposed object of the worthy commander, whom on this occasion I ought to inform that a few days since a Paraguayan steamer, the Pirabete, I judge, in despite of these military reasons, arrived at Pilar, where she was seen and watched, and where she fired several cannon shots on shore.

What I have here briefly stated to Lieutenant Commander Kirkland does not mean that I intend to obstruct, in the least, the departure of his excellency Minister Washburn and his family from Paraguay.

If I cannot accede to the means proposed, I will point out another method which will produce the same result, uniting all the advantages prescribed by the laws of nations and of war for the observance of belligerents and neutrals. Let his excellency Mr. Washburn embark his family, servants, and baggage, as soon as may be convenient to him, in a Paraguayan steamer, which, with a flag of truce, can come down the river as far as Pilar or as Tagy. His excellency will find at either of these points all the vehicles of transportation which may be necessary to carry his family and baggage by land as far as Curupaiti, for which I will give immediate orders, satisfied that his excellency Minister Washburn will make a comfortable journey until he embarks on board the steamer Wasp at Curupaiti.

You herein see, Lieutenant Commander Kirkland, the good will and earnest desire that prompt me to aid his excellency Mr. Washburn in leaving Paraguay and in going wherever he wishes.

The reply of Lieutenant Commander Kirkland will guide me in taking the measures and the orders that may be necessary.

I cannot omit improving this opportunity of tendering to Lieutenant Commander W. A. Kirkland the assurances of my high consideration and perfect esteem.

M. DE CAXIAS.

Lieutenant Commander W. A. KIRKLAND,
Commanding North American steamer Wasp.

Lieutenant Commander Kirkland to Mr. Washburn.

UNITED STATES STEAMER WASP,
Curupaiti, May 23, 1868.

SIR: Your communications of the 14th and 15th instant were received by me on the 21st instant. On the 22d I wrote to the Marquis de Caxias, and asked permission to pass through his fleet, in order to reach Tacuara, below the mouth of the river Tebicuary, for the purpose of embarking yourself, family, &c. On the 23d, (this afternoon,) I received his answer, which was partly as follows:

"In reply, I must express to Lieutenant Commander William A. Kirkland the great regret I feel in not being able to comply with his request, being forced to this by considerations of great importance, and moreover it would be very improper to do so. The military reasons given by Mr.

Washburn why the Paraguay vessels could not descend so low, and why they might not be permitted to go to a certain point below the mouth of the Tebicuary, are agreed to by me, and put me in the unpleasant position of being obliged to deny the request of Minister Washburn and Lieutenant Commander William A. Kirkland, whom I must now inform that, a few days ago, a Paraguayan vessel, (the Pirabete, I think,) contrary to all supposition, came down as far as Pilar, where it was seen and watched, and whence several cannon shots were fired towards the shore."

The Marquis then goes on to say, if Mr. Washburn will embark in a Paraguayan steamer and come down the river to Pilar or Tagry, with a flag of truce flying, that he will meet at either of these two points all the vehicles which may be necessary to transport his family and baggage to Curupaity by land; and he concludes his letter by assuring me that he will give the necessary orders, and that you shall be well provided for. He even goes so far as to say that he is convinced you will have a comfortable voyage until, in Curupaity, you embark on board the Wasp.

The admiral is in Rio, and has sent me no orders. Therefore, if you wish to, and can come, it will be advisable to accept M. de Caxias's offer, otherwise a very long delay may occur. Let me know at once whether I shall expect you. Your letters, I understand, were returned to Mr. Hollister, at Buenos Ayres. Your other articles I have heard nothing about; but it must be all right, as you have the bill.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. A. KIRKLAND,

Lieutenant Commander U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Wasp.

His Excellency CHARLES A. WASHBURN,

Minister Resident of the United States at Asuncion, Paraguay.

Lieutenant Commander Kirkland to the Marquis de Caxias.

UNITED STATES STEAMER WASP,
Curupaity, May 24, 1868.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 23d instant, in which you state that you cannot satisfy the request made in my communication to you of the 22d instant, which was to the effect that the United States steamer Wasp should be permitted by you to pass through the allied fleet, and as far up the Paraguay river as a point called Tacuara, below the mouth of the Tebicuary river, for the purpose of receiving on board the United States minister resident at Asuncion, his excellency Charles A. Washburn, with his family, servants, and baggage.

Your excellency, as I understand it, proposes that the American minister, Mr. Washburn, should come to Pilar or to Tagry in a Paraguayan steamer, with a flag of truce, and that at one of these points to be agreed upon, your excellency will cause to be provided such transportation as under the circumstances may be fitting and necessary to bring himself, family, and baggage to Curupaity by land. As the mission here of this vessel is to embark the American minister, your refusal to permit the United States steamer Wasp to pass through the allied fleet and up to Tacuara for that purpose, leave me only one course to pursue. I shall, therefore, inform his excellency Mr. Washburn of your answer and your courteous offer, and shall await his reply.

In conclusion I have to request that you will cause to be forwarded at an

early moment the accompanying letter to his excellency Mr. Washburn at Asuncion.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. A. KIRKLAND,

Lieutenant Commander U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Wasp.

His Excellency the Marquis DE CAXIAS,

Commander-in-Chief of all the Brazilian forces,

and, in the interim, of the allied army in operations

against the government of Paraguay.

Marquis de Caxias to Lieut. Commander W. A. Kirkland, U. S. N.

[Office of the commander-in-chief of all the Brazilian forces, and for the time being of the allied armies in operation against the government of Paraguay.]

HEADQUARTERS IN PERA-CUÉ,

Before Humaita, May 25, 1868.

S. Sa. Lieut. W. A. KIRKLAND,

Commander of the North American Steamer Wasp:

I have to acknowledge the receipt of the note dated the 24th instant, sent me by Lieutenant Commander W. A. Kirkland, commander of the North American steamer Wasp.

In reply, I communicate to you, to-day, that, as you will perceive by the accompanying copy of a report made to me by the Baron of Passage, commander of the advanced division of the Brazilian squadron, the note directed to Mr. Washburn, American minister at Asuncion, was delivered to-day to a Paraguayan officer appointed to receive it, at the enemy's fort in front of Timbo.

As soon as a reply comes to hand, I shall hasten to transmit it to Lieutenant Commander W. A. Kirkland, to whom I reiterate the assurance of my consideration and esteem.

M. DE. CAXIAS.

Baron of Passage to Marquis de Caxias.

[Translation.]

TAMANDARE, (iron-clad,)

Off the Island of Guayacaru, May 25, 1868.

ILLMO. EXMO. SR. In execution of your excellency's order of yesterday, enclosing a letter from Commander Kirkland, commanding the North American gunboat Wasp, to the American minister, residing in Asuncion, which order reached this division at 4.30 p. m., I set out immediately in the monitor Para, but arriving at night at the camp in front of the island Guayacaru, I returned in the monitor, and this morning I went in the Tamandare to the enemy's fort fronting Timbo, near which I delivered the letter in question to a Paraguayan officer who came in a boat to receive it.

God keep your excellency.

BARON OF PASSAGE,

Commander of Advanced Division.

His Excellency MARQUIS DE CAXIAS,

Commander-in-Chief, &c., &c.

Mr. Washburn to Lieutenant Commander Kirkland.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Asuncion, June 3, 1868.

SIR: Your interesting letter, bearing date of the 23d instant, has been received. In it you advise me that you had asked permission of the Marquis De Caxias to pass through the allied squadron, which request had not been acceded to, but that he had promised that if myself and family would go down the river in a Paraguay steamer as far as Pilar or Tagy, he would provide all the vehicles necessary to transport us to Curupaiti. In answer to this proposition of his excellency, the marquis, I have only this to say, that the state of Mrs. Washburn's health is such that it is quite out of the question for her to think of making the proposed journey by land. Besides this, I consider that the Marquis de Caxias has no right whatever to prevent the passage of the Wasp above the squadron. I had supposed that all questions of that sort were settled by the case of the Shamokin. It is true that the Brazilian government on that occasion said it would protest, but when our government was informed of this, the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, wrote to our minister at Rio, Mr. Webb, that he "would not even consent to argue the question." Since the passage of the Shamokin, the French, English, and Italian gunboats have all been allowed to pass above the squadron, and, so far as I know, without any protest or other objection being made. By what authority of law or justice do they deny to the United States rights and immunities that are freely granted to other nations?

The proposition of the marquis, that if we are so disposed we may go by land, is similar to that which was made to me by the Paraguayan government in the case of the Brazilian minister Senor Vianna de Lima, after the taking of the Marquis de Olinda and the suspension of his diplomatic relations. When I interfered in his behalf, I was told he could go by land. But I rejected the proposition as absurd, and my conduct in that matter was highly approved by the Brazilian government and press, while that of Paraguay was universally condemned by both. Does the Marquis de Caxias expect me to accept terms for myself and family that I would not accept for a Brazilian minister? Will you please call his attention to this, if you have the opportunity?

You inform me that the admiral is in Rio, and that he has sent you no orders. Probably he did not anticipate that the allies would renew their discourtesy and unlawful proceedings towards the United States after the lesson they received at the time of my coming to Paraguay. He could not suppose that after the question of right had been established, and the allies had repeatedly conceded it by allowing the war vessels of other nations to pass unquestioned, that the Marquis de Caxias would have the assurance to deny to the Wasp the same right. In my opinion your legal rights to pass were so clear and well established that you were under no obligations to ask his permission, but only as a matter of courtesy to notify him of your arrival, and that in fulfilment of your instructions you would find it necessary to pass above his squadron. Of course, not knowing what your instructions were from the admiral, I therefore am not competent to give a definite opinion. But if they were similar to those of Captain Crosby when he came up with the Shamokin, you would have been justified in taking that course. And if you had no instructions at all, it would have been the same, as since the passage of the Shamokin, the Brazilians have

repeatedly recognized the right of neutral gunboats to pass the blockade. Under all the circumstances, therefore, unless you have positive orders to the contrary, my opinion is that on receipt of this you should advise the Marquis de Caxias that, for the reasons I have given, his proposition that we should go by land from Pilar or Tagy to Curupaiti cannot be accepted, and that therefore you will be under the necessity to pass through the squadron. Should he reply that he will not permit it, but will stop you by force, I should nevertheless start, and if he fires across your bows, then I should come to and fall back below the squadron and wait further orders. But do not on any account leave the river, or go below Corrientes, till so ordered. After having vindicated our rights a year and a half ago so effectively, let us not abandon them and have the whole work to do over again. It is a national question, and your position is one of great responsibility; and the government, I am satisfied, will sustain you in a firm and determined course. So far as I may and can do it, I take all responsibility of the course which I have recommended. If, after all, you should fail to pass the blockade, will you please advise the admiral of our situation here: that the family of the United States minister resident in Asuncion are, by the act of the Marquis de Caxias, virtually detained as prisoners in Paraguay. I say *the family*, for of course, were I alone, I could go through the Chaco, or by any route through which there is military communication, and my departure would depend on emergencies or on instructions received from the State Department, as it must finally in any case.

You inform me that my correspondence referred to in my letter of the 14th ultimo has been returned to Consul Hollister. That is certainly a very strange proceeding, and looks like a trick so that I should not get it. You might, however, I would suppose, have sent us a few newspapers or clippings from newspapers, to inform us of what is transpiring in a world from which we have heard nothing for the last seven months. If, however, you do not come up, you will probably write me again very soon. In that case do try and send us some news. Very likely the despatches returned to Mr. Hollister will have come back by that time, with others additional. Also try and learn something of the provisions, and bring or send all and everything of mine that you can. Our necessities are very great.

Your obedient servant,

CHARLES A. WASHBURN.

Lient. Com. WILLIAM A. KIRKLAND,

Commanding United States Steamer Wasp.

Commander Kirkland to the Marquis de Caxias.

UNITED STATES STEAMER WASP,

Off Curupaiti, Paraguay River, June 8, 1868.

SIR: I yesterday received a communication from his excellency Charles A. Washburn, minister resident of the United States at Asuncion, Paraguay, extracts from which I herewith submit for your excellency's consideration.

His excellency Mr. Washburn writes as follows, viz:

In answer to the proposition of his excellency the Marquis de Caxias, to furnish all necessary transportation by land from Pilar or Tagri to Curupaiti, I have only to say that the state of Mrs. Washburn's health is such that it is quite out of the question for her to think of making the proposed journey by land. Besides this, I consider that the Marquis de

Caxias has no right whatever to prevent the passage of the Wasp above the squadron. Since the passage of the Shamokin, the French, English, and Italian gunboats have all been allowed to pass above the fleet. By what authority of law or justice do they deny to the United States rights and immunities that are granted to other nations? In the case of the Brazilian minister to Paraguay, Senhor Viena de Lima, after the taking of the Marquis de Olinda, when I interfered in his behalf, I was told he could go by land, but I rejected the proposition as absurd. Does the Marquis de Caxias expect me to accept terms for myself and family that I would not accept for a Brazilian minister? Since the passage of the Shamokin the Brazilians have repeatedly recognized the rights of neutral gunboats to pass the blockade, and if you should not be allowed to pass through the allied fleet, you will please advise the admiral of our situation here, that the family of the United States minister resident are, by the act of the Marquis de Caxias, virtually detained as prisoners in Paraguay.

Having thus brought to your excellency's notice the situation as set forth in Mr. Washburn's letter, I shall await for 24 hours, or longer if necessary, any communication which you may wish to direct to me in reply.

And assuring your excellency of the continuance of my high esteem, I remain your obedient servant,

W. A. KIRKLAND,

Lieut. Com'r U. S. Navy, Com'g U. S. Steamer Wasp.

His Excellency the MARQUIS DE CAXIAS,

Marshal and Commander-in-chief of all the Brazilian forces, and in the interim of the allied armies in operation against the government of Paraguay.

The Marquis de Caxias to Commander Kirkland.

[Translation.]

[Office of the commander-in-chief of all the Brazilian forces, and for the time being of all the allied armies in operation against the government of Paraguay.]

HEADQUARTERS PERA-CUÉ,

Before Humaita, June 8, 1868.

I have the honor to submit the following reply to the note of this date, addressed to me by Mr. William A. Kirkland, commanding the American gunboat Wasp.

I have read with due attention the letter of his excellency Mr. Washburn to Lieutenant Commander Kirkland, a copy of which was transmitted in the note to which this is a reply, and it gives me pain to perceive that Mr. Washburn declines to accept the plan which I had the honor to propose to him for conveying from Paraguay his family, his servants, and his effects, with every convenience and perfect security.

Lieutenant Commander Kirkland will oblige me if he will have the goodness to communicate to Mr. Washburn my regret that among the reasons assigned for his rejection of my proposition is the ill health of Mrs. Washburn, for whose recovery I sincerely pray.

With regard to the conclusions drawn by Mr. Washburn from the passage of the United States steamer Shamokin, and of the French, English, and Italian gunboats, it appears to me that they furnish no grounds for the opinion expressed by Mr. Washburn, that it is the intention of the allied powers to deny to the United States that which they have conceded to other neutral nations.

In order that Mr. Washburn may agree with me, it will be sufficient for his excellency to recall the prevailing circumstances at the period to which he refers, of the actual state of the operations of war, and also

the point to which these vessels were allowed to ascend, which was Curusir, beyond which they did not pass, and where they were always in sight of Brazilian men-of-war. Moreover, I did not then direct the operations of war.

The generous conduct of Mr. Washburn in behalf of the Brazilian Minister Viena de Lima, in Paraguay, and his kind interposition, based upon the clearest and most definite provisions of the laws of nations, cannot be adduced by his excellency as a motive by which I am to regulate my conduct at the present juncture, and in the distinguished position which I occupy as commander-in-chief of the allied armies and director of the war. His excellency must remember that the existing circumstances at that time were very different from the present.

The capture of the steamer Marquis de Olinda, and of her passengers and cargo, and the violence attempted against the Brazilian minister in Asuncion, without any previous declaration of war, show the unscrupulousness of the Paraguayan government in violating, in order to injure Brazil, all the laws and principles unanimously accepted by refined and civilized nations.

Mr. Washburn himself must admit, in his own mind, that the act of reciprocity on my part, which in recalling the past he appears to expect, would lose this character and assume the proportions of the most flagrant dereliction of the duties imposed upon me by my position.

Happily, the ground of my action in the proposition which I made to his excellency, through Lieutenant Kirkland, is independent of the judgment or will of any individual, and recommends itself to the impartial discrimination of all who examine it.

His excellency Mr. Washburn must be aware that the allied forces on shore and afloat occupy at present, and operate in, all the territory which extends from Paso da Patria to Tibicaury, conflicts actually occurring in all the intermediate space, and showing that the operations of war are in the greatest activity; it is but a few days since some of the iron-clad steamers of the advanced division ascended the river, and they ought to be now at Tibicaury, or past it, while at the same time a column of the army marched in the same direction. This proves undeniably all that I have before said, for it is a fact that they are in the territory of the belligerents, and not in that where Mr. Washburn is, who resides in the capital of one of the belligerents.

Were it not for the painful information which Mr. Washburn furnishes us of the unsatisfactory state of his wife's health, malevolence might attribute to his excellency intentions, which I take pleasure in being the first to deny the possibility of his excellency's entertaining.

My desire to fulfil the wish of Mr. Washburn to leave Paraguay with his family is so great and so sincere, and so far am I from concurring in the slightest degree in his excellency's remaining with his family and his servants in this situation, which his excellency calls that of prisoners in Paraguay, that I am going to offer him the only means which occurs to me which is in my power, and which, with my best judgment, I place at his disposal.

I will give orders that one of the Brazilian vessels of war above Humaita shall go up the river with a flag of truce, to receive his excellency, his family, his servants and effects, at the point on the river previously indicated by his excellency, and this steamer on its return shall disembark his excellency at the nearest possible point to Humaita, or pass that fortification with the consent of the government of Paraguay, so that his excellency may be able to move immediately from her to the United States gunboat Wasp.

Lieutenant Kirkland, to whom I renew the assurances of my esteem and consideration, will transmit this answer of mine to his excellency Mr. Washburn, with the well founded hope on my part that his excellency will accept the arrangement I propose to him.

M. DE CAXIAS.

Lieut. Com. W. A. KIRKLAND,
Commanding United States Steamer Wasp.

Commander Kirkland to the Marquis de Caxias.

UNITED STATES STEAMER WASP,
Curupaiti, June 9, 1868.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's note of June 8, in which you say that you still offer to Mr. Washburn the only means that are within your attributes, and which you place at his disposal with the greatest cordiality. The means are, as I understand it, these: That your excellency will send one of the Brazilian war steamers which have passed Humaita, with a flag of truce, to receive his excellency Mr. Washburn, and family, at that point of the Paraguay river which Mr. Washburn shall previously indicate to you, and that this steamer shall land Mr. Washburn either at the nearest point possible to Humaita, or that it may pass that fortification, with the necessary concurrence of the government of Paraguay, and that his excellency Mr. Washburn can then pass on board the United States gunboat Wasp.

Your excellency undoubtedly gives me credit for a knowledge which I do not possess, of that usage of warfare which permits one of the belligerents, by the use of a flag of truce, to pass by the fortifications and into the heart of the enemy's country without molestation. I know that the Paraguayan government would be guided by a very false sense of courtesy did it permit such an act by a Brazilian vessel of war.

His excellency Mr. Washburn, the United States minister, could not embark in a Brazilian vessel in the enemy's lines without being fired into, and perhaps attacked in other ways, which event would at once create a difficulty between his own government and that of Paraguay, and I must therefore decline any such proposition as the one which your excellency now wishes me to forward to the representative of the United States.

Your excellency makes an allusion to intentions which you say malevolence might well attribute to the United States minister to Paraguay, but your excellency does not explain those intentions. A conversation, however, sought by one of the members of your staff, leads me to believe that your excellency thinks that the family of President Lopez might seek protection under the American flag, and that to prevent such an occurrence you will not allow the United States steamer Wasp to pass through your fleet. The fact of virtually detaining as prisoners the United States minister and family in Paraguay, in order to prevent the suspected escape of the feminine and infantine portion of President Lopez's family, is so unreasonable that it savors strongly of extending the dangers and difficulties of war to women and children.

I have already pointed out to your excellency the reasons why I decline your proposition of the 8th instant, and I have only to add that my vessel was sent here to remove the United States minister and his

family, with the least delay. I am now no nearer the accomplishment of that end than on my arrival, owing to the unsatisfactory and temporizing nature of the correspondence which I have had to carry on. I shall, therefore, unless your excellency grants permission for the Wasp to pass the allied fleet, proceed to-morrow, the 10th instant, at 3 p. m., to lay before my government the actual state of affairs, in order that prompt and active measures may be taken for the removal of his excellency, the American minister, from Paraguay.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. A. KIRKLAND,

Lieut. Com'r U. S. Navy, Com'g U. S. Steamer Wasp.

His Excellency the MARQUIS DE CAXIAS,
*Marshal and Commander-in-chief of all the Brazilian
 forces, and in the interim of the allied armies in operation
 against the government of Paraguay.*

Commander Kirkland to the Marquis de Caxias.

UNITED STATES STEAMER WASP,
Curupaiti, June 10, 1868.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a communication for his excellency the United States minister to Paraguay, in which I have stated to him your excellency's proposition of the 8th instant, and also my reasons for declining such proposition.

I also forward to your excellency a box and a package for Mr. Washburn, from the United States, which I have not hitherto sent to him because I expected to receive him on board. As your excellency's action has thwarted such expectation, I have the honor to request that you will cause to be forwarded to his excellency Mr. Washburn, at Asuncion, the accompanying letter, box, and package.

And assuring your excellency of the continuance of my high esteem,
 I am, your obedient servant,

W. A. KIRKLAND,

Lieut. Com'r U. S. Navy, Com'g U. S. Steamer Wasp.

His Excellency the MARQUIS DE CAXIAS,
*Marshal and Commander-in-chief of all the Brazilian
 forces, and in the interim of the allied armies in operation
 against the government of Paraguay.*

Lieutenant Commander Kirkland to Mr. Washburn.

UNITED STATES STEAMER WASP,
Curupaiti, Paraguay River, June 10, 1868.

SIR: Your note of June 3 was received on the 7th instant. On the 8th I wrote to the Marquis de Caxias, giving him all your opinion, and calling his attention to the delicate state of Mrs. Washburn's health. On the 9th I received an answer, in which he says:

The report of the delicate health of Mr. Washburn's worthy spouse might arise from malevolent intentions, which I will not venture to attribute to his excellency.

As Mr. Washburn expresses the desire to quit Paraguay with his family, and complains that he is kept a prisoner there, I freely offer him the only means in my power to escape from his unpleasant situation.

I will order one of the Brazilian war vessels to pass Humaita with a flag of truce, and go up to receive Mr. Washburn, his servants and baggage and family, at any point he will indicate in Paraguay, and then return with them, passing Humaita, with the consent of the government of Paraguay, and place them on board the United States steamer Wasp.

To which I replied:

Your excellency undoubtedly gives me credit for a knowledge which I do not possess, of that usage of warfare which permits one of the belligerents by the use of a flag of truce to pass by the fortifications and into the heart of the enemy's country without molestation. I know that the Paraguayan government would be guided by a very false sense of courtesy did it permit such an act by a Brazilian vessel of war. His excellency Mr. Washburn, the United States minister, could not embark in a Brazilian vessel in the enemy's lines without being fired into, and perhaps attacked in other ways, which event would at once create a difficulty between his own government and that of Paraguay; and I must therefore decline any such proposition as the one which your excellency now wishes me to forward to the representative of the United States.

Your excellency makes an allusion to intentions, which you say malevolence might well attribute to the United States minister to Paraguay, but your excellency does not explain those intentions. A conversation, however, sought by one of the members of your staff, leads me to believe that your excellency thinks that the family of President Lopez might seek protection under the American flag, and that to prevent such an occurrence you will not allow the United States steamer Wasp to pass through your fleet. The fact of virtually detaining as prisoners the American minister and his family in Paraguay, in order to prevent the suspected escape of the feminine and infantine portions of President Lopez's family, is so unreasonable that it savors strongly of extending the dangers and difficulties of war to women and children.

The Marquis de Caxias wishes to temporize and gain time. Your suggestions about what I am to do cannot of course be attended to; I shall therefore leave this at 3 p. m. to-day, provided nothing happens to prevent; and if Caxias does not say "yes" to the passing up, I shall proceed as rapidly as possible to Buenos Ayres, where I hope to catch a steamer bound to Rio. It will give more force to the affair than if I remain quietly here, and the admiral can at once act up to the emergencies of the case.

I imagine Caxias cannot take Humaita, and therefore wishes to be removed from command for some other cause; and if our government takes up the matter, as it should, the allies will have to "eat dirt" very soon.

I know nothing of your correspondence, or of your provisions. I send to Caxias to forward to you a box of papers and books, and one package from Washington.

I should recommend adherence to your plan not to embark in a Brazilian vessel within Paraguayan lines, as I think this vessel will be sent back immediately, with orders to pass the allied fleet; and besides, they have no right to hoist a white flag inside of Lopez's lines for the purpose of traversing almost the half of his territory.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

W. A. KIRKLAND,

Lieut. Comdr. U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S. Wasp.

His Excellency C. A. WASHBURN,

Minister Resident of the United States at Asuncion, Paraguay.

Mr. Webb to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

No. 70.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Rio de Janeiro, July 22, 1868.

SIR: By the steamer to Marseilles on the 15th I wrote to the legation in London to telegraph to you that immediately after the sailing of the

English steamer to Southampton I received my response to my demand of the 1st, which you have. * * * * I enclose it with the translation used, tied together, and marked No. 1.

After the receipt of this despatch, I was waited upon by one of the under-secretaries of foreign affairs to talk over matters. Our interview, however, had no result, except that I told him plainly that the ministry had no alternative but to recede from their position and let the Wasp go up, quarrel with the United States, or resign.

* * * * *

SATURDAY, *July 25, 1868.*

I had another interview with Mr. Souza yesterday, in the hope that I might make sufficient impression upon this government to induce it to recede; but it is all in vain.

* * * * *

You will probably receive this on the 22d or 23d of August. The French mail steamer sails from Bordeaux on the 25th, and from Lisbon on the 28th of August, and of course a telegram, with information, instruction, &c., &c., put on board by our minister or consul, would reach me on the 16th of September. In like manner a telegram to our minister in London or Lisbon, to leave Southampton on the 9th or Lisbon on the 12th September, would reach me on the 2d October; while I could not receive a reply to this by our steamer until the 20th October, unless indeed it should arrive in time to send a response by the steamer of 22d August. * * * * *

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State.

Senhor de Souza to Mr. Webb.

[Translation.]

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CENTRAL SECTION, No. 4,
Rio de Janeiro, July 9, 1868.

The undersigned, counsellor to his Majesty the Emperor, minister and secretary of state for foreign affairs, has the honor of acknowledging the receipt of the note which, under date of the 1st instant, was addressed to him by General James Watson Webb, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary for the United States.

In that note General Webb communicates the following:

That he received, on the date above, an official despatch from Rear-Admiral Davis, commanding the United States squadron in the Southern Atlantic ocean, informing him that the American steamer Wasp, sent by him to Asuncion for the purpose of bringing away from there the Hon. Mr. Washburn, United States minister, and his family, had been prevented from ascending to that city, as her commander was ordered to do by the said rear-admiral, in compliance with instructions received from the Secretary of the Navy, at the request of the Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State for the United States; that, in consequence of such a grave disregard of the rights of the United States, the commander of the steamer referred to, after repeated requests for

permission to pass the war lines of the allies, returned to Montevideo, declaring to the commander of the American squadron that he had not been enabled to fulfil his mission, as the refusal he had received from the general commander-in-chief of the allied forces was peremptory; that such extraordinary and unjustifiable proceeding on the part of the general commander-in-chief of those forces, the Marquis of Caxias, is in direct opposition to the rights of the United States; and, in view of what was agreed upon in August, 1866, between General Webb and the Brazilian government, is an outrage upon the honor and sovereignty of those States which demands the prompt and severe censuring of the offender; that when, in 1861, the foreign minister for Brazil justified the conduct of the President of Maranhao in relation to the Sumter, the Secretary of State for the United States declared that that conduct and the approbation of it was intolerable; General Webb in consequence received orders to request that steps should be taken in reference to that occurrence by which the President of Maranhao should be made aware of his Majesty's displeasure; that the act of the Marquis of Caxias is very much more offensive to the honor and sovereignty of the United States than that of the president had been, because he knew perfectly well that in August, 1866, Brazil was formally advised that the United States would not allow such a violation of its sovereign rights, and that Brazil reconsidered and revoked the offensive act; therefore, that the Marquis of Caxias was fully conscious that he was gravely offending the honor and sovereignty of the United States by refusing.

General Webb, therefore, to conclude, requests that the Marquis of Caxias be promptly and peremptorily censured for his unfriendly and extraordinary proceedings; and as his unwarrantable interference in the matter has already occasioned a delay of at least four months in freeing the United States minister and his family from their embarrassing and probably dangerous position, he strenuously urges upon the Brazilian government that without any unnecessary delay orders may be issued for the removing of all hindrance to the passage of the United States vessel Wasp through the allied posts, and that General Webb be informed without demur also that those obstacles have ceased to exist, so that he may be enabled to communicate to the commander of the American Southern Atlantic squadron that he will not encounter, in the discharge of his duties to his country and to humanity, any further impediment from any of the Brazilian authorities.

In reply to General Webb's note, the undersigned has the honor of calling his special attention to the following: The Marquis of Caxias could not recognize Lieutenant Kirkland, a subaltern of the United States navy, in command of the Wasp, as a competent person to make a direct request for permission for that vessel to pass the war lines of their very legal and effective blockade of the Paraguay river, which he only did towards the end of May, and not four months ago, as by so doing the blockade would have been broken.

In refusing that permission the Marquis of Caxias did not ignore any right whatever of the United States, nor did he in any way wish to offend, as he did not, its honor or its sovereignty. On the contrary, he thereby maintained an unquestionable right of sovereignty on the part of the allies in the occupation of the waters and territories of that river, where they are at present.

To have broken through that blockade in the manner which was and is requested—that is, that the Wasp should pass through the war lines of the allies and their military positions into the heart of the enemy's territory which is blockaded, serious disarrangement in the operations

of the war, at the very moment too when important and perhaps decisive movements were impending, would have been, yes, the disregarding of a right of the belligerents which has never been questioned, would have diminished and weakened the sovereignty of a friendly power without the least justification, besides subjecting it and its allies to difficulties in the speedy termination of a war in which their honor is compromised.

It is further added that the refusal of the Marquis of Caxias was not peremptory, as General Webb supposes. The Marquis de Caxias's objections to the way in which Lieutenant Kirkland proposed to aid Minister Washburn to withdraw from Paraguay were accompanied by an exposition of the very weighty reasons he had for so doing, and at the same time offered him, with the greatest cordiality and deference, the choice of either of two means of arriving at the same result without producing any of the evil consequences which would result to the allies from the admission of the proposal made by him in the name of that minister.

Those reasonable means, which would have reconciled, in a most dignified and effective manner, the rights of the allies with the wishes of both Messrs. Washburn and Kirkland, were rejected by those gentlemen, who continue to insist in exacting a permission offensive to the sovereign rights of the said allies.

One of the least of the inconveniences which would happen through satisfying the request of Lieutenant Kirkland and Mr. Washburn would evidently be the nullification of the whole of the blockade established in Paraguay by the allies, who would be laying themselves open to the reception of similar exactions from any other nation which might, under any pretext, demand a like privilege for its ships.

So true is this, and so worthy of consideration in view of the consequences, on the part of friendly powers, that Admiral Godon himself, in 1866, when the passage of Mr. Washburn to Paraguay was in treaty, was the first to admit, merely begging in his request for the permitting of the passage up the river to Asuncion of the said Minister Washburn, that it should be done in any way which would harmonize with the dignity of the United States and have been most convenient to Brazil and its allies, further desiring that Mr. Washburn might be helped forward to his destination either by land or by water without placing any obstacle in his way.

This is just what the Marquis de Caxias desired to effect in the present instance, had he not been denied the option.

General Webb alludes in his note to orders received by Rear-Admiral Davis from the Secretary of the Navy, at the request of the Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State for the United States, for the purpose of assisting Mr. Washburn to withdraw from Paraguay.

The undersigned begs leave, however, to impress upon General Webb that the text of those orders cannot but be subject to an intelligent analysis.

If a nation cannot, in equity or justice, issue orders contrary to the rights or sovereignty of another, those to which General Webb refers were without doubt accompanied by some clause which would cause the execution of them to be carried out in a way not to offend those rights or that sovereignty, and having that in view to enter into some arrangement both expedient and honorable with the nations interested in the matter. Otherwise it would be an outrage, and in the present instance an unwarranted one, since Brazil and its allies proposed and offered to realize a reasonable manner of enabling Mr. Washburn to retire from Paraguay, to which the undersigned has already alluded.

General Webb argues that the decision of the Marquis de Caxias is in direct contradiction to the agreement entered into in August, 1866, between himself and the imperial government, and that the said marquis seriously offended the honor and sovereignty of the United States, being perfectly aware at the time that he was doing so.

This view of the matter on the part of General Webb is unfounded; not only are the benevolent and friendly intentions of Brazil towards the United States evident in this case, but also that the refusal of the marquis had nothing in it which was, or could be, offensive to the honor or sovereignty of those States, but on the contrary was the vindication of the legitimate right of the allies so to act.

Putting aside these no doubt convincing considerations to General Webb, it remains for the undersigned to demonstrate to the general that the agreement of 1866, which he invokes, cannot properly be applied to this case.

In the first place, the imperial government never consented, except under protest, to the passing of the *Shamokin* through the war lines of the allied powers for the purpose of carrying Mr. Washburn beyond them, and that protest really made against his passage by the Brazilian admiral, when that steamer was on its way to Curupaity, proves that Brazil did not admit the fact as a right.

In the second place, even had Brazil and its allies, for reasons worthy of attention at that time and at that place, judged it expedient to waive some of their rights as belligerents in favor of a friendly power, now perhaps they may be influenced by different motives; and indeed they have other and weightier ones, which prevent them from conceding now what they did then; further, the present request is not of the same nature of the one then advanced, since at that time the terms of that petition were more acceptable.

Finally, the very circumstances of the war are very different now from what they were then; the military movements and operations were not then so active as they are now, being about to terminate.

General Webb mentions the case of 1861, to ask that the conduct of the Marquis de Caxias in the present shall be censured and peremptorily disapproved of, as he requested that that of the president of Maranhao should be in relation to the Sumpter case; but as that affair does not bear an exact relation to this one, the undersigned declines entering into any discussion whatever upon the subject.

To conclude, the imperial government does not consider that the proceedings of the Marquis of Caxias in this transaction are at all open to censure, but that on the contrary, they merit its approbation; firstly, from the fact that his refusal was in perfect conformity to the rights and sovereignty of the allies; and secondly, from the circumstance that though it was not in his power to concede the permission as requested by Messieurs Kirkland and Washburn, he did offer and place at their command, with the heartiest good will, the proper means for the safe and convenient conveyance of the American minister from Paraguay.

The undersigned hopes that General Webb, conscious of the justice of the reasons given and of the serious inconveniences which would have happened to the cause of the allies from the upward passage along the river to Tibicuary (centre of the enemy's operations) of the *Wasp*, under present circumstances, and from her remaining there in communication with that enemy without restriction as to time or manner, will, without hesitation, conform his wishes to that decision, and accept either of the ways proposed for the departure from Paraguay of Mr. Washburn, and that in pursuance of such acceptance transmit to Rear-Admi-

ral Davis the necessary directions for the effecting of it. Meanwhile the imperial government will have no objection to accept any other alternative which may be suggested as equally effective and honorable by General Webb, provided that it be not the one already discussed, or a similar one, but that its conditions be such as to place no difficulties in the way of its acceptance by its allies at the river Plate, nor interfere with any plan they have or may conceive for the consummation of the desired end.

By these steps the imperial government endeavors to prove how great is its desire to, without injury or offence to its rights and sovereignty, or those of its allies, arrive at an early, and to the United States satisfactory, termination of the question.

The undersigned repeats, &c., &c., &c.,

JOAO SILVIERA DE SOUZA.

Senhor General JAMES WATSON WEBB,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the U. S.

Mr. Webb to Senhor de Souza.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Rio de Janeiro, July 13, 1868.

The undersigned, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from the United States, has the honor to acknowledge the receipt, on the 9th instant, of a note, bearing that date, from his excellency Joao Silviera de Souza, counsellor to his Majesty the Emperor, minister and secretary of state for foreign affairs, in reply to his note of the 1st July instant.

The note of his excellency, after reciting the contents of the undersigned's note of the 1st, says:

The Marquis de Caxias could not recognize Lieutenant Kirkland, a subaltern in the United States navy in command of the *Wasp*, as a competent person to make a direct request for permission for that vessel to pass the war lines of their very legal and effective blockade, which he only did towards the end of May, and not four months ago.

In the first place, the marquis *did* recognize Lieutenant Commander Kirkland as a proper person to make the request he did, as appears from his prompt response to his application.

Secondly, Lieutenant Commander Kirkland was not sent to Curupaity to make a "direct request for *permission* to pass the allied lines." His destination was Asuncion; and presuming that Brazil would not again wound the sensibilities of the people of the United States, or outrage their sovereignty and honor, it was not deemed necessary for him to do more than courteously *notify* the Brazilian commander-in-chief of his presence, destination and purpose, accompanied by the assurance that nothing would be done or permitted militating against the rights of either of the belligerents or the national character of his ship and flag.

Thirdly, His excellency has misapprehended the remarks of the undersigned in regard to the delay of four months already produced by the action of the Marquis de Caxias. If the *Wasp* had not been obstructed in her passage to Asuncion, on the 25th April last, Mr. Washburn and family would probably have reached Montevideo early in May; whereas it is not possible for him to do so now until September; and it may be still later, if the *modus operandi* of getting him and family from their "*embarrassing* and possibly *dangerous* situation" is to be determined at Washington.

His excellency the minister of foreign affairs next denies that in refusing to let the Wasp pass the Marquis de Caxias offended the sovereignty and honor of the United States, as is alleged by the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, and insists that by so doing he only maintained an unquestionable *right* of sovereignty on the part of the allies. And it is insisted also that in stopping the Wasp the marquis in no way violated the arrangement made between the undersigned and Brazil in August, 1866, because the Shamokin, with Minister Washburn on board, was only allowed to pass the allied lines under *protest*.

On the subject of this protest the honorable Secretary of State wrote to the undersigned as follows:

The President, however, marks the incident that the opposition to the passage of Mr. Washburn was withdrawn under a protest. So far from considering the question of the *right* of Mr. Washburn to proceed to his destination as a *debatable* one, the United States cannot consent to argue that question.

His excellency the minister of foreign affairs will perceive, therefore, that the undersigned has no authority to discuss the right of the United States to communicate with its minister in Paraguay. The obstruction offered in 1866 was declared by Mr. Seward "disrespectful in itself, and entirely inconsistent with the law of nations."

And yet his excellency the minister of foreign affairs informs the undersigned that "the imperial government does not consider that the proceedings of the Marquis de Caxias, in this transaction, are at all open to censure; but that, on the contrary, they merit its *approbation*."

It is a well-known fact that Asuncion, the capital of Paraguay, can only be reached by the river of that name; and also, that long before the empire of Brazil and Uruguay, and the Argentine Confederation, bound themselves, by treaty, to carry on war, not against the people of Paraguay, but against its government until overthrown, the United States had established diplomatic relations with that republic. In fact, but for the presence of the United States minister, Mr. Washburn, in Asuncion, in 1864, and his threat of closing his mission if the minister of Brazil was not permitted to leave the country by water instead of by land, as the Marquis de Caxias proposed that Mr. Washburn should do, that gentleman would, most probably, have shared the captivity of Governor Campos. How it is possible, then, for any intelligent Brazilian to claim that by virtue of Brazil's blockade of the Paraguay the United States shall not communicate with her minister by the only channel he can be reached, is more than the undersigned can conceive. But, as Mr. Seward says, from a sense of self-respect, the United States cannot consent to argue that question. Thus precluded from any discussion on this question of right, the undersigned notes the declaration that in this proceeding by the Marquis de Caxias there is no disrespect intended, and no unfriendly feeling towards the United States.

And this is said to be made manifest by the declaration that he *did* offer and place at the command of Mr. Washburn and Lieutenant Kirkland, with the heartiest good will, the proper means for the safe and most convenient conveyance of the American minister from Paraguay. That is to say, Brazil, or the commander of her land and naval forces on the Paraguay, is to determine what is "the *proper means*" of getting our minister out of Paraguay, and not the United States. And what were those "proper means" thus proposed?

First, The Marquis de Caxias proposed that the minister, his feeble wife and child, his servants, with their luggage, &c., should traverse some 50 or 100 miles of wilderness, more or less, and then embark on board a Brazilian vessel bearing a flag of truce, and descend the Paraguay to

Curupaity. President Lopez, of course, to give sanction to this espionage of his territory by an enemy avowedly engaged in a personal warfare against *him* and for his overthrow, and not against the people of Paraguay.

To this his excellency Charles A. Washburn, the minister of the United States accredited to the government of Paraguay, which it is the avowed purpose of the allies to overthrow, replied as follows, after very properly and peremptorily refusing to leave his post of duty, except in the manner indicated by his government:

The proposition of the Marquis de Caxias that, if we are so disposed, we may go by land, is similar to that which was made to me by the Paraguayan government in the case of the Brazilian minister, Senhor Viana de Lima, after the taking of the Marquis de Olinda and the suspension of his diplomatic relations. When I interfered on his behalf, I was told he could go by *land*. But I rejected the proposition as *absurd*; and my conduct in that matter was highly approved by the Brazilian government and press, while that of Paraguay was universally condemned by both. Does the Marquis de Caxias expect me to accept terms for myself and family that I would *not* accept for a Brazilian minister?

Secondly. The first proposition of the Marquis de Caxias having been very properly and indignantly rejected, he deliberately substituted the following:

I will give orders that one of the Brazilian vessels of war above Humaita shall go up the river with a flag of truce to receive his excellency, his servants, and effects, at the point of the river previously indicated by his excellency; and this steamer, on its return, shall disembark his excellency at the nearest possible point to Humaita, *or pass that fortification with the consent of the government of Paraguay*, so that his excellency may be able to move immediately from here to the United States gunboat Wasp.

It would be improper on the part of the undersigned to speak of this proposition in the terms it deserves, after it has been gravely endorsed by the Brazilian government; and therefore he leaves it to the just indignation of that public opinion which must ultimately pass upon this correspondence, and which will treat this unheard of proposition with the severe condemnation it so richly merits. Your excellency pronounces it friendly and magnanimous, while the undersigned deems it unfriendly and offensive, and, he might add, on the part of the marquis, trifling with the dignity of his position.

That the commander of the Wasp so considered it is manifest from his reply, which, written in doubt whether it was a serious proposition or one intended to cast ridicule upon the whole affair, is worthy of all praise. He says:

Your excellency undoubtedly gives me credit for a knowledge which I do not possess, of that usage of warfare which permits one of the belligerents by a resort of a flag of truce, to pass by the fortifications and into the heart of the enemies' country without molestation. I know that the Paraguayan government would be guided by a false sense of courtesy did it permit such an act by a Brazilian vessel of war.

A conversation, sought by one of the members of your excellency's staff, leads me to believe that your excellency thinks that the family of the President Lopez might seek protection under the American flag, and that to prevent such an occurrence you will not allow the United States steamer Wasp to pass through your fleet. The fact of virtually detaining as prisoners the United States minister and family in Paraguay in order to prevent the suspected escape of the feminine and infantine portion of President Lopez's family is so unreasonable that it savors strongly of extending the dangers and difficulties of war to women and children.

Whether this proposition was ever intended by the Marquis de Caxias to be seriously received, or whether it was designed to treat Lieutenant Commander Kirkland's application with ridicule and contempt, it is equally unfriendly and offensive. *Unfriendly*, because it denies on the most frivolous and indefensible grounds an act of *courtesy* to a friendly and neutral power, which could not be withheld without offence, even if the law international conferred the right of such denial on Brazil, which it assuredly does not. And *grossly offensive*, because it assumes that the

commander, officers, and crew of the United States steamer Wasp would act dishonorably and give information in regard to the Brazilian fleet to the Paraguayans, while no such suspicion of dishonorable conduct could possibly attach to the officers and crew of a Brazilian vessel of war, which it is gravely proposed to send hundreds of miles into the enemies' country.

Now it is patent to the public the number and character of the Brazilian fleet, above and below Humaita, are as well known to President Lopez as to the Marquis de Caxias, the press, and the public. And if we are to believe official reports, it is equally certain that the state of things on the Paraguay, above the allied forces, is absolutely unknown to the Marquis de Caxias or any other person. If, then, every person on board the Wasp were of the disreputable character implied, the most they could possibly communicate to the injury of the allies would be to report the number of vessels they saw; information which President Lopez has already. How utterly idle, then, and how exceedingly offensive the pretence, that the passage of the United State steamer Wasp, under the United States flag, and commanded and officered by *gentlemen* who recognize all the obligations which a high sense of honor imposes upon them as neutrals—how exceedingly offensive to a friendly nation to allege that such passage would be injurious to the interests of Brazil, “because of the operations and movements of war shortly to be carried into effect, near the place indicated as the destination of the North American steamer.” That is to say, “the steamer of a friendly neutral power, rapidly running through our lines, and communicating with no one but the commander-in-chief and his staff, will become possessed, supernaturally, no doubt, of all our purposes; and those on board *not* being men of honor, will disclose to our enemy, the President, and not the people of Paraguay, the knowledge thus supernaturally acquired.”

But while the Marquis de Caxias thus guards against American officers not revealing what everybody knows, and nobody better than President Lopez; and while he cannot listen to the idea of a friendly neutral passing his lines, he perceives the benefit to be derived from availing himself of the occasion presented, to send one of the Brazilian vessels of war above Humaita, with a flag of truce, into the very heart of the enemy's country, to bring away the United States minister, and at the same time explore the *terra incognita* where he would willingly extend his operations. Nay, he would go even still further, and permit the iron-clad thus employed, now above Humaita, to repass that fortification with the consent of the government of Paraguay; and thus escape from what is deemed a perilous position until the fall of Humaita, if fall it should. What President Lopez would have said to this proposition the good sense of the commander of the Wasp promptly determined; what the Brazilian government thinks of it is to be found in its formal approval, conveyed to the undersigned by the despatch of your excellency; but what the governments, statesmen, and military men of Europe and America may say of it remains to be seen.

President Lopez, “the government of Paraguay,” was the only party who could possibly suffer injury from the presence of a friendly neutral in his waters and amidst his defences. And yet President Lopez, recognizing his duty to that friendly neutral, and to the comity that should be practiced between nations, and entertaining none of the doubts in regard to the *honor* of American naval officers, which so disturbed the mind of the Marquis de Caxias and made him desirous of sending a Brazilian vessel of war into his enemy's country under a flag of truce, to be guaranteed by the flag of the United States minister, no doubt,

promptly consented that the United States steamer Wasp should ascend the Paraguay to any place she might desire to visit.

The undersigned is of opinion that the facts of the case will abundantly demonstrate whether the act of the Marquis de Caxias, endorsed by Brazil, was not as unfriendly and offensive as it clearly was in violation of international law and the sovereignty and honor of the United States.

But, says your excellency, if the Wasp had been permitted to pass the blockading lines of the allies, other nations would have been entitled to claim a similar right for all their ships. Most assuredly so, if those other nations had diplomatic representatives at Asuncion whom it was desirable to get away. But Mr. Washburn is the only diplomatic representative resident in Asuncion, and consequently the position is untenable.

Your excellency next quotes Rear-Admiral Godon, then commanding the United States South Atlantic squadron, as fully justifying the action of the allies in 1868. So correct is this, says your excellency, "that Admiral Godon himself, in 1866, when the passage of Mr. Washburn to Paraguay was in treaty, was the first to admit it, merely begging in his request the passage of Mr. Washburn, and that he might be helped forward to his destination *either by land or by water*, without placing any obstacle in his way. This is just what the Marquis de Caxias desired to effect in the present instance, had he not been denied the option."

It is no news to the undersigned that in 1866 Admiral Godon, having quarrelled with the three United States ministers, in the river Plate—General Asboth, Mr. Washburn and Governor Kirk—and with the consuls of the United States at Buenos Ayres and Montevideo, instead of simply obeying orders and furnishing the United States vessel, which Mr. Washburn was authorized to demand, to take him to Asuncion, did all in his power to prevent Mr. Washburn's having such conveyance; and on one occasion actually went *north* from this port instead of *south*, apparently to avoid receiving the contemplated application. But it is news to him that the then commanding officer of the United States squadron in this station should have permitted his feelings of hostility to Mr. Washburn to render him so forgetful of his duty to his country as to endorse and justify and advise the Brazilian government in its assumption that it might safely, and with great propriety, refuse to permit one of our national vessels to pass its lines with our minister on board, provided the minister "was helped forward to his destination, *either by land or by water*, without placing any obstacles in his way."

But the Brazilian government and its representatives in the river Plate well knew that Rear-Admiral Godon was not vested with any diplomatic powers whatever, and that he was as proverbially ignorant of the law of blockade as of international law. He was the last man in the navy to be safely entrusted with the discussion of such questions; and his expressing any opinion upon Mr. Washburn's case, or making any admissions in regard to it, was simply meddling with what did not concern him. That he should have done so in the gratification of a vindictive feeling towards a gentleman in every respect his superior does not surprise the undersigned; but it does surprise him greatly that your excellency should refer to the unpatriotic acts of that personage, who was the representative of himself and his vindictive feelings only, as justifying a proceeding which every department of our government, and its four diplomatic representatives in this region, as well as every intelligent foreigner here, united in condemning. The undersigned does not doubt that Rear-Admiral Godon *did* make the admissions described,

and did, in the gratification of vindictiveness, seek to produce a result so diametrically opposite to what justice and honor, and national sovereignty, as well as the convenience of our minister and family, demanded; but as he was not vested with any diplomatic power in the premises, and as it appears that if he had been he would not have exercised them in the interest of his country, his opinions and admissions cannot, with propriety, be introduced into this correspondence.

The undersigned makes no apology for the length of this note. The existing diplomatic relations between the United States and Brazil, and the present and future intercourse between their people—whose interests, political and commercial, are inseparable—depend, to a very great extent, upon the amicable adjustment of the pending difficulty; a difficulty which should not and could not have arisen, and in the progress of which the sovereignty and international rights of neither party could have become involved, if Brazil had promptly extended to the United States that comity which is usual among all friendly nations.

Being prohibited from arguing the question of right in this very important matter, the undersigned, frankly and in the interests of good neighborhood, will now proceed to extract from his various instructions on this subject, the well-settled convictions of his government in relation thereto, all or most of which may be found in part 2 of the published diplomatic correspondence of 1866:

Mr. Seward to General Webb.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 21, 1866.

We have learned, with much surprise, that Charles A. Washburn, esq., minister resident of the United States to the Republic of Paraguay, has been hindered and detained at or near Corrientes, on the Parana river, by the allied armies engaged in the war against Paraguay, on his return, after a leave of absence, to Asuncion, the capital of Paraguay. I give you for your information a copy of instructions which have been sent to him in this emergency. We sincerely hope that the Emperor of Brazil has neither ordered nor approved of this hindrance to the passage of the diplomatic representative of the United States, so disrespectful in itself and so entirely inconsistent with the law of nations.

You will bring the subject to the notice of the government and the Emperor and ask for explanations.

Mr. Seward to General Webb.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 27, 1866.

I am obliged to write, therefore, in ignorance of the present condition of affairs in South America. Nevertheless the sovereignty and honor of the United States will admit no hesitation or delay in the matter. Mr. Washburn is therefore now instructed to return at once to the United States if the hindrance before alluded to shall not have ceased, through some proceedings of the government concerned.

In the case that you shall have put into execution the before mentioned instructions which were given you by the department on the 21st day of April last, and shall not have received the satisfactory explanations which you were instructed to ask from the government of Brazil, you will demand such explanations peremptorily. If they shall not be given you *within six or eight days you will ask for your passports to return to the United States.*

The Secretary of the United States, the Hon. William H. Seward, to General Ashoth.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 24, 1866.

I have now before me a definitive correspondence between this department and the Brazilian government, which leads me to hope that long before this reaches you the difficulty

will entirely have ceased. But among the papers which the record presents is a letter written by President Mitre to Mr. Washburn, on the 24th of July last, which distinctly asserts and maintains the rights of the allies to make that detention endure according to the pleasure of the allies. The President of the United States *cannot consent to hold relations of peace and friendship even with friendly nations, when they make their own interests the rule of exposition instead of the law of nations.*

The Secretary of State of the United States to General Webb.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 23, 1866.

* * * * *
The paper treats of the final disposition and settlement of the annoying question which arose by the detention of Mr. Washburn, &c., &c., &c.

The President, however, marks the incident that the opposition to the passage of Mr. Washburn was withdrawn under a *protest*. So far from regarding the question of the *right* of Mr. Washburn to proceed to his destination as a *debatable one*, the United States cannot consent to agree to that question.

In the second place, you are authorized to state that the sensibilities of the American people have been wounded by the transaction.

I am not prepared to say that, in the absence of explanations by the allies, the settlement of the question which has been made will be held to be satisfactory.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Your excellency will preceive from the foregoing extracts from instructions from the Secretary of State of the United States why the undersigned has not entered into any discussion of the rights of his government in the question pending between it and the allies, prosecuting a war against the government and not the people of Paraguay. He has but one course left him to pursue, and that is, to urge upon "the government and Emperor of Brazil" a reconsideration of their decision as conveyed to him in your excellency's note of the 9th instant. And again, in the words of his note of the 1st instant, "he earnestly entreats that the government of Brazil will, without any unnecessary delay, issue instructions that all hindrance to the United States steamer Wasp's passing through the lines of the allies on the Paraguay be withdrawn, and promptly advise the undersigned that such hindrance has altogether ceased."

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to his excellency the assurances of his distinguished consideration.

J. WATSON WEBB.

His Excellency JOAO SILVEIRA DE SOUZA,
*Councilor to his Imperial Majesty the Emperor,
Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

Mr. Webb to Mr. Seward.

[Extract]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Boa Viagem, opposite Rio, August 7, 1868—5 p. m.

SIR: In my last I stated that the minister of foreign affairs desired me to ask for a conference, which I had declined doing, at the same time expressing my readiness to wait upon him at the foreign office whenever desired to do so. I was in consequence invited to a conference on the 1st of August.

We accordingly were in conference two and one-half hours on the 1st, three hours on the 4th, and nearly three hours to-day, I having just returned from the foreign office.

The result was that I left with the minister my despatch herein enclosed and marked No. 4, he having previously explained that in no event should the Wasp be impeded in her course to Asuncion. It is understood that Paranhos's note, "subject only to such trifling delay as may arise from the active execution of any military operation which may transpire at the time," mean simply that if when the Wasp arrives at the front the Brazilians are actually firing at the enemy, they shall not be required to cease firing; but in such an event, the Wasp shall wait until the firing ceased. To this I assented, stipulating, however, that if the Wasp thought proper to pass between, and under the fire of the belligerents, she should have a right to do so, and in like manner the belligerents would be at liberty to sink her if they can, and she is sufficiently foolhardy to invite destruction.

* * * * *

I shall send a brief despatch by telegraph from London, announcing the result of the Wasp affair.

I have reported to admiral that a United States vessel of war may go up the Paraguay for Mr. Washburn; and have requested him to send the Wasp, with the same commander. This he will do.

* * * * *

Humaita was attacked on the 16th by the allied forces and the assailants beaten off with fearful loss. On the 18th the allies were again badly beaten in the Chaco.

On the 25th the allies discovered that Humaita had been evacuated by Lopez's forces, and they quietly took possession of it. The city of Rio has, in consequence, been illuminated for three nights in succession. There is no end to the rejoicing, and the press assures the people that there is no such triumph on record in ancient or modern warfare.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Senhor Paranhos to Mr. Webb.

[Translation.]

CENTRAL SECTION, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Rio de Janeiro, August, 5th, 1868.

The undersigned, counsellor to his Imperial Majesty, and his minister and secretary of state for foreign affairs, has the honor of addressing himself to General James Watson Webb, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary for the United States.

The object of the present note is to reply to that of the 13th ultimo, which was received by the *predecessor of the undersigned*, relative to the passing of the steamer Wasp through the lines of the rigorous blockade of the allies, in the waters of the Paraguay river, for the purpose of bringing away from the enemy's territory Mr. Charles A. Washburn, minister resident for the United States near the republic of Paraguay.

The undersigned, having had the honor of conferring with General Webb on the 1st and 4th instant, will defer the considering of each of the propositions of the note referred to.

The undersigned holds himself excused from that duty, as he feels assured that they do not contain the slightest idea of a rupture of the friendship and customary deference with which the government of the Union has ever responded to that of his Majesty the Emperor; and also because he at the same time acknowledged that it is of urgent importance that the understanding should be arrived at which is desired by both parties, with regard to the passing of Mr. Washburn through the territory occupied by the allied forces.

The imperial government is grieved at perceiving that, either because the propositions submitted by the Marquis de Caxias were not understood as they were meant to be, or that owing to the illness of Mr. Washburn's wife, the egress of that gentleman and his family should have been delayed until the present time. The undersigned is confident, however, that General Webb is also profoundly convinced that on the part of Brazil there does and always has existed a most sincere desire to maintain and tighten the most friendly relations with the government at Washington; and therefore that it never has been wanting either in courtesy or consideration towards its representatives.

General Webb knows that the passing of the diplomatic agent of the United States through the territory which the allies occupy in the waters and on the banks of the river Paraguay was not denied to him, they having nevertheless the full and undeniable right of jurisdiction therein according to the right of nations. The question has rested upon the *way* or *manner* of passing between the warlines of the allies without weakening their moral force, or injuring the activity of their operations, or giving rise to questions with other neutral powers.

Now, as in 1866, when the passing up the river of Mr. Washburn was under consideration, the allied governments and their representatives at the seat of war had not, nor have they, anything in view other than the conciliating of the interests and necessities of the belligerents with the duties of courtesy and friendship which they are only too happy to observe towards so neutral and friendly a power as that of the United States.

The Marquis de Caxias, in his character of general commander-in-chief of the allied forces, did not hesitate, on the reception of the despatch from the commander of the Wasp, to point out and help to execute two sure methods for the speedy return of the United States minister, who is in the enemy's country. Unfortunately, however, those methods it seems were not deemed admissible, for it was declared to us that both were impossible; notwithstanding, the undersigned begs leave to explain *en passant*, perceiving that they evidently were not duly appreciated.

The distance by land from Tayi to Curupaiti is little more than five leagues, which would have been gone over by Mr. Washburn in a carriage and other conveniences which the Brazilian general would have had much pleasure in placing at the disposition of the United States minister, his family, and suite. Only through ignorance of the conditions or circumstances of that journey could it have been compared, as it was, to the offensive offer made by President Lopez in 1864, after his declaration of war to the Brazilian minister at Asuncion, Mr. Viana de Lima.

The government of Paraguay, during profound peace, commenced hostilities by surprising and capturing the Marquis de Olinda and the imprisonment of all her passengers, among whom was the president of the province of Matto Grosso. It was under such circumstances that he wished the Brazilian minister to retire by land to the Passo da Patria—that is, that Mr. Viana de Lima and his family should travel over 50

leagues, through the middle of an enemy's territory, without any guarantee as to the means of conveyance, or indispensable help during so long a route, besides not having the slightest protection for their personal security.

The journey of Mr. Washburn from Tayi to Curupaiti would have been effected under far different circumstances, and in another way, much more speedy, honorable, commodious, and safe. Mr. Washburn would have passed through as a neutral friend, whereas in the case of the Brazilian minister at Asuncion, he would have been unavoidably detained or delayed on his passage through the interior of a country whose government had most unexpectedly declared war against the empire, initiating it by those acts of most unjustifiable surprise and violence.

The second method suggested by the general commander-in-chief of the allied forces—that is, the passage of Mr. Washburn in a Brazilian vessel to Carupaiti—evinces deference towards the diplomatic agent of the United States, and cannot be otherwise considered without gravely impugning the intentions of the Marquis de Caxias, and manifesting ignorance of the true position of the belligerents.

The Brazilian division of six iron-clads, which forced the passage of Humaita in February of this year, has already been at Asuncion, and has cruised beyond Tebicuary more than once, round about Humaita, and on the opposite side called the Chaco, or right bank of the Paraguay. The allies by the effective occupation of their troops commanded those positions; there could not have been, therefore, any interest arising to them from the sending of a Brazilian vessel to receive on board Mr. Washburn under cover of a flag of truce, further than the showing of their earnest and unalterable good will towards the government of the United States.

General Webb declares that he cannot, in view of the instructions from his government, enter into an examination of the question of right involved in the passing of Mr. Washburn through the allies' lines of blockade, attack, and defence; and the undersigned admits also, on his side, that he should abstain from discussing the matter, since it was not the denying of a passage through to that diplomatic agent which is being treated of, but the reconciling of it with the inevitable necessities of the war to which the allies were provoked, and which they are using every effort to terminate in the speediest, most just and honorable manner.

The imperial government cannot, nor would it wish to proceed in an affair which, like this, is of grave importance to the alliance, without previously consulting with its allies; and the undersigned would, therefore, insist that the present emergency be definitely decided upon at the river Plata, or here, after communications shall have been received from both the Argentine and Oriental governments, if there were not on the one side the consideration that there is no one there to represent the United States, and on the other that the Senhor Juan E. Torrent, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary for the Argentine Republic near this court, manifests the same friendly and deferential disposition towards the United States that he does.

In pursuance to an agreement with Mr. Torrent, and in the hope that that agreement will be approved of and duly appreciated by the allied governments at the river Plata, the undersigned proceeds to propose to General Webb a solution of the question, which cannot fail to be considered as satisfactory, as well by the government of the United States as by its representative accredited near his Majesty the Emperor.

Mr. Washburn thought it impossible that President Lopez would con-

sent to the passing of a Brazilian steamer under a flag of truce, for the inoffensive purpose of aiding him to retire, as mentioned before. Well, then, the government of his Majesty, in its own name and in those of its allies, will most willingly accede to the descent from Asuncion of the United States minister, on board of a Paraguayan vessel, under a flag of truce, to Curupaiti, or to the most advanced post of the allies, the Wasp to go up to that point wherever it may be, and there to receive on board the diplomatic agent of his country.

Apparently the material difficulty pointed out by Mr. Washburn will be thus removed; there will be complete reciprocity of the just and friendly propositions which are advanced on both sides; in a word, the rights and supreme necessities of the belligerents will be in harmony with the passing and returning of the representative of the United States.

But the imperial government and its allies will carry their deference to the United States beyond that. If its representatives near this court and at the republic of Paraguay hold that they should not accept either of these methods, or that the return of Mr. Washburn can be only effected safely and conveniently by the Wasp's going to receive him at his place of embarkation, then the allies will agree that a United States vessel of war shall proceed to that point for that purpose, that vessel being subject only to such trifling delay as may arise from the active execution of any military operation which may transpire at the time; the allies being well assured that the assertions of General Webb (which they never have doubted) with regard to the observance of the duties of a strict neutrality on the part of the vessel and of the representative of the Union shall most rigorously be carried out.

The undersigned hopes that this resolution taken by the imperial government, in combination with the representative of the Argentine Republic near this court, will be benevolently admitted by its allies at the river Plata, and that it will be apparent to General Webb and Mr. Washburn, and to their government, that this is a further proof of the cordiality with which the said allies profess the most friendly sentiments toward the United States government.

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to General Webb the assurances of his high consideration.

JOSÉ MARIA DA SILVA PARANHOS.

Mr. Webb to Senhor Paranhos.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Boa Viagem, August 5, 1868.

The undersigned, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from the United States, has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a note from His Excellency José Maria da Silva Paranhos, counsellor to his imperial majesty the Emperor, minister and secretary of state for foreign affairs, dated yesterday, August the 5th, and which is in reply to a note from the undersigned addressed to the predecessor of his excellency, dated July the 13th, remonstrating against the decision of the late government, approving of the conduct of the Marquis de Caxias in refusing to permit the United States steamer Wasp to pass his military lines on her way to Asuncion, the capital of Paraguay, for the purpose of bringing from that capital his excellency Charles A. Washburn, the duly accredited minister of the United States to Paraguay, and thus relieve him and his family from what the government of the United States declared to be a "disagreeable and probably dangerous situation."

The undersigned is greatly impressed with the friendly tone of this note from his excellency the minister of foreign affairs, and tenders to him his sincere acknowledgments for the cordial and frank manner in which he has complied with the wishes of the government of the United States.

His excellency, in reconsidering the too hasty action of his predecessor, and in recognizing the propriety and necessity of a movement by the government of the United States for the relief of its diplomatic agent in Paraguay, and the mode adopted for that relief, has given another and most acceptable proof, on the part of the government and Emperor of Brazil, of their determination to reciprocate the friendly feelings which have always controlled the action of the United States in its intercourse with all the governments on the continent of America. An "American policy," based upon the advanced civilization of the world, the progress of the age, the interests and wants of new peoples, in contradistinction to a policy which is of necessity the offspring of the past, and fettered by the thought and action of the period in which it originated, is recognized by all American statesmen, whether of the north or the south. And to secure to the government of America the benefits of such an "American policy," it is of primary importance that Brazil and the United States, and all the governments on this continent, all of them being constitutional governments, should cultivate among each other the most friendly intercourse and the closest political alliance compatible with their constitutional forms of government. To accomplish this great work, and to draw closer together the United States and Brazil, has been the one great object of the undersigned during his long residence at this court; and he is happy to recognize in the despatch of his excellency the evidence of a similar feeling and purpose.

Orders have been forwarded by Rear-Admiral Davis, commanding the United States South Atlantic squadron on this station, to Lieutenant Commander Kirkland, commanding the United States steamer Wasp, to proceed at once to Asuncion for Mr. Washburn and his family; and it would be idle for the undersigned to assure your excellency that under no circumstances and in no conceivable event will the progress of that vessel to or from Asuncion impede or in any way be injurious to the interests of the allies waging war against the government of Paraguay.

The undersigned is happy to avail himself of the occasion presented to renew to your excellency the expression of his cordial respect and great consideration.

J. WATSON WEBB.

JOSÉ MARIA DA SILVA PARANHOS,
*Councillor to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor,
 Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

Mr. Seward to Mr. Webb.

No. 233.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
 Washington, August 17, 1868.

SIR: Your despatch of the — day of July, No. 68, has been received.

I learn from it that Rear-Admiral Davis, who commands the United States South Atlantic squadron, has sent the United States ship of war

Wasp up the Parana, with a view to bring the United States minister, Charles A. Washburn, and his family, from Asuncion, the capital of Paraguay, and thereby remove them from their embarrassing and possibly dangerous situation; and that the Marquis de Caxias, the commander of the allied forces, refused to permit the Wasp to pass through his blockade up to Asuncion, in consequence of which refusal the Wasp returned to Montevideo, after a delay of 47 days, without having accomplished the object of her voyage. Your despatch is accompanied by a copy of a note which, on the first of July last, you addressed to his excellency Joao Silveria de Souza, the secretary of state for foreign affairs of his Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, in which note you made complaint of this proceeding of the Marquis de Caxias, and requested that the same might be disapproved, and that the Wasp might, without delay, be allowed to proceed to Asuncion for the purpose of removing Mr. Washburn and his family. I find in an appendix to these papers a correspondence concerning the events which were the basis of your note to the Brazilian secretary, in which correspondence are contained letters from Rear-Admiral Davis, Commander Kirkland, of the Wasp, Charles A. Washburn, esq., United States minister in Paraguay, and the Marquis de Caxias. I have also received from Mr. Moran, late United States chargé de affaires in London, a cable telegram, from which it would appear that you have intimated a purpose to ask for a passport in case the Brazilian government should refuse to allow the request contained in your note before mentioned. I further find a reference to this latter point in your despatch of the 8th of July, No. 59, which has been previously acknowledged. From this last paper I learn that at the time it was written no answer to your note had been received from the Brazilian secretary of state for foreign affairs, and that, in the event of an unfavorable reply, you contemplated making a request for a passport, and an immediate withdrawal from Brazil.

The grave and critical issue which it thus appears was pending at the date of your despatch has probably before this time reached a solution, although many days may elapse before that conclusion shall become officially known to this government. It would be impossible, under these circumstances, to give you definitive instructions upon the course to be pursued in the possible event of a sanction of the proceeding of the Marquis de Caxias by the Brazilian government; nor am I now authorized, nor is it deemed necessary, with such unauthentic information as we have, to pronounce the sense of the government concerning your contemplated demand for a passport and the consequent close of your mission at Rio.

It is thought, however, to be neither improper nor premature to consider the several matters in regard to the Wasp which are expressly brought in review by your despatch.

The proceedings of Rear-Admiral Davis in directing the Wasp to go up the Parana to Asuncion for the purpose mentioned is approved.

This government holds that it has a lawful right to send a ship of war up the Parana to Asuncion, for the purpose of receiving the United States minister and his family, and conveying them from the scene of siege and war to neutral territory or waters; that the refusal of Marquis de Caxias to permit the Wasp to pass up to Asuncion violates becoming comity on the part of Brazil and the allies towards the United States, and is in contravention of the law of nations; that Mr. Washburn and Commander Kirkland justifiably and properly declined the alternatives offered by the Marquis de Caxias. The requests upon the Brazilian government, expressed in your note to the secretary of foreign affairs, are approved and adopted.

Should this despatch find you in the performance of your official duties, you will read it to the Brazilian secretary for foreign affairs, and deliver him a copy if he shall desire it.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

JAMES WATSON WEBB, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Webb.

No. 235.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
September 15, 1868.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 7th of August, which is without number, and which is accompanied by a copy of the final correspondence which has taken place between yourself and Mr. Paranhos, the Brazilian secretary for foreign affairs, relating to the opposition which was offered by the Marquis de Caxias to the voyage of the Wasp up the Parana river, with the purpose of relieving Mr. Washburn and his family at Asuncion.

Your proceedings in the settlement of that vexatious case, as they are represented in your despatch and the accompanying correspondence, are approved and commended.

You will assure the Marquis de Paranhos that this government highly appreciates the just and friendly manner in which the transaction has been brought to a satisfactory end on the part of the government of Brazil.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

JAMES WATSON WEBB, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

Mr. Webb to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Boa Viagem, October 8, 1868.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter addressed to Admiral C. H. Davis, in relation to what I consider a measure of *policy* on the part of our squadron. From what Mr. Washburn writes, I have but little doubt that the persons he left behind him as constituting a part of his legation have been already murdered; and yet I think the honor of the country appears to demand some such demonstration as I ask. England, France, Italy, and Spain, all have sent gunboats up to Asuncion; and considering the outrage perpetrated on our legation, we are called upon, if for appearances only, to send all our disposable force up the river. I do not know, nor do I believe, that they could do any good, as probably our two citizens are no longer living. But, nevertheless, sound policy requires that we do something more than those who have no such outrage to punish as that perpetrated against our legation.

Neither Admiral Davis nor I have anything to do with the approval or censure of Mr. Washburn's conduct in the press. It is sufficient to know that the sanctity of our legation has been violated to justify and to demand such interposition as I have asked. And it is satisfactory to

know that the cost of a demonstration which would be invaluable to us would be precisely the expense of the fuel consumed; no more and no less. And if, as is said, an expedition up the Paraguay would prevent the Guerriere's contemplated visit to the Cape of Good Hope and coast of Africa, whence the Quinnebaug has just returned, the value of the coal thereby saved would be double the cost of that consumed by our small steamers in an expedition up the Paraguay, where, at present, we are the only naval power *not* represented.

Admiral Davis is one of the most accomplished and intelligent gentlemen in our navy, and nobody can know him without entertaining for him both respect and affection. He is, withal, a gentleman of science, and so courteous and just to all under his command that he is justly popular on shipboard as well as on shore. Most assuredly, I know no gentleman in service who possesses more of my regard; and yet we differ as widely as the poles in regard to what is required of him in this emergency. He thinks the whole affair not worth a second thought, and, like most naval officers, perceives no peculiar sanctity about the diplomatic representatives of a country. Of course my views are directly the opposite of his. We have no right to consider *what should be*, but must look at *what is*; and so long as we recognize the existing mode of international intercourse, we have no option but to vindicate our own honor; and in so doing, punish, or attempt to punish, what is equally an outrage against every civilized nation.

What Admiral Davis will do I cannot pretend to say. He was to have sailed with his entire squadron for the river Plate at the end of this week. Recent events, most certainly, will not delay his departure.

Beyond all question you will receive full details of all that has transpired from Mr. Washburn. * * * * *

Doubtless Mr. Washburn will sail from here for New York on the 26th. We expect him on the 20th.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Webb to Rear-Admiral Davis.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Boa Viagem, opposite Rio, October 6, 1868.

MY DEAR SIR: I yesterday received from his excellency Charles A. Washburn, United States minister resident to Paraguay, a communication, dated Buenos Ayres, September 26, 1868, apprising me of his safe arrival at that city in the Wasp, in which he says: "We have barely escaped *alive*. You probably little thought, when you were battling with the Brazilians so strongly for a gunboat to come to my relief, that I was at that time in danger of my life." And he also informs me that Lopez "took away Bliss and Mastermann," his secretary and interpreter, "by force, at the moment of leaving the legation to go on board the steamer."

I felt, of course, that while we had rescued the minister and his family our work was only half completed, and that the honor of our country had been directly insulted by Lopez thus trampling upon the rights of our legation, and by the gross outrage perpetrated upon two of its members, by their forcible seizure when under the immediate protection of our minister. And consequently I immediately enclosed to you Mr.

Washburn's letter, with a brief note, saying, "I write thus that you may turn this matter over in your mind before I join you;" and I begged you to send a boat for me at 2 p. m. This you did, and I am indebted to you for the prompt and kind manner in which you have always complied with similar requests, as well as for your cordial co-operation at all times in the discharge of my public duties.

I reached the *Guerriere* at 2½ o'clock p. m. I am sorry to say that for the first time in our official intercourse there appeared to exist a wide difference of opinion upon a question of duty, and especially in regard to the gravity of the existing emergency: I believing that this is precisely one of those cases to meet which our country keeps up, at great expense, a large squadron on this station, the protection of our citizens and the prompt vindication of our national honor; while you unfortunately look upon it as an event of no special significance, and which calls for no assumption of any unusual responsibility on your part, because you have no instructions or direct orders in contemplation of such a contingency—a contingency which, of course, could not be foreseen and anticipated.

You enquired what I would have you do; and I answered then, and I answer now, I would have you send up to Asuncion every available vessel of your squadron and demand the immediate release of Mr. Bliss and Mr. Mastermann, two members of the United States legation in Paraguay, forcibly seized by Lopez in violation of their diplomatic rights, and now held in prison by the tyrant, if, as Mr. Washburn suggests, they have not already been put to death. And even if the chances were ninety-nine out of a hundred that they are no longer in existence, such in my judgment is the importance of this action, in view of its influence upon the opinion of the civilized world in regard to the character and the energy of our government, and the efficacy of our navy, that I would have you transfer your flag to one of the smaller vessels of your squadron and go up the Paraguay and make such demonstration at least as will prove that England is not the only nation that protects the lives and persons of its citizens and the diplomatic rights of its representatives, without stopping to count the cost. True, we are not called upon to raise an army of 10,000 veterans, at a cost of \$30,000,000, for a second Abyssinian expedition into the wilds of Paraguay, but we may safely incur the *expense of the fuel* necessary for what I propose, and this is all it can cost us. Our squadron is here for just such work—to protect the commerce, the lives, and the persons of our people; and you have already informed me that the entire squadron will sail for the river Plata during the present or early next week, with the exception of the *Shamokin*, which is to go home, probably to be broken up. But why send her home, if an emergency is presented in which she can render as good service as any other vessel of the squadron?

Be assured, my dear admiral, that this is no ordinary occurrence. The eyes of the civilized world are upon us, and precisely as you may act in this emergency will our country come out of the affair with credit and honor or lose prestige as a nation. You and I have done our duty in sending up the *Wasp*, but we have not yet discharged our *whole* duty; and, in my opinion, to complete our work, we must make such a demonstration as I am urging upon you. We are both servants of one government, and each independent of the other, to be controlled only by our common superior, the President of the United States, speaking through his Secretaries of State and of the Navy. I do not claim the remotest right to control your action, and feel the full responsibility of attempting to influence it. But it is my imperative duty to call upon you officially

to act energetically in this emergency, stating, at the time, my reasons for making such call, and assuming all the responsibility of so doing. That duty I have attempted, hastily, to discharge, and now your responsibility begins. That you will meet that responsibility fearlessly and do what you think is *right*, I know.

You remarked to me yesterday that you had no facts to warrant the action I recommend and solicit; and that although you had received Commander Kirkland's report of his visit to Asuncion and return to Montevideo, it contained nothing which demanded the proceeding I desire.

One word in regard to Commander Kirkland, and the manner in which he has discharged the delicate duty upon which he was detached, in both of his visits up the Paraguay. No officer of any rank in the navy could have done better; and his reply to the Marquis de Caxias, when that personage proposed to send a Brazilian iron-clad up the Paraguay for Mr. Washburn, was so apposite and so appropriate to the occasion, that I quoted the most of it to the Brazilian minister of foreign affairs when reiterating my demand that the Wasp should not be obstructed in her passage of the allied lines on her "errand of mercy." And Mr. Washburn, in his letter to me, attributes his escape with life to Commander Kirkland's manly defiance of Lopez, and his indignant threat of consequences if he dared to carry out his avowed intention of detaining a United States minister in Paraguay.

What Mr. Kirkland could or should have reported in regard to Lopez's conduct towards our legation in Paraguay is not for me to determine; but Mr. Washburn, the duly accredited minister of the United States to the government of Paraguay, has made his report, which I have placed in your possession, and every word of which I endorse. And in addition I send herewith a supplement to the Buenos Ayrean Standard, of the 26th of September, in which you will find a letter from Mr. Washburn to the British minister accredited to the Argentine government, giving a full history of events in Paraguay for the past six months. That document was sent to me by Mr. Washburn, and I desire to have it received as a part of this official communication.

You do not know Mr. Washburn, but I do; and I know too that both at Buenos Ayres and here in Rio de Janeiro the public press, in the interest of Brazil and the allies, is doing all in its power to blacken his character. On the other hand, the Standard, representing the feelings and opinions of the foreign diplomatic corps, and of the British minister and British residents in Buenos Ayres, does Mr. Washburn full justice and commends his conduct throughout. I know him to be a man of honor and truth; but even if he were personally unknown to me as he is to you, both you and I know him to be the duly accredited minister of the United States, and his testimony, which we have, it is our bounden duty to respect. He tells us that two members of his legation were forcibly detained as prisoners by Lopez, and that their lives are in danger if, as is quite probable, they have not already been murdered, and we have nothing to do with what others may say or do in regard to the affair. Our government is far distant; appeal to it is impossible; and therefore it becomes my duty officially to make a requisition upon you to interpose for the vindication of our national honor and the protection of our citizens. I am responsible to our government for the grounds upon which that requisition is based, and it is your right to respond to or reject my application, and for so doing you and you only are responsible.

In conclusion, permit me to add that, in my judgment, an emergency

of such rare occurrence, and so certain to redound to the honor of our country and the credit of all concerned, if judiciously managed, should be deemed a great boon. For weeks past the press in this region has teemed with rumors of insult to the United States legation in Paraguay, and a violation of its sanctity; and, beyond all peradventure, the rumor is ere this widely circulated through Europe; and statesmen and diplomatists, our enemies and our friends, while uniting in lauding England for her recent exploits in Abyssinia, and her noble sacrifices in giving protection to her official agents and humble citizens, in a far off and barbarous land, are anxiously watching to learn what will be the conduct of the great American nation under almost identical circumstances. I pray that the response may be the immediate departure of every vessel of our squadron, of light draught of water, to the capital of Paraguay.

Such demonstration, made without one day's unnecessary delay, whether successful or not, would, in my judgment, be invaluable to our country and to its navy. And if this be not precisely such a duty as our squadron is kept on this station to discharge when the emergency occurs, then, most assuredly, I am ignorant of any necessity for United States squadrons in every quarter of the world in time of peace.

Pardon me for having written so much. I could not write less. And, whatever may be your decision in the premises, I do not entertain a doubt but it will be based upon patriotism, as it will unquestionably be the result of wisdom and a conscientious discharge of duty.

Believe me, my dear admiral, most devotedly your friend and obedient servant,

J. WATSON WEBB,

U. S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Rear-Admiral CHARLES H. DAVIS,

Commanding United States South Atlantic Squadron.

Mr. Webb to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

No. 75.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Rio de Janeiro, October 24, 1868.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith the continuance of my correspondence with Rear-Admiral Davis, numbered 3, 4, 5, and 6; No. 2 having already been forwarded with my despatch No. 74, via England.

* * * * *

In my second letter to the admiral I give only an extract from my hasty private note, written at the consulate, and asking a boat to be sent me. To show that my only object in suppressing any part of that note was to save time and labor, I now place the entire note before you. It was as follows:

CONSULATE, 12½.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: I inclose for your perusal a letter [from Washburn. I think we should talk this matter over, and see if anything can be done to relieve the two members of the United States legation, so outrageously seized by Lopez. It is one of those cases in which to do nothing is to do wrong; and it appears to me that the mere fact of sending up a force to look after our people would, at least, avert much reproach that will otherwise fall upon us.

As to sending Washburn from the La Plata in a United States gunboat, that is quite unnecessary. Our government has brought him down from Asuncion, and that is demon-

stration sufficient. Now our duty is to look after the other members of the legation. No matter who appointed them, our obligation is equally binding. But I will come to you at two, or a little sooner. I have an appointment at the foreign office at one o'clock, and write this that you may turn the matter over in your mind before I join you. If your boat is at the landing at quarter to two, I shall doubtless be there.

Your friend,

WEBB.

* * * * *

This accounts for my reception by the admiral, as detailed in my second note to him, marked 4, and dated October 9, when he declined doing anything; and so specially to hurry his departure, fixed for the 10th, and get off on Thursday, the 8th. I told him he left me no alternative but to address him an official note, recapitulating all I had said, and urging him to take up the Paraguay every vessel of his squadron of light draught of water, five in number. He said he hoped I would do nothing of the kind. I replied that it was my duty so to do, and make a requisition upon him for the employment of the squadron in the present emergency; and having done that, the responsibility of refusing to act would rest upon him. He answered, "I will write in reply, I do not choose to respond to your call. No, I will not say I do not *choose* to; I will reply, that on my arrival at the river I will investigate the matter." I rejoined, "there is nothing to investigate. I have placed in your hands Mr. Washburn's report to me; and that, and his letter to the British minister at Buenos Ayres, cover the whole ground." In answer to this he said that Washburn's letter was not worthy of credit, as his fears for his life had disqualified him as a witness; he was a frightened man, and his letter to me showed that he had not yet recovered from his fears. I insisted that I knew Washburn, and endorsed all he had written, and that he, the admiral, had no right to listen to, or put faith in, what others said. We then agreed that our official differences of opinion in regard to a question of duty need not, and should not, cause any change in our personal relations. * * * * *

Judge, then, of my surprise at the receipt of his letter of the 8th. He is an exceedingly weak man, notwithstanding his accomplishments, and has those about him who have led him astray. One thing is certain; we cannot both be right, and one of us should be severely censured, if not recalled.

I will not attempt to describe the general feeling of indignation among Americans at the inaction of our squadron and the contemptuous terms in which intelligent men of all nationalities speak of us. To show that neither our government nor its minister are to blame in this, I inserted in a card defending Mr. Washburn, which I published yesterday, a paragraph to which I call your personal attention. You will find that card enclosed.

General McMahon arrived in the steamer Mississippi on the 21st and called on the 22d after having been on board the flag-ship both on the 21st and 22d. Before showing me his instructions from you, he inquired if there would be any obstructions to his going up the Paraguay to Asuncion. I asked if he had any such purpose in view. He said that he had; that Admiral Davis intended to take him to the river next week, when he would change his flag to one of the smaller vessels (the Pawnee) and take him up to Asuncion, in order that he might present his credentials to Lopez and liberate Bliss and Masterman. * * * * *

He said there were so many versions of what had occurred that he could not decide what to do until he reached the river. I replied, "that is an error; there is but one version of the facts of the case to which you or I or the admiral can refer, or which we can receive, and that version

is contained in the official report of your predecessor, the duly accredited minister of the United States to Paraguay, and endorsed by me from my knowledge of the man and his official character."

* * * * *

I should have stated sooner that when the Brazilian Times announced, on the 8th, that the United States squadron was under orders for the river, Admiral Davis, who had that day written me the exceedingly offensive note which called forth my second letter, addressed the editor of that paper as follows:

FLAG-SHIP GUERRIERE, October 9, 1868.

MY DEAR SIR: I am very much obliged to you for the two papers which you very kindly sent me, and I shall have the pleasure of saying this in person on my return from Petropolis.

I see in these papers that you take an interest in the movements of my squadron, but that the source of your information is incorrect. Not only is the squadron not under orders for the La Plata, but no single vessel of the squadron is under sailing orders at this moment for any place.

Very truly yours,

C. H. DAVIS, *Rear-Admiral.*

WILLIAM SCULLEY,

Editor and Proprietor of the Anglo-Brazilian Times.

I learn that the English have two boats up the Paraguay, and they are hourly expecting a third to arrive, which will be immediately sent up to join the Linnet and Beacon. France, Italy, and Portugal have one each. Lopez refused to give up his English prisoners to the English secretary of legation, Mr. Gould, who was on board the Linnet, and that gentleman immediately left to report to his minister at Buenos Ayres. Lopez then sent word to the French gunboat Decidée, that he was willing to release the Englishmen.

Mr. Washburn writes me under date of the 14th October, confirming the previous report that Lopez *had shot both his brothers and his sister*, the widow of General Barrios, who committed suicide some months ago to escape torture. And Mr. Matthew, the English envoy at this court, writes me as follows. Although his note is marked "private," I have his permission to send it to you:

Private.]

OCTOBER 15, 1868.

MY DEAR GENERAL: Will you allow me to ask what steps you are taking in consequence of the treatment of your legation in Paraguay? If the last letter published as from Mr. Bliss was genuine, its tone, I am sorry to say, confirms the belief that it was written under torture.

Rumors of all kinds are, of course, rife, and I frankly confess that I expected ere this to have heard of some decided course of action, and I should be very sorry to see the prestige of the United States in this land affected by any unsuitable delay or hesitation in a case that seems worse than ours in Abyssinia.

Indeed, I almost question whether all nations should not unite in bringing this monster to his senses. The latest accounts I see assert that Lopez had ordered his *sister* and his *brothers* to execution.

With best regards to Mrs. Webb, believe me, my dear general, most truly yours,

G. BUCKLEY MATTHEW.

His Excellency General WEBB, &c., &c., &c.

My only reply was a statement of the fact that Rear-Admiral Davis ignored my right to have any opinion on the subject, while his admiral, Ramsay, promptly responded to his calls, and sent every vessel he had up the Paraguay, and will send up the gunboat to arrive.

* * * * *

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. WATSON WEBB.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Secretary of State.

Rear-Admiral Davis to Mr. Webb.

UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP GUERRIERE (1st rate),
Rio de Janeiro, October 8, 1868.

SIR: I owe you, perhaps, an apology for not having acknowledged sooner the reception of your letter of the 6th instant, in which you give me the *unsolicited* benefit of your opinion on the subject of my official duties.

Since your opinion is formed without a knowledge of all the circumstances of the case, I may not, possibly, attach so much value to it as you seem to expect.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. H. DAVIS,
Rear-Admiral Commanding South Atlantic Squadron.

His Excellency J. WATSON WEBB,
*United States Minister Plenipotentiary
and Envoy Extraordinary to the Court of Brazil.*

Mr. Webb to Rear-Admiral Davis.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES.
Boa Viagem, October 9, 1868.

SIR: On returning from the United States consulate to the ferry, yesterday afternoon, when passing a Portuguese corner grocery, known as "Portuguese Joe's," the proprietor stopped my carriage and placed in my hands your official letter dated yesterday, October 8, in answer to my official letter of the 6th, delivered on board the *Guerriere* on the same day, by my secretary in person. Your letter is as follows:

SIR: I owe you, perhaps, an apology for not having acknowledged sooner the reception of your letter of the 6th instant, in which you give me the *unsolicited benefit* of your opinion on the subject of my official duties.

Since your opinion is formed without a knowledge of all the circumstances of the case, I may not, possibly, attach as much value to it as you seem to expect.

There is no mistaking the purport of this language; although it does appear incredible to me that it should have been penned by you.

The first paragraph of your response to my letter of the 6th is, as subsequent reflection must have satisfied you, equally *inaccurate and unjust*. To demonstrate this declaration, I am compelled to go back to the origin of a difference of opinion which the tenor of your note aims to convert into a *personally* offensive correspondence.

Immediately on receiving and reading Mr. Washburn's letter, which I did at the consulate on the 5th, I handed it to Fleet Surgeon Duvall to read and to deliver to you; and while he was reading it, I addressed to you the following hasty note and handed it to the doctor, which you subsequently returned to me:

CONSULATE, 12½.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: I enclose for your perusal a letter from Washburn. I think we should talk over this matter and see if anything can be done to relieve the two members of the United States legation, so outrageously seized by Lopez. It is one of the cases in which to do nothing is to do wrong; and it appears to me that the mere fact of sending up a force to look after our people would at least avert much reproach that will otherwise fall upon us.

* * * * *

Your friend,

J. WATSON WEBB.

On my arrival on board you promptly indicated your unwillingness to act in the affair, and put to me the question, "What would you have me do?" I certainly did not consider that you thereby intended to ask my advice in the premises, because you took prompt measures to intimate that my advice was not desirable. But I understood then, as I do now, that I, having invited a friendly consultation on the subject, you were really desirous of knowing what it was I would have you do. To that question I replied at length in my letter of the 6th; and in that reply not only stated my wishes as the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States accredited to Brazil, but, as it was my imperative duty to do, I gave you my reasons for desiring prompt and energetic action on your part in vindication of the honor of our country, as well as to afford protection to our much-abused citizens.

To what you allude as "official duties," I am quite unable to determine. Most assuredly I have not attempted to interfere with the administration of the affairs of your squadron, and I do not pretend even to have any knowledge of its internal condition. I have contented myself with the discharge of my duty in pointing out to you what in my judgment the honor and dignity of our country demand, and wherein our people require that protection which it is made the duty of our navy to afford; and to secure which is the sole object of your presence here, at the cost of many millions annually to the public treasury. In doing this I have not gone beyond the strict line of my duty, as better information in regard to what a minister's duty is, in an emergency like the present, cannot fail to convince you. But I might have gone still further than I did, and not only have pointed out your duty and advised you what to do, but finding you *tardy* in recognizing your duty in the premises, and ignoring the testimony of United States officials and adopting the charges and rumors of the Brazilian press and of Americans in Brazilian employ, I might with great propriety have formally remonstrated against your supineness and your rejection of official testimony, while you endorsed the slanders put forth against Mr. Washburn by those whose interest it is to traduce him.

When I addressed you my letter of the 6th, I regretted the necessity of so doing, and dreaded an official collision between friends. Your letter of yesterday has completely eradicated all those regrets. Its deliberate ignoring of a minister's having any opinion whatever in regard to matters relative to which he should be far better posted than under any circumstances you can be, and your arrogantly assuming to yourself, and consequently to the junior lieutenant in the navy, an absolute superiority over the envoys extraordinary of our country, be they who they may, brings at once to an amicable issue a question which it is the interest of our country should be settled by legislation, and not be left longer to the whims and caprices of officers of the navy, to the very serious injury and possible dishonor and discredit of our country. According to your theory, it is a positive offence against your dignity, meriting rebuke such as is conveyed to me in your note of yesterday, for the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from the United States to Brazil to entertain any opinion whatever upon a great outrage such as has been perpetrated by Paraguay against the honor and dignity of the United States; and if he should happen to entertain such an opinion, and, in the discharge of what he considers a duty, should venture to express it, no matter how courteously, and point out what in his judgment should be done, he is guilty of a crime for which any ensign in the navy who happens to be in command of a gunboat may rebuke and insult him!

Permit me to illustrate my meaning. For more than three years past

we have had on this coast a South Atlantic squadron, consisting of from six to eight steamers in number, and sustained certainly at a cost of not less than \$5,000,000; and yet, during that period, the only *national* services required of it have been the firing of a salute to the Brazilian flag in Bahia as an *amende honorable*, promised by me, the United States envoy extraordinary, in consequence of our having violated Brazilian neutrality in cutting out and capturing in Brazilian waters the pirate Florida. That salute should have been fired by the flag-ship because, when a great nation resolves to make an *amende honorable*, self-respect demands that such *amende* shall be made in a magnanimous and manly manner. But your predecessor, having denounced any such concession to the wounded honor of Brazil, and actuated by anything but a commendable feeling towards the civil service of our country, and incapable of appreciating the chivalry of the act, sent one of the smallest gunboats in our navy to perform this duty, while he in the flag-ship remained in this harbor; and when the duty had been discharged in a manner so disreputable to us and so offensive to Brazil, he immediately sailed for Bahia to demonstrate, as it were, the contemptuous manner in which the matter had been disposed of. One high in authority here very justly remarked, "It was an act of grace performed most ungraciously;" and it became my duty to explain that no *slight* was intended by our government, and that it was our misfortune to have had in command a naval officer who could not understand, much less appreciate, the delicate duty with the performance of which he was entrusted, and who did not perceive that it was his own country and not Brazil that was slighted by his proceeding.

The salute referred to was fired by the Nipsic, commanded at that time by one of the junior lieutenant commanders in service.

The next *national* service rendered by the squadron was by the gunboat Shamokin, which was permitted to take Mr. Washburn, our minister to Paraguay, through the enemy's lines, because I gave notice to this government that if they refused such permission I should demand my passport.

And the third occasion upon which our squadron has rendered a *national* service was when you sent the Wasp to Asuncion after Mr. Washburn, and after a detention of seven weeks at the allied headquarters permission to pass was peremptorily refused by the Marquis de Caxias. You, at my request, reported the facts to me, and I, contrary to your judgment, insisted upon our *right* to send her to Asuncion, and demanded that all hindrance to her passing up should cease. Twice, in formal notes from the foreign office, was the demand rejected, and the conduct of the Marquis de Caxias approved. I then again, in opposition to the advice of cautious friends, assumed the responsibility of informing this government that on a certain day either my passports or an order for the Wasp's going up to Asuncion must be sent me.

Thereupon all opposition to the Wasp's passing the blockading lines of the allies was withdrawn. I communicated the facts to you, and requested that the same vessel, commanded by the same intelligent gentleman, might be sent up to Paraguay. You promptly complied with my request, and, thank God, she not only arrived safely at her destination, but most providentially just in time to save the lives of our minister and family.

Now you know that the Nipsic could have rendered all the national services performed for our squadron by the Shamokin and Wasp; and at the same time have made an annual visit to the coast of Africa. Let us suppose, then, that the Nipsic, commanded by a lieutenant commander, had been the only United States vessel of war on the station, and that upon receiving Mr. Washburn's report of the gross outrage perpetrated in Paraguay against the honor of our country and the rights

and liberties of our people, I had addressed him the identical letter I addressed to you; are you prepared to say that such lieutenant in command would have been justified in sending me in response such an exceedingly offensive note as that to which I am replying? You will not pretend that any immunity in the premises attaches to you which would not equally apply to him. The rights and immunities, whatever they may be, attach to the position, to the officer in command, and have no relation to his rank.

I now pass to the second paragraph of your note, in which you say:

Since your opinion is formed without a knowledge of the circumstances of the case, I may not, possibly, attach so much value to it as you seem to expect.

This is a most extraordinary, gratuitous, and, I must add, a most reckless assertion. And upon what is it based? If upon testimony of a higher character than that of our duly accredited minister, received by you since our interview, then, most assuredly, it was your duty to have apprised me of such testimony being in your possession. But such a supposition is simply impossible; because, there can be no reliable testimony—nay, there cannot, in the nature of things, be any testimony whatever in the case which can for one moment weigh against Mr. Washburn's history of what has occurred in Paraguay, as reported to me and as has been set forth by him in his official letter to the British minister accredited to the Argentine Republic. Besides, you distinctly informed me on Monday, that although you had received Commander Kirkland's official report of his having performed the duties assigned him, he had made no report upon the events which had transpired in Paraguay. Of course not. Commander Kirkland is too wise to pretend to make a report upon events of which he necessarily could know nothing except what he learned from Mr. Washburn.

It follows, then, that your unwarranted assumption that my "opinion was formed without a knowledge of all the circumstances of the case," has no other foundation whatever than the abuse heaped upon Mr. Washburn in the allied press, because he has told, imprudently perhaps, disagreeable truths about the Marquis de Caxias, and upon the slanderous stories concocted by the allies, and retailed and circulated by Americans in the pay of Brazil, who consider it a condition of their employment that they shall be more Brazilian than Brazilians themselves. And upon such data you venture to set aside the elaborate and carefully prepared testimony of the American minister, who has just escaped from Paraguay with his life; and as an apology for so doing affect to discover in his own report of events, the evidence of a man writing under such excitement (the result of bodily fear) as discredits his testimony. This is, indeed, an extraordinary state of things; and whatever may be "your official duties," and however disagreeable it may be to receive "unsolicited" opinions in regard to them, I venture the assertion, that thus to repudiate the direct testimony of a duly accredited United States minister upon the unfounded slanders of his enemies cannot and does not constitute any part of such "duties." And I assert, moreover, that your repudiation of Mr. Washburn's testimony, officially endorsed by me, has no more warrant than your uncalled for assumption and unqualified declaration that my "opinion is formed without a knowledge of all the circumstances of the case."

I will only add, in conclusion, that the question of the relative duties and respective rights of United States ministers and naval officers in command, which for some purpose that I cannot fathom you have thought proper to raise, should, and I trust will, be speedily settled by Congress. Whether in your favor or mine, does not matter. We are simply the

instruments whose differences in a far-off land, in regard to what action is demanded by our naval forces on this station in vindication of the nation's honor, the rights of its officials, and the lives of its citizens, must and will call forth congressional legislation too long delayed. To secure such a result I shall cause this correspondence to be called for at the next session of Congress; and to convince you that, in the performance of my whole duty in this emergency, I do not intend to permit an official difference of opinion to degenerate into a personal controversy, I enclose herewith a copy of my despatch to the Department of State, written yesterday, when you were penning your extraordinary note to me, and which went forward by the steamer to Southampton this morning. Its spirit will be found somewhat different from that which guided your pen, and invited a personal controversy. To that spirit I shall adhere; and now feel it my duty to reiterate my requisition upon you, promptly and properly, to employ the large naval force under your command in the vindication of our national honor, the protection of the diplomatic rights of our country, and to attempt at least to save the lives of our outraged officials.

You may not know—and probably, if you did, would ignore it if reported to you by any one in the civil service of our country, but it is nevertheless my duty to inform you—that among the diplomatic representatives of foreign governments at this court, so far as I can learn, there is no difference of opinion in regard to what is expected from our minister and naval force on this station. They do not know that you and I are at variance on the question of duty; and, judging me by the past, they assume most naturally that we will not be unmindful of what is due to our country, and, in her vindication, to the civilized world. As evidence of this sentiment, I copy from a note of his excellency George Buckley Matthew, the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Great Britain at this court, his opinion upon this emergency, and which undoubtedly is the opinion of all his colleagues. You will perceive by its date that it was written on Tuesday, although it only reached me last evening:

OCTOBER 6.

MY DEAR GENERAL: 'Tis not pleasant to add to bad news, but a live to the eleventh hour tells me that your unfortunate countryman, *Bliss*, had been cruelly *tortured*, and that his companion was said to have been *shot*.

If U. S. (Uncle Sam) stands that he can't hold up his head again. * * *

Yours, always.

I am in the receipt, too, of another letter from Mr. Washburn, dated the 29th September, (doubtful authority, the Brazilians, native and adopted, will tell you,) by which it appears that, in ignorance of your estimate of his character and the character of his testimony, he has addressed you a letter on the subject of his affairs. He says, among other things:

Come what may, I fear that I am embargoed here for several weeks. The reaction that has come upon Mrs. Washburn renders it out of the question that she should venture to sea at present. While the danger lasted, and we did not know but I should be arrested, tortured to death or shot, and she sent on foot to the Cordilleras, she held up bravely. But the danger is past, and she has completely broken down. Visions of imprisonment, fetters and stripes for your humble servant, disturb and haunt her, and her doctor tells me to-day she must keep entirely quiet, and not go out for weeks. This excitement and prolonged strain on the nerves has brought on * * * ; so that there is no remedy but to wait here till she is sufficiently restored to start for home. What she most needs is quiet, together with sleep, undisturbed by horrid visions of Lopez and torture.

A horrible picture this; but horrible as it is, be assured, no matter what others will tell you to the contrary, and no matter how great your unfounded prejudices against Mr. Washburn, it is strictly true. Mr.

Washburn is incapable of falsehood. His report of events in Paraguay is as worthy of credit as if signed by you or by me; and we may judge from Mrs. Washburn's present state what she and her husband have passed through.

May I not indulge the hope that this picture of the present consequences of past events may induce you to accept the truth as officially presented to you instead of your being biased in your judgment, and permitting your official action to be controlled by the representation of interested individuals? General Quitman, a northern man and class-mate of mine, brought me a challenge from Brooks after his brutal assault upon Sumner, and my account of that infamous affair; and in justification of his bringing the challenge he informed me that no northern man could live quietly in the south unless he proclaimed himself more ultra upon the question of slavery than the slaveholders themselves. May not this be the condition of our countrymen in the employ of Brazil? Be this as it may, the only purpose for which the United States squadron is stationed on this coast, at enormous cost to our treasury, is to give protection to American commerce and American citizens, and to defend and vindicate the national honor, no matter by whom assailed. This cannot be accomplished by its lying idly in the harbor of Rio. The squadron you command is not here either for your pleasure or your convenience; and patriotism requires that it should be in the waters of the La Plata. And therefore it becomes my imperative duty, earnestly but respectfully, to urge upon you an immediate departure for the south.

SATURDAY, October 10.

While writing, I have had placed in my hands the following from the British minister written yesterday. I have not seen Governor Matthew for a week, but I know he speaks the sentiments of the entire diplomatic corps as well as the wishes of every disinterested and patriotic American in this region:

OCTOBER 9.

MY DEAR GENERAL: Is your fleet going down to the river and up? I hope so. I declare to you I think we should have a general *raid* upon that wretch, who, with such a foe as Caxias, will go on for months.

Yours always,

G. BUCKLEY MATTHEW.

Does it not occur to you, admiral, that it is alike strange and unaccountable that you alone, of all intelligent men in Brazil, and without the sympathy of a solitary disinterested countryman, should look unconcernedly upon the outrage perpetrated against our national honor, and should persistently refuse to employ our squadron for the purposes for which alone it was intrusted to your care? Does it not become you to scan close the influences which guide and mislead you; and, irrespective of self, to try and discover what the honor of our country requires at your hands?

Should this correspondence be continued, I request that you will send your official notes to me in the same manner that you have heretofore forwarded your private correspondence, that is, by a boat from the *Guerrière* direct to the legation. Or if that should be inconvenient, please send your letters to our consulate, which is in close proximity to the fleet landing. It is not seemly that an official correspondence between the United States minister and the naval officer in command of a station, no matter how exalted or humble his rank, should be left at a corner grocery, to be forwarded when the proprietor of such grocery finds it convenient to send lard and groceries to the minister's kitchen. One

proceeding of that nature is quite sufficient to indicate your contempt for the subject discussed, even if not intended to be personally offensive to your minister.

This note, like my previous one, will be delivered to you in person on board the *Guerrière* by my secretary.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. WATSON WEBB.

Rear-Admiral CHARLES H. DAVIS,
Commanding South Atlantic Squadron.

Rear-Admiral Davis to Mr. Webb.

UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP GUERRIÈRE,
Rio de Janeiro, October 13, 1868.

SIR: I received your letter dated the 9th instant on the evening of Saturday, the 10th instant.

Its style and language, and the character of its imputations, forbid the continuance, on my part, of this correspondence.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. H. DAVIS,

Rear-Admiral, Commanding South Atlantic Squadron.

His Excellency J. WATSON WEBB,
*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the United States, Boa Viagem.*

Mr. Webb to Rear-Admiral Davis.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Boa Viagem, October 14, 1868.

SIR: I am in the receipt of your letter, in which you say:

SIR: I received your letter dated the 9th instant on the evening of Saturday, the 10th instant.

Its style and language, and the character of its imputations, forbid the continuance, on my part, of this correspondence.

I immediately read with great care the notes which have passed between us, with an avowed determination that if I discovered in aught I have written any imputation whatever upon your character or conduct, promptly to withdraw and apologize for it. The result of such careful examination of our correspondence is a conviction that the only imputations contained in it are to be found in your unwarranted and uncalled-for note of the 6th instant. A statement of facts, however disagreeable, cannot be considered "imputations."

I am sorry my "style" does not please you. Looking only to the discharge of a public duty, I did not consider it incumbent upon me to aim at any peculiarity of "style" in order to render grave official truths acceptable to a fastidious taste; and I employed the simple language of earnest conviction as eminently suited to the occasion.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. WATSON WEBB.

Rear-Admiral CHARLES H. DAVIS,
Commanding South Atlantic Squadron.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Webb.

No. 238.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 17, 1868.

SIR: Your despatch of the 8th ultimo, without number, has been received. The recent events in Paraguay to which it refers may be regarded as painfully important. The letter* of this department to the Secretary of the Navy, a copy of which is enclosed, has been approved by the President, and may be accepted as our present impression in regard to affairs in that quarter. Any further measures which may be considered or adopted will depend upon future developments.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

JAMES WATSON WEBB, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

GREAT BRITAIN.

Mr. Moran to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

No. 88.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, August 4, 1868.

SIR: On Sunday last, the 2d instant, I received a note from General J. Watson Webb, the United States minister at Rio, a copy of which I have the honor to enclose, and yesterday I sent you by the cable the message, almost word for word, which he requests me in that letter to transmit to you.

* * * * *

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

BENJAMIN MORAN.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Webb to Mr. Moran.

[Extract.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Rio de Janeiro, July 8, 1868.

MY DEAR MORAN: I do not know who I address in the enclosed, as I am told Mr. Adams has gone home; but I beg there may be no delay in forwarding the telegram.

My orders are precise, to demand my passports and come home if our steamer is not permitted to pass; and I have reason to believe that the conduct of Caxias in stopping her will be approved. Of course, on receiving my telegram our government will begin preparations to force the passage of the allied lines, and will probably communicate with me through your legation.

* * * * *

Your friend,

J. WATSON WEBB.

BENJAMIN MORAN, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

*For this enclosure see instructions to Mr. Washburn, No. 78, November 17, 1868.

Rio, July 8, 1868.

The steamer Wasp has been refused permission to pass the allied lines for Mr. Washburn and family. I have demanded the censure of Caxias and permission for the Wasp to pass. If refused, will, as instructed, demand my passports.

J. WATSON WEBB.

To the Legation of the United States in London :

I have the honor to request that the foregoing may be telegraphed to the Secretary of State of the United States at your earliest convenience. Doubtless by the freight line of steamers to Liverpool on the 15th I'll send our government further information through the legation at London.

With great respect, &c.,

J. WATSON WEBB,
*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
from the United States to Brazil.*

Mr. Seward to Mr. Johnson.

No. 6.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 25, 1868.

SIR: Mr. Moran's despatch of the 4th of August, No. 88, concerning affairs in Brazil, is received, and his proceedings are approved.

I give you herewith a copy of an instruction for Mr. Webb which goes by cable to-day.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

REVERDY JOHNSON, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Johnson.

[Telegram per cable.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 25, 1868.

Inform Webb at Rio that instructions to him were sent yesterday by United States mail steamship from New York to Rio. His demand for permission for the Wasp to go for Washburne is approved, but his demand for passport must be suspended until further directions, which will go by the same mail steamer, September 23.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

REVERDY JOHNSON, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

PARAGUAY.

Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward.

No. 92.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Asuncion, October 14, 1867.

SIR: Your despatches from No. 64 to No. 71, inclusive, were all received by me yesterday. They were brought by a French gunboat which has come up to Curupaiti from Buenos Ayres for the purpose of

bringing up the new consul and taking away Mr. Laurent Cochelet, who for the last four years has been the French consul here, and who some eight months ago was named as consul to Richmond, Virginia, but has been unable to leave until now, as the person named as his successor seems to have been disinclined to enter Paraguay, lest he should get into a trap from which it would not be easy to extricate himself. This delay has caused the tardy successor to be retired by his government and another man has been sent to relieve M. Cochelet, whose situation here for the last two years has been as disagreeable as it is easy to conceive. He will leave here to-morrow, and I will take the opportunity to send through my despatches by him.

The situation in a military point of view is, so far as I can learn, about the same as at the date of my last despatch. There has been some fighting since then, but no decided advantage seems to have been gained by either party. It is very hard to get any accurate information here as to the true state of the Paraguay army, as every skirmish is represented as a great victory. The Paraguayan army seems to be nearly surrounded, but yet not entirely so, for the telegraph from this place to Humaita is most of the time in working order, and the steamers continue to run to near Humaita. There is a space of some five miles from the advanced lines of the allies to the river that is still open, though it is said that the Paraguayans find it very difficult to pass any cattle through that way. The allies have once occupied Pilar, a town some seven leagues above Humaita, and there have been reports that skirmishing parties have been seen at a considerable distance this side of there. As any town or district seems to be threatened the inhabitants are required to move away to the north. As no people are left but women and children it is a great hardship, but in this war hardships to the people are not counted. It is believed here that the inhabitants have been compelled to leave the country for a long distance above Pilar, and it has been reported that Villa Franca, which is about half way between this place and Humaita, has also been evacuated. If this be so, then it is pretty certain that the allied troops are moving up by land at some distance from the river, and there is great fear among the people here that they will be compelled to evacuate this place. In fact it is evident that the government is preparing for such an emergency. The nearest relations of the President have already left for the interior and taken away their most valuable movable property, and other families which it is supposed are highest in favor are constantly moving out of town. Others are in great dread that an order will be issued for everybody else to leave the town; so that the enemy, if they come here, will find neither people nor food. Some even fear that the town may be razed, but that is preposterous, as the best part of it is owned by the Lopez family, who have been building some and buying largely within the last year. It is also whispered here (reports are not permitted) that the government archives and the government property in the custom-house have all been sent into the interior. The departure of so many families cannot escape notice, and the reason given for it is that they have left from fear of the cholera. But as nobody seems to have any fear of the cholera, it is believed that the favored families are advised to do in time, and at their convenience, what the multitude will be ordered to do in a hurry. Naturally there is great alarm and anxiety here among both natives and foreigners, and I am often asked what I shall do in case the threatened evils come upon them. I tell them all that I shall stay at my post until I am ordered to leave it by my government. If the enemy come and bombard the town they can bombard my house, but I shall keep my flag flying and shall

not leave it; and if they or anybody else shall blow up the town they can blow me up with it, for I shall not leave my post except I am carried away a prisoner and by force. This determination seems to have given great confidence to people who think many evils may be averted by my remaining here. A good many, mostly foreigners, have brought their money and other valuables to my house for safe-keeping, as I tell all that whatever protection my house and flag can give to my own property will be given to theirs, but that I take no responsibility and give no receipts; so that if the town is sacked, and my house with others, neither I nor my government will be in any way liable for the damage done or the property taken.

Should the evacuation of the town be ordered—and I believe it will be if the war lasts much longer—it is uncertain whether the foreigners will or will not be permitted to remain. If they are not, I apprehend many will ask admission to my premises and request protection, which it would be hard to refuse and might be embarrassing to grant. As against the enemy, however, I have not hesitated to say that this legation will give whatever protection it can to whomsoever, save notorious criminals, may resort to it in time of danger. I am unable to see that any advantage can result to the cause of President Lopez by the evacuation of the capital, for if once the enemy should get possession of it his cause would be irretrievably lost. And yet the conviction is universal here that if the war is not soon over the evacuation will be enforced. Such an act must cause great misery, and probably it would not be carried out towards foreigners if the English, French, and Italian ministers in Buenos Ayres would make strong protests against it, and send up each a gunboat to await results. I could not expect an American gunboat to come up, as there are very few Americans here, and I do not suppose those few would be molested.

In your despatch of May 20, No. 66, in reply to mine of March 11 and March 12, Nos. 81 and 82, in which I expressed a wish to be recalled, you remark that the President would be pleased if I would remain at my post, but that if I shall make my resignation absolute, it will be accepted.

In my despatch No. 82 I made no conditions in regard to my resignation; but I did express a wish that my successor might arrive before I left, as if I, the only foreign minister here, were to leave, and no one were to come to take my place, the people here would think they were abandoned by the civilized world and left to be exterminated. I also said that it would be hardly possible for me to leave the country with my family unless some means were provided by the government for my departure; but as no successor has been appointed, it is clearly my duty to remain until the war is over, or until the dangers that now threaten are past. I fear gloomy times, but I am satisfied I can be of much service to many, even if the worst shall happen, and am well aware that should an opportunity arise for initiating terms of peace, my efforts in the matter would be more acceptable to this government than those of any other person whatsoever.

Very respectfully, I am, sir, your obedient servant,

CHARLES A. WASHBURN.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward.

No. 95.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Asuncion, January 13, 1868.

SIR: On the 14th of October last, in my despatch No. 92, I had the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches Nos. 68, 69, 70, 71, and to advise you of the condition of affairs in this country. Since then I have received nothing from the United States, as we are still cut off from all intercourse with the outer world. At the date of my last despatch, No. 94, I did not suppose this war could last till this time, and then expressed a willingness to remain to the end, as I believed I might be of some service should the time for making peace ever arrive. But the aspect of affairs is so changed since then that I have considered that resolution. I see little reason why the war should not last another year. At least the end has never appeared so remote to me as it does now. From what I can learn of affairs below everything is going badly with the allies. Several provinces of the Argentine Republic are said to be in revolution, and President Mitre has been obliged to resign his presidency and his post as commander-in-chief of the army on account of ill health, and has gone to Europe. Such at least are the reports here. Meanwhile I cannot learn that they are doing anything with their army or squadron calculated to bring affairs to a crisis. It seems as though it was their policy to starve out Paraguay; but they will find that a long process, and one to which I have no wish to be a victim. They appear afraid to make a general attack on the Paraguayan lines, and the Paraguayans have no idea of coming out of their entrenchments so long as they can keep the way open for obtaining supplies. I have no reason to suppose they will not be able to do that for a long time, and therefore, with the policy now pursued on both sides, I see no light, no hope of peace for a long time. Even should the "triple alliance" be broken up, and Brazil be left alone to carry on the war, with her credit ruined and her home resources exhausted, I nevertheless believe that a large part of the squadron would remain in the river, and that Paraguay would still be effectually blockaded, perhaps as long as Montevideo once was, viz., nine years. I think that under such circumstances it would hardly be expected that I should remain here till the end of the war. I see no probability of my receiving anything from beyond the allied lines until some United States gunboat may come to fetch it. The English, French, and Italian governments have each recently sent a war vessel through the squadron to Curupaiti to communicate with this government, and I have no reason to suppose either of them will return for several months. The last that came (the Italian) left Buenos Ayres about the 10th of November, but it brought nothing for me, though there must have been an accumulation of two or three months' mail matter for me in Buenos Ayres. I learned, however, with the most profound regret, that our minister there, Mr. Asboth, was so exceedingly ill that he could scarcely speak, much less attend to any business, and that his friends had small hopes of his recovery. He had previously been my entire dependence for receiving my despatches or other correspondence, or any needed supplies, and I am well aware that in his state of health his efforts to alleviate the unpleasant position of myself and family have caused him great trouble and annoyance. It took him nearly four months to get through to me a small supply of stores that were indispensably necessary, and without which I could not have remained. I cannot expect him to be at as much trouble again, though I have advised

him that the stock then sent would be exhausted before this time, as it actually is; but as the allies complained that it was preposterous that I should require so much, and detained everything for more than three months, I conclude that any other efforts to relieve me that he might make would be attended by similar discourtesies and embarrassments. The prices of almost everything here are such as are only known in times of siege. All these things could be endured were there any certainty, or even a probability, that they would come to an end within a few months. But as it is, the prospect of peace is so remote that I must again ask for my recall.

In your despatch No. 66 you remark that the President desires that I should remain here, but say that if my resignation should be made absolute it would be accepted. From the preceding statement of the circumstances in which I am situated I think I shall appear justified in making my resignation thus absolute; but though it be absolute and unconditional, I trust with my recall may come a successor. I know that my presence as United States minister, and the only minister of a neutral power here, gives a great sense of security to many people, and especially to all foreigners. My departure before the arrival of a successor would also, I am persuaded, be regarded with great regret by this government. At the same time I think that at this crisis, when important political changes seem impending in this part of the world, this legation should be continued; but I do not want this to be taken as a condition of my resignation. On the contrary, I now ask my recall unconditionally, and with this make my resignation absolute.

I will add that whoever may be my successor, he will find it impossible to get here with the baggage and provisions necessary for a six months' residence, unless a war vessel is sent purposely to bring him; but if no successor should come to take my place my letter of recall would probably not reach me for months unless special measures were taken to send it to me, and if it were received I could not, as circumstances now are, and very likely will be six months hence, leave the country with my family unless a national vessel were sent up the river and above the blockading squadron to take me away.

I have the honor to be, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,
 CHARLES A. WASHBURN.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Washburn.

No. 75.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 14, 1868.

SIR: Your despatch No. 92, of October 14, was received on the 24th ultimo.

The account you give of the state of political affairs in the country of your residence is far from encouraging.

Your determination to remain at your post of duty as long as you can be of any service to our countrymen is highly commended.

Your intention to afford an asylum in the legation to those who may resort to it, save notorious criminals, as far as it can be done without compromising your neutral character or that of your country, is approved.

The Secretary of the Navy has been informed that it is necessary to

have a vessel ready to relieve you from your embarrassing situation. His reply I enclose for your information.

I am sir, &c.,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

CHARLES A. WASHBURN, Esq., &c., &c.,
Asuncion, Paraguay.

Mr. Welles to Mr. Seward.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., January 8, 1868.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th ultimo, in reference to the aspect of affairs in the Rio de la Plata, and the necessity of having a vessel of the navy ready to relieve Mr. Washburn, minister resident to Paraguay, from his embarrassing and probably dangerous position.

A copy of your communication has been transmitted to Rear-Admiral Charles H. Davis, commanding the South Atlantic squadron.

Very respectfully,

G. WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward.

No. 96.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
Asuncion, January 17, 1868.

SIR: Since closing my last despatch of the 13th instant, I have been advised by the minister of foreign affairs, Señor Berges, of the death of General Bartolomé Mitre, president of the Argentine Republic and commander-in-chief of the allied armies. Of this event you will probably have been advised for some weeks before the receipt of this despatch. It had been reported here, previously, that President Mitre had left the army by reason of his infirm state of health and gone to Europe. It appears now, however, that he died in the camp. On the day of his funeral, I am informed by Señor Berges that President Lopez gave orders that not a shot should be fired from the Paraguayan camp. This act of courtesy and magnanimity, I have learned indirectly, was but illy responded to by the Brazilians, who, through the whole day, kept up an incessant cannonading on Humaita.

I am utterly unable to conjecture what may be the effect of this important event on this long protracted war. The opinion of Señor Berges, and I think of this government, is that it will be favorable to Paraguay, that his death will be followed by serious disturbances and revolutions in the Argentine Republic, which may compel the withdrawal of all the Argentine troops from the army and break up the "triple alliance." This result may follow from President Mitre's death, but I have great doubts in the matter. But whether it does or not, I do not see how it will have any effect towards bringing the war to a close. Brazil will still have her immense squadron in the river that can be maintained at little more expense where it is than it would cost in the harbor of Rio

de Janeiro. Besides that, one-half of the squadron is now so placed between the batteries of Curupaiti and Humaita that I doubt if it could get away without the permission of the Paraguayans, and as the river is now falling it is not likely their condition will be improved. They must stay there and defend themselves, or else make a more ignominious retreat than ever was known, abandoning iron-clads and other vessels that have cost many, many millions of dollars—more than all Paraguay would sell for in quarter sections. This I do not believe they will do, and therefore the war must last till there is neither Paraguay nation, nor people, nor government left. The longer the war lasts, the more I am convinced that this people will never be conquered. They may be exterminated, but, as I have frequently had occasion to say before, it will be only when there are neither men nor women left that the terms of the "triple alliance" will be enforced. Whether other nations may interfere to put a stop to a war carried on not for purposes of conquest only, but with the deliberate view of exterminating a nation whose existence mars the symmetry of a neighboring empire, is a question on which it is not for me to pronounce. But this I do say, that so complete is the organization of this country, and so entirely are all its elements absolutely at the command of President Lopez, to be devoted to repelling the allies and to maintaining the established government, that to all appearance the war may be prolonged for many months, and if from sheer exhaustion this country must fall, its conquerors will find little but a desert.

To avert so sad a climax is it not possible that neutral powers may *intervene*, may declare to both parties that this miserable war must stop and impose their terms of peace, saying to whichever party may refuse to accept them that it must thenceforward reckon all the governments whose good offices have been rejected as enemies that will afterwards enforce harder terms than those rejected.

I know not if anything of this kind is feasible. But I know this miserable war ought to end, and I see no other way for it.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

CHARLES A. WASHBURN.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Washburn.

No. 76.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 2, 1868.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches numbered 95 and 96, of the 15th and 17th of January last.

I have read with painful interest the account which you give of the unhappy condition of affairs in Paraguay, and in view of which you have been induced to tender your resignation of the position of minister resident of the United States at Asuncion.

I am directed by the President to inform you, in reply, that your resignation is accepted, with permission to exercise your own discretion in regard to awaiting the arrival of a successor.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

CHARLES A. WASHBURN, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

Mr. Seward to Mr. McMahon.

No. 3.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
September 2, 1868.

SIR: When, on the 18th day of August last, you were on the eve of your departure for Asuncion, the capital of Paraguay, as minister resident of the United States to that republic, this department, by direction of the President, requested you to remain in the United States until you should receive further instructions. The occasion of that direction was that Rear-Admiral Davis, who commands the United States South Atlantic squadron, had just then reported that he had sent the United States ship of war *Wasp* up the Parana for the purpose of bringing away your predecessor, Mr. Charles A. Washburn, and his family, from Asuncion, thereby removing them from an embarrassing and possibly dangerous situation. Rear-Admiral Davis had further reported that the Marquis de Caxias, who commands the allied forces, had refused to permit the *Wasp* to pass through his blockade up to Asuncion, in consequence of which refusal the *Wasp*, after a long delay, had returned to Montevideo without having accomplished the object of her voyage. The admiral having brought this transaction to the knowledge of Mr. Webb, the United States minister at Rio, that minister had made it the subject of a representation to the government of Brazil, in which he demanded that the proceedings of the Marquis de Caxias might be disapproved, and that the *Wasp* might be allowed to proceed without delay to Asuncion, for the purpose of removing Mr. Washburn and his family from that place. Mr. Webb, at the same time, gave intimations to this department that, if the demands he had thus made upon the Brazilian government should be denied, he should, in that case, ask for a passport, and immediately withdraw from Brazil. The Brazilian government was still holding the demands of Mr. Webb under consideration at the time when your intended departure was arrested by this department.

It was then supposed that the opposition which the Brazilian commander of the allied forces made to the use of the United States ship of war for the removal of Mr. Washburn from Asuncion, if persisted in, would equally embarrass your journey to Asuncion. It was necessary, in any case, to wait for the answer of the Brazilian government to Mr. Webb's demands, before the President could properly determine what measures should be adopted, either to bring your predecessor away from Asuncion, or to secure you a safe and speedy passage to that capital. What the government did determine, at that time, on the subject was communicated to Mr. Webb. This government thought it neither improper nor premature to consider the transaction of the hindrance of the *Wasp*, which had been brought by Mr. Webb to its notice. The proceeding of Rear-Admiral Davis in sending the *Wasp* up to Asuncion for the purpose of bringing Mr. Washburn away was approved; and this government held that it has a perfect right to send a ship of war up the Parana to Asuncion for the purpose of receiving a United States minister and his family and conveying them from scenes of siege and war to neutral territory or waters; that the refusal of the marquis to permit the *Wasp* to pass the Parana violated becoming comity on the part of Brazil and the allies towards the United States, and was in contravention to the laws of nations; that Mr. Washburn and Commander Kirkland properly declined the alternatives which had been offered by the Marquis de Caxias, and the requests which Mr. Webb had made to the Brazilian government in regard to the whole transaction were approved and adopted.

On the 22d of August last a voluminous despatch was received from Mr. Webb, which bears the date of the 22d of July last, and which was accompanied by a copy of a further correspondence which had taken place between himself and the Brazilian minister for foreign affairs. This correspondence, however, had not reached a definitive conclusion, and the demands which Mr. Webb had made still remained without a definite reply on the part of the Brazilian government, so that on the 22d of July last Mr. Webb's demands still remained under the consideration of the Brazilian government. Important events are unofficially known to have occurred on the Parana since that date. The fortress of Humaita has been evacuated by the Paraguayan forces, and the allies have advanced somewhat further up the river, in the direction of Asuncion.

It is not improbable that the military considerations which may have influenced the Marquis de Caxias to refuse permission to the Wasp to pass through the blockade may now have ceased. It is deemed not improbable that Mr. Washburn and family may have already descended the river.

To day I received from Mr. Webb a despatch, which bears date August 7, and which came from London by cable, in which despatch he says that the Brazilian ministry has yielded to his request, and that the Wasp goes to Asuncion.

The information thus received is deemed sufficient to warrant your proceeding at once by the next United States steamer to the seat of your legation. You will, however, stop at Rio long enough to communicate with Mr. Webb, and also at Montevideo and Buenos Ayres to communicate with the consulate and legation at those places, and to ascertain whether the military obstacles to your voyage up the river, which were heretofore apprehended, have been removed. It is very desirable to avoid the trouble and expense of sending a ship of war up the Parana merely for the purpose of conveying you to your post. You will therefore proceed by such other conveyance as shall offer itself, if it be reasonably safe and feasible. If no such conveyance shall offer you will then confer with Rear-Admiral Davis in regard to the most suitable way of reaching the capital of Paraguay. You will be expected to show this instruction to Mr. Webb and to Mr. Worthington, and to the rear-admiral. In so doing you will take care to say that I have altogether refrained from discussing in this paper the diplomatic question, which has been raised at Rio, concerning the hindrance of the Wasp on the present occasion.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

MARTIN T. MCMAHON, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

Mr. Seward to Mr. McMahon.

No. 4.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
September 3, 1869.

SIR: Very few words will suffice for your instruction in regard to the political conduct of your mission. You will assure the President of Paraguay of the sincere and cordial friendship of the government and people of the United States for the government and people of Paraguay.

The United States recognizes every foreign nation with which it has treaty connections as sovereign, and as such having a right to make or carry on war, for such causes, or on such occasions, as it may deem just and proper.

The United States consequently avoid alliances or engagements by which they might become parties in the conflicts of other nations. They have asserted and faithfully maintained neutrality in the unhappy war which has so long existed in the valley of the La Plata. Nevertheless the United States regard wars between the several states of this continent with sincere regret, and they have, therefore, constantly tendered their good offices to the belligerents for the purpose of procuring an end of hostilities and a restoration of peace among the nations of South America.

This is the spirit of the instructions which have been given to your predecessor and they will be found sufficient for your guidance.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

MARTIN T. McMAHON.

Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

BUENOS AYRES, *September 26, 1868.*

SIR: At length I have escaped alive from Paraguay, and have brought the larger part of my family with me. Two members of my legation, however, Porter C. Bliss and George F. Masterman, were seized by the police of President Lopez, at the moment of their starting to accompany me to the steamer, at the time of my departure. The condition of affairs in Paraguay, at the time I left, was horrible beyond description. All, or nearly all, of the foreigners were in prison and heavily fettered, and I believe if the steamer that came to take me away had been a month later, I should have shared their fate. Lopez pretended, some three or four months ago, to have discovered some sort of conspiracy, and, after arresting almost all the foreigners, demanded of me that I should deliver up to the tribunals those who had sought asylum in my house at the time the Brazilian fleet went to Asuncion, in February last. To defend these men and save them from the clutches of Lopez, I had a correspondence with the government long enough to make a volume of diplomatic despatches. It was all in vain, however. They all had to go; though none, except Bliss and Masterman, were taken by force. Had not the *Wasp* come to my rescue, I have no doubt I also should have been shot, or else held a prisoner and subjected to torture. Lopez pretended to believe that I, too, was engaged in the conspiracy, and in his last letters gives what he says are the declarations of his two brothers, his ex-minister of foreign affairs, Don José Berges (the same who went as commissioner to the United States in 1859,) and his chief justice, Señor Urdapilleta, in which they all say that they were engaged in a great conspiracy, and that the American minister was at the head of it, and used his official seal to cover the correspondence between the traitors and the enemy. Of course, when he included such declarations in official correspondence, I asked for my passports, but I did not receive them until the arrival of the *Wasp*. Even then I was not able to get away for nearly a week, and until I was on board the *Wasp*, I had good reasons to apprehend I should not get away at all.

Since my arrival here I have had no time to write a full or succinct account of the horrors of the last three months. Nor can I send you copies of my correspondence till the next steamer. * * *

I have been completely run down by people who have come to inquire of me in regard to their friends in Paraguay. I regret that I have but one answer for them all: "Lopez has killed your friends, or holds them in prison loaded with fetters." I fear, too, that none of them will escape with their lives. I take it for granted that all of those whose declarations have been published, including the two brothers of Lopez, and his ex-minister, José Berges, have been or will be executed. They will not be left to deny them, or to give an account of the tortures by which they were extorted.

I am confident there has never been any conspiracy, for I do not believe that under the system of espionage that exists throughout Paraguay, and the universal distrust that everybody has for everybody else, there are three men in the country so fool-hardy as to engage in anything of the kind. Lopez, however, in his policy of extermination, and of leaving no one to testify against him, has declared that there is, and seems to imagine that confessions extorted by torture will justify him before the world in executing those who have made them; or rather, those whom he declares to have made them. It was to dispel this illusion that I sent him my note of September 12 when on board the Wasp.

* * * *

The English, French, Italian, and Portuguese ministers have all sent gunboats up the river, in the hope of rescuing their unfortunate countrymen. Neither of them, however, would have been allowed to pass the blockade, had not the Wasp done so previously. The French and Italian ministers are very much concerned about their consuls there, as Lopez has taken and is reported to have shot the Portuguese consul, and subjected the vice-consul to such treatment that he died under it. They all say there is no question now of national dignity, of law or right; all these considerations are to be sunk under the imperative duty of rescuing their countrymen from the grasp of a madman.

* * * *

Though I have staid the last year in Paraguay to my great pecuniary loss, and have been compelled to live without many of the necessities of life, and have done it all in order to be of service to others, nearly all of whom were of different nationalities than my own, I find, on arriving here, I am greeted by the press (with the exception of the *Standard*) with a perfect storm of obloquy.

* * * *

They have, therefore, regarded me with great disfavor ever since I returned to Paraguay, and they cannot conceal their chagrin that Lopez did not make a climax of his atrocities by killing me. This, they imagine, would have justified the "triple alliance," and established the courage and endurance of the allies, in taking as many years to conquer Paraguay as they ought to have been months.

But, had Lopez made me a prisoner, and shot me as a conspirator, they know that the contempt they have brought upon themselves by their imbecility would be diverted from them, and that the burden of the war would be transferred to a more powerful nation, and that they would be relieved from further responsibility in regard to its further prosecution. Their vexation and annoyance, therefore, that Lopez did not kill me is extreme, and the same papers that quote me as authority for their execration of Lopez, quote his tortured witnesses as evidence against me.

I learn that a new minister has been appointed for Paraguay, and it is supposed he will soon be here; I shall not feel justified in leaving this

place till he arrives, and I can fully advise him of the condition of affairs in Paraguay. I take it for granted that if he comes he will not go up the river till he has further instructions from the department. Should he go up now, or a month hence, he would probably find that Lopez had fled to the Cordilleras. But should he not come soon I shall consider that I ought to remain here till I can consult Mr. Webb, in Rio, in regard to the case of those two members of my legation, Mr. Bliss and Mr. Masterman, who were taken from me by force by President Lopez. I cannot abandon them as long as there is a possibility of saving them. Truth is, I fear they have both been executed before this, though I know that nothing exists or could be proved against them were the witnesses outside of Paraguay. Lopez, however, can produce declarations of honorable men that they have committed every imaginable crime, including sorcery, treason, arson, flat burglary, and trespass on the case.

I was unable to comply with your instructions to leave the archives of the legation with some responsible American citizen in Paraguay, in whom I had confidence. Unfortunately all such were prisoners at the time I left. I therefore gave them in charge of the Italian consul there, Mr. Lorenzo Chapperson.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES A. WASHBURN.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State.

Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward.

No. 101.]

BUENOS AYRES,
October 5, 1868.

SIR: With this I send you copies of all the correspondence I had with the government of Paraguay subsequent to my despatch of January 17, 1868, which appears to be the latest that President Lopez allowed to pass through the military lines. Other despatches that I sent in the month of April I now learn never reached this city, and I therefore send duplicates of them. In these despatches, Nos. 97, 98, and 99, I gave full accounts of the events that had transpired in Paraguay subsequent to the passage of the allied squadron above Humaita, and the evacuation of Asuncion. But as I was obliged to entrust them to the hands of Lopez to be forwarded, I felt it necessary to be very guarded in my language, as I suspected they would be opened and detained by him, and if they contained anything unfavorable to him or his cause, that all to whom I had given shelter and protection would be exposed to his implacable vengeance, and my own situation rendered as disagreeable as possible. I nevertheless repeated my request to be recalled, and gave a full account of the circumstances of the evacuation, and stated my reasons why I wished to get away. Matters had been going on from bad to worse, till even at that time a reign of terror existed, such as had never been known in the worst days of France. I had thought it my duty to stay as long as I could be of any service in giving aid or protection to foreigners, or even to Paraguayans, who might seek the shelter of my flag at the last extremity. It was evident to me by that time, however, that though by remaining I might give a sense of security, the reality I could not give; and that if Lopez were forced to retire into the interior, he would leave no one in his rear, not even me nor any one belonging to the legation.

These despatches, with private letters, undoubtedly were opened and read by Lopez, and he learned from them that I was tired, sick, and disgusted with him and his government; for soon after sending them, when I went to visit him at his headquarters on the arrival of the "Wasp" at Curupaity, to see if I could not make some arrangements so that she would come above the blockading squadron, I found him morose and churlish. Previously he had always evinced a disposition to keep on amicable terms, and his changed manner I ascribed partly to the fact that he was losing ground in the war, and partly to the circumstance that I had given asylum to so many persons in my legation. I was previously well aware that it was gall and wormwood to him to have it supposed that there was one house, or one person even, in Paraguay, over which he could not exercise his absolute power; and before I left him to return to Asuncion he gave me to understand that the persons whom I had admitted into my house would not be allowed to remain there.

I then saw clearly that there were "breakers ahead," and the first thing for me to consider was how I should get my wife and child out of the country without abandoning those who had sought refuge with me, or the larger number who had looked to me as their last and only hope. I knew perfectly well that if I had asked my passports at that time and requested Lopez to send a steamer to convey me under flag of truce to Curupaity, he would not have done so. He would probably have said that there were so many torpedoes and other obstacles in the river that he would not venture one of his steamers to pass them, and there was no other way by which I could get aboard the Wasp. My only hope, therefore, of getting my family away was that the Wasp would pass above the blockade, and if I could once get them out of danger, I was disposed to remain to give protection, or at least a sense and feeling of protection, to the foreigners. At such a fearful crisis I thought it would appear cowardly and selfish for me to go away leaving hundreds or thousands who believed that my presence in the country was a guarantee of their safety. But at that time I had not the most remote idea of the absurd and preposterous charges that were soon to be made, not only against those whom I had protected, but against myself.

The Wasp, however, was not allowed by the Brazilians to go above the squadron at that time, and her commander, after waiting for nearly two months and finding that he could do nothing to relieve me without going higher up the river, returned for further instructions. I then supposed he would soon return with orders to force the blockade if necessary to effect a passage. Events, however, were occurring about the time of the departure of the Wasp that led me to suppose Lopez had become distrustful of everybody. Gradually I found that the most of those foreigners who had looked to me for safety were one after the other arrested and taken in irons to headquarters. What their offence was no one in my house could imagine. Then came the succession of events as related in my letter to the English minister on my return to Buenos Ayres, a copy of which I send with this.

The several foreign ministers here are greatly exercised concerning the course they ought to pursue. They have all asked my opinion and I have told them that Lopez was amenable to no principle or sentiment but fear; that his reiterated vaunt that he would fight to the last man and last dollar, and fall on the field of battle when all was lost, was but the whistling of the boy passing through the grave-yard; that he would save his own detested person at last if possible, and carry with him all the money and jewels that he could rob from their rightful owners; that with all his apparent recklessness, such was his ultimate intention that

he would sacrifice everybody so far as possible, and yet leave a safe retreat for himself; that he was infatuated with the idea he could seize any foreigner and confiscate his property and then publish what would purport to be his confession or "declaration," confessing himself to be a conspirator or plunderer of the treasury, or both, and that this would be received as ample justification for shooting him and taking his property; that to leave no intelligent witnesses to testify against him he would take care to butcher all intelligent people, Paraguayans and foreigners alike, relying on the "declarations" he had caused to be promulgated as theirs as his own justification. In conclusion, I have added that being thus convinced of his intentions, and knowing so well his character, the only means that the foreign ministers had of giving security to their countrymen in Paraguay was to awaken the fears of the despot who held them in his power, and that, in my opinion, the most efficient way to do this was for them all to unite in a joint note to Lopez and warn him that he would be held responsible by their respective governments for the lives and good treatment of all their fellow-countrymen.

The course I have suggested, however, has not been adopted. The ministers fear to do so lest it may provoke Lopez to an indiscriminate massacre of all foreigners. They feel that they are treating with a madman, and doubt whether his personal cowardice gives such "method to his madness" as would make him consult his own safety. Instead of the course thus suggested by me, they have sent the gunboats of their respective nations to pass through the squadron, each one to forward a message to Lopez requesting him to send on board the citizens of their respective nationalities.

No good, in my opinion, can result in such half-way measures. Lopez is so absolute that in reply to the demand for the delivery of the subjects of any foreign government, he could send a letter with the veritable signature of every foreigner living in the country—for if he could not get their signatures they would live no longer—saying that they did not wish to leave Paraguay; that they were so well treated by the great Lopez, and were so grateful to him for his care and protection of them, that they never would leave him. And yet, of these very people who would, to save, or rather prolong their lives, sign such a paper, there is not, to the best of my knowledge and belief, one out of a hundred that would not give everything he has got in the world, except life, to escape from Lopez's power.

So far as I can learn, there is not a person outside Paraguay who believes there has ever been any conspiracy at all; that the pretence that there has been is only to give Lopez an excuse for killing off all foreigners and such Paraguayans as have money enough to tempt his cupidity. Previous to my arrival here, there were many in favor of breaking up the triple alliance, and making peace with Lopez. But now, since it is known how he has treated all foreigners, not excepting even the members of the United States legation, the universal sentiment is that he must be destroyed—that he is a common enemy of mankind.

In my last despatch, No. 100, I mentioned the fact that the newspapers here appeared to be indignant that I had got away from the grasp of Lopez. The correspondence had not then been all published, and at the time of their unfavorable comments they evidently supposed that, by remaining, I could have continued to give protection to more or less people. The last long letter to me from Lopez's last foreign minister, Luis Caminos, has completely dispelled this impression, and if they show no affection for me, they are constrained to language respectful and de-

cent. I enclose a slip from the Standard of the 30th of September, which is a sharp rebuke of the temper they at first manifested.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES A. WASHBURN.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State.

[From the Buenos Ayres Standard, September 30, 1868.]

MR. WASHBURN, THE UNITED STATES MINISTER.

To the Editors of the Standard :

GENTLEMEN: Like all others, I have been greatly horrified at hearing the accounts given by the Hon. Mr. Washburn of the state of affairs in Paraguay. But my horror at the brutality of Lopez does not equal my disgust at the treatment Mr. Washburn has received at the hands of the native papers. Mr. Washburn, it is well known, remained in Paraguay for a long time, for no other purpose than to give aid and protection to foreigners. He staid there until such charges were brought against him by Lopez that he could not with self-respect hold any more official correspondence with that government. He then demanded his passports. He did not receive them, however, until the arrival of the Wasp, and it is evident that up to that time it was the intention of Lopez to keep the American minister a prisoner in Paraguay; so he told Captain Kirkland. It is also evident that had he committed any act of violence towards Mr. Washburn he would have committed the last, and after he had tortured him to death he would have published such declarations as coming from him as suited his purpose. No wonder Mr. Washburn did not wish to partake of that banquet which Lopez had prepared for him.

Having incurred the implacable wrath of Lopez, it was useless for him to remain any longer in Paraguay. He could give protection or aid to nobody. As he justly says in his parting note to Lopez, the seizure of Bliss and Masterman in the street was as clear a violation of his rights as a minister as if they had been taken from his house by force.

No, Mr. Editor, the conduct of Mr. Washburn throughout this whole fearful time was humane, generous and self-sacrificing, and the abuse that he is now receiving is for other reasons than those alleged. In the correspondence lately published, Mr. Washburn has made very severe and sarcastic remarks in regard to the way the allies have conducted the war. But he is not alone in that; has not Lopez got the sympathy of at least half the world, not from any merit of his own, but by reason of the procrastination of the allies? These comments of Mr. Washburn your contemporaries know to be just and deserved, and they feel them strongly, and they revenge themselves by throwing dirty water at the only man who has ever told the whole truth both about Lopez and the allies.

There is another reason why the American minister is assailed. It is known he gave great offence two years ago by forcing the blockade to get into the country after the Brazilians had told him plainly he never should pass, and now he has forced it again to get out of it, notwithstanding the defiant language of the Marquis de Caxias. They feel humiliated at the arrogance of this Yankee, and are greatly chagrined that Lopez did not make him a prisoner and shoot him. That would have brought the United States into the conflict, and would have promised an end to the war. Their anger at Lopez is not so much because

he puts others in prison and shoots them as that he did not do the same to Mr. Washburn. This, they imagine, would have called off the attention of the world from the slow progress of the war, and would have proved the wisdom of the triple alliance. The burden, then, of making an end of Lopez would have fallen on the United States. But Mr. Washburn got away alive, and in their anger at him for doing so they show a sanguinary spirit worthy of the Gaucho. "*Hine illæ lacrymæ.*"
LEX TALIONIS.

[From the Buenos Ayres Standard, October 11, 1868.]

A WORD FOR MR. WASHBURN.

GENTLEMEN: It surely needs but a slight examination of the correspondence which is, thanks to your efforts, now placed in the hands of the public, to see how innocent Mr. Washburn is of all the ridiculous charges brought against him, whether by the outwitted Lopez, or by the partial native press; and it will be difficult for any one to lay down that "lucky volume of letters" without freely confessing the United States representative is one, in all respects, worthy of the trust confided in him by the great republic.

His position was a most difficult one; he had to please Lopez, and, as it seems, this republic as well; nevertheless, he has succeeded in steering as straight and honorable a course as was, under the circumstances, possible. It is urged his praise of the Paraguayans (see letter of July 14) was hypocritical, and that he, in thus writing, was afraid to speak what he really thought. But is this really so? were these sentiments not his real ones? We find (see letter of August 11) that he wrote in the same strain to his government. Surely, then, he was not afraid, but spoke what he felt; and, indeed, who is there that can deny the Paraguayans have fought well, nobly, and most bravely? Thus, remembering he wrote the same to Benitez on this matter as he did to Washington, the charge of hypocrisy, of acting dishonorably, must fall to the ground; and were this fact not so, still, when so many lives depended on his actions, so to speak, surely this praise would not only have been excusable, but altogether profitable. But, is it this which ruffles the spirit of the native press, or the comments on Mitre, Elizalde, Caxias, Tamandare, and a reference to the Shamokin? (in letter of August 11.) Perhaps partiality and party bitterness combined with this is the cause why all the native papers are angry with the United States minister. One thing, however, is certain, did the native press only look at the state of things with an impartial eye, it would be forced to confess Mr. Washburn's conduct is far from all blame. His conduct has been that of a gentleman, a diplomatist, and of a man not deaf to the cry for help and protection. When we consider the insults at first freely hinted, and then thickly showered upon his shoulders by the Paraguayan government—and may it not be said indirectly upon the United States as well?—one must admire his calm, courteous, and gentlemanly answers. A comparison of Benitez's letters from July 23, abounding in insults, hints of treachery, and dishonor of the United States minister, and Mr. Washburn's replies, will show a difference none the less marked than to the latter's credit.

Mr. Washburn has done well in placing this correspondence in the hands of the public, and so long as that public gives an impartial verdict, his conduct cannot fail to be approved.

It would be well did some writers and thinkers place themselves in Mr. Washburn's position if they would consider how he was placed; any fool can keep his head above water in a calm, but it is the rough sea which proves what a man is really made of, and the difficult position in which he was placed, and out of which he has sallied victorious, does credit to him and to his government. Let all remember the United States minister was the only one who dared to stick to his post, and not blame him for not causing perhaps the massacre of all the foreigners in Paraguay by an open resistance to Lopez at first; which course would not have done, could not have done any good, but might have caused much harm. Had Mr. Washburn been supported by a fleet of United States iron-clads he might have defied Lopez, but as it was, with no protection but what Lopez for the moment chose to give, the case was altered.

By a cautious, honorable, and skilful diplomacy he effected as much as a man situated as he was could do. Surely he may not be blamed for not doing more than was possible? He is blamed by some for giving up his guests, but what good could have resulted from a refusal to comply? He would have to leave Paraguay sooner or later, and then could no longer protect them under the sacred folds of the American flag. Besides which, did he give them up? Rather the reverse; he counselled more than one not to leave, and left it to the choice of all to go or stay; they chose to leave; by what right could he make them remain?

In justice to Mr. Washburn, all should either read this correspondence carefully or else keep their verdict to themselves. No man has the right to judge unless he judges after an impartial, careful, and complete hearing of the evidence for and against.

Apologizing for the length of this, which may perhaps find some unoccupied column,

I am, &c.,

TRABUCO.

Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

No. 102.]

BUENOS AYRES, *October 13, 1868.*

SIR:

* * * * *

I intend to start for Rio, and thence for the United States, by the first steamer that leaves for the former place. Mr. Webb writes me that Admiral Davis is not disposed to take any action for the rescue of those two members of the United States legation at Asuncion, Mr. Bliss and Mr. Masterman, who were forcibly seized by the government of Paraguay as they started to accompany me to the steamer at the time of my departure. Such being the case, I shall not delay here a day longer than I can avoid.

Since I left Paraguay, there appears to have been little done to change the situation.

There was a report several days ago that Lopez had shot his brother and sister, and his bishop. It was not generally credited, however, until to-day, when I hear that information of an authentic character has been received that he has shot his two brothers, Venancio and Benigno, and his sister, the widow of General Barrios, who died some five or six weeks ago of wounds inflicted on himself in an attempt at suicide. The bishop is also said to have been shot.

If this be true, and I fear it is, there seems to be little prospect for any of those to escape who took refuge in the United States legation. The most remarkable thing in the whole dreadful tragedy is that I got away alive. I fear there will not be another such exception.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES A. WASHBURN.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. McMahon to Mr. Seward.

[Extract.]

No. 6.]

RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL,

October 26, 1868.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that I arrived at this port on the 20th instant, and on the 21st, in obedience to instructions, submitted your despatch of the 2d September last, numbered 3, to Rear-Admiral Charles H. Davis, commanding the United States squadron on this station, on board the flag-ship *Guerriere*; and on the day following to Hon. James Watson Webb, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States at the court of Brazil, at his residence at Boa Viagem.

Mr. Webb informed me that he personally knew that no objection would be made upon the part of the government of Brazil to my passing through the blockading lines on the tributaries of the La Plata, and at my instance promised to communicate to me on the following day official assurance to that effect.

This communication I have not yet received, and I fear it may not now reach me in time to enclose a copy with this despatch.

The admiral informed me that in consequence of the insult offered to the government of the United States, in the forcible seizure and detention of two members of the United States legation at Asuncion by order of President Lopez, he deemed it advisable to proceed with his entire squadron to the La Plata, and ascend the river with such of the vessels as are suited to that service, for the purpose of exacting such reparation from the government of Paraguay as the honor and dignity of the government of the United States may require. He requested me also to accompany him on the flag-ship, and offered to transfer his flag in the La Plata to one of the smaller vessels, and proceed with me to the headquarters of President Lopez at Villeta, to take such action as we would mutually decide upon, in anticipation of instructions from Washington.

The seizure of the two members of the United States legation at Asuncion, one of whom, Porter C. Bliss, is an American citizen, the other, George Masterman, a British subject, has been, I am informed, fully communicated to the government by Mr. Webb, and also by my predecessor, Mr. Washburn.

It was also published by Mr. Washburn, in Buenos Ayres, in the form of a letter to the Hon. William Stuart, her Britannic Majesty's minister plenipotentiary at Buenos Ayres, containing a detailed account of the unfortunate occurrences in Paraguay that preceded Mr. Washburn's departure.

A printed copy of this letter, I am informed by Mr. Webb, will accompany his communication to me on the subject of Paraguayan affairs, and will be transmitted with this, if received in time.

The correspondence between Mr. Washburn and the government of Paraguay which preceded his departure from that country I have read with as much care as its great length and the little time allowed me would permit. All that portion of it which relates to the privilege of asylum at the house of the minister, the right of the government to establish the proper place for diplomatic residence, the attempt to implicate Mr. Washburn in a conspiracy for the overthrow of the government, I believe it is no part of my official duty, under existing circumstances, to consider.

It appears that the government of Paraguay demanded of the minister of the United States the dismissal from the legation of Messrs. Bliss and Masterman, members of the legation, reported as such to the minister of foreign affairs some time previous to the demand for their delivery. Mr. Washburn declined to comply with this demand. The minister of foreign affairs insisted, denying that the individuals named were members of the United States legation, and alleging that they had been indicted for treason and conspiracy before the judicial tribunal, and that evidence to sustain the charges was in the possession of the government. I would call attention here to the fact that at a subsequent stage of the correspondence the minister of foreign affairs alleged that similar evidence against the minister of the United States was on record in the tribunal of justice, and produced certain depositions alleged to have been made by members of the conspiracy then awaiting trial or already convicted. A peremptory demand was also made upon Mr. Washburn for the surrender of a package of papers alleged to have been entrusted to him by one of the traitors. He denied in positive and explicit terms that such a package had been delivered to him, whereupon the demand of the Paraguayan government was discourteously repeated. After a correspondence of great length, much embarrassed by the painful and ingenious attempt to connect the minister of the United States with the conspiracy for the overthrow of the government, Mr. Washburn finally receives his passport, in accordance with his repeated request, and is notified that a steamer is in readiness to convey him to Villeta, where the United States steamer Wasp awaits him. The government refuses passports for Messrs. Bliss and Masterman, and arrests them in the street, while on their way to the steamer in company with the minister and his family. Mr. Washburn, after addressing a letter to President Lopez, solemnly protesting against the arrest and detention of members of his legation and other acts done in Paraguay, proceeded to Buenos Ayres, where he still remains.

These events have naturally produced great excitement in South America, and there exists, of course, much speculation with some diversity of opinion as to the course of action proper to be taken in anticipation of instructions from the government at Washington. Mr. Webb, our minister at the court of Brazil, has frankly and with characteristic kindness expressed to me his views as to the proper course to be followed, and has informed me that in the communication which I am now hourly expecting to receive from him he will discuss the affairs of the Paraguayan mission, and inform me at length of his opinions. I thanked him for the kind interest he manifested in a subject of some embarrassment to me, and will give to his letter of advice such careful and respectful consideration as his high character and great experience deserve for it. At the same time, I am confident the department will not expect of me that I will permit myself to be deterred by the high consideration and respect entertained for Mr. Webb from proceeding at once with the admiral to the nearest proper point of approach to the capital of Paraguay, for the

purpose of promptly advising the Secretary of events as they occur. I make this remark because, in consultation with Mr. Webb, he informed me that it was his opinion that I ought not under any circumstances to proceed beyond Buenos Ayres; that the United States are now in a state of war with Paraguay; that my instructions are therefore abrogated; that, having no power to make peace, I would compromise the dignity of the government by approaching Paraguayan territory. From these views I am compelled to dissent. I believe it my duty to inform the Secretary of State of all that occurs in Paraguay, and this duty I can perform properly only by proceeding up the Parana river with the squadron.

I have officially acquainted the admiral with the state of affairs as already communicated to the department, and informed him that in the absence of instructions from Washington, diplomatic relations with the government of Paraguay will not be resumed until the two members of the legation, now held by President Lopez, are released, and such reparation made as may seem proper in view of the serious character of the offence committed against the honor and dignity of the United States.

The admiral has announced his intention of proceeding on the information communicated to him, promptly, and with all necessary firmness. He has requested that I will accompany him to Villeta, to the end that we may consult upon ulterior action, should the demand for the rendition of Bliss and Masterman be denied by the Paraguayan government. We will accordingly sail to-morrow for Montevideo with the entire squadron, and thence with such of the vessels as are adapted to river service up the Parana.

It is proper to add that the information in regard to affairs in Paraguay to be obtained in Brazil is usually of the most unreliable kind. What is asserted to-day most positively is contradicted to-morrow unequivocally. In regard to the unfortunate circumstances now claiming attention, Captain Kirkland, of the United States steamer Wasp, an officer whose course in Paraguay displayed great discretion, writes unofficially to Admiral Davis that it is important that our government should thoroughly investigate the subject before taking decisive action; that such an investigation may reveal important facts not yet made public; that President Lopez expressed to him great anxiety to preserve friendly relations with the United States, and solicited his mediation with Mr. Washburn, for the purpose of restoring a more amicable state of feeling between the government of Paraguay and the representative of the United States. It appears also that the statements positively and repeatedly made in this city that the Portuguese consul, Mr. Leite Pereira, a former refugee at the house of the United States minister at Asuncion, had been executed by President Lopez, are incorrect. The French consul, also reported as put to death, is not only alive but has left Paraguay on a French man-of-war, and reports by the admiral of the French fleet on this station that he was at no time during his stay in Paraguay disquieted on account of his personal safety. In view of these facts, I am led to indulge the hope that Messrs. Bliss and Masterman have suffered at the hands of the Paraguayan authorities no personal discomfort other than their forced detention, and that they will soon be restored to the protection of the national flag.

I have endeavored in this despatch to touch but briefly on those matters which have already been made known to you in full, as I am informed, and to communicate such other circumstances as may help to afford you a full understanding of the existing state of affairs.

The communication I had expected to receive from Mr. Webb, conveying the assurance that the government of Brazil will interpose no obstacle to my passage through their lines, has not yet reached me.

* * * * *

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
M. T. McMAHON.

HON. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Washburn.

No. 73.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 17, 1868.

SIR: Your despatch from Buenos Ayres of the 26th of September last, giving an account of events at the close of your mission in Paraguay, has been received. The letter of this department to the Secretary of the Navy, a copy of which is enclosed, has been approved by the President. Any further measures which may be adopted will await developments.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

CHARLES A. WASHBURN, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Welles.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 17, 1868.

SIR: A despatch was received yesterday from Charles A. Washburn, esq., late United States minister to Paraguay, which was written at Buenos Ayres on the 26th of September last. The despatch shows that a controversy has been carried on for some time between him and the President of Paraguay. The merits of the controversy cannot be fully understood until a copy of the correspondence itself shall have been received, which is now daily expected. Meantime Mr. Washburn's despatch conclusively shows that the situation of all foreigners, including United States citizens at Asuncion, is greatly imperilled, and that especially Porter C. Bliss and George F. Masterman, United States citizens, lately in some way connected with the United States legation, have suffered personal violence, and have perhaps been murdered. A despatch has been received from Mr. Webb, United States minister at Rio, in which he states that he has requested Rear-Admiral Davis, commanding the South Atlantic squadron, to send or to proceed with an adequate naval force to Asuncion, to protect American citizens. Mr. Webb is unable to inform the department whether Admiral Davis would assume the responsibility of complying with this request without special instructions from this government.

The situation thus presented seems to me so critical that I have thought it my duty to advise the President that the rear-admiral should be instructed to proceed with an adequate force at once to Paraguay, and take such measures as may be found necessary to prevent violence to the lives and property of American citizens there, and, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to demand any other prompt redress for any

extreme insult or violence that may have been arbitrarily committed against the flag of the United States or their citizens.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Seward to Mr. McMahon.

No. 6.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 18, 1868.

SIR: I herewith enclose for your information a copy of a despatch* addressed by this department to James Watson Webb, esq., United States minister at Rio de Janeiro; also a copy of a communication† from this department to the Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, in relation to late occurrences on the Parana.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

MARTIN T. MCMAHON, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

Mr. Seward to Mr. McMahon.

No. 7.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 21, 1868.

SIR: I transmit a copy of the orders which have been issued by the Secretary of the Navy to Rear-Admiral C. H. Davis, commanding the South Atlantic squadron, occasioned by recent events in Paraguay, in connection with your predecessor and other citizens of the United States. The department has not yet received from Mr. Washburn detailed reports upon the subject. No doubt, however, you will by personal intercourse with him, and from other sources, have obtained such a knowledge of the facts as will enable you to proceed judiciously in co-operation with Admiral Davis for the purpose of vindicating the honor of this government and the rights of any citizens of the United States in Paraguay who may not be able to obtain redress through the ordinary channels. You will notice that Mr. Welles expresses confidence in your discretion. This opinion the department trusts will be justified by the firmness and wisdom of your course under the difficult circumstances which will surround you upon your entrance on your mission.

After the foregoing part of this paper was prepared, your despatch of the 26th of October, No. 6, from Rio Janeiro, was received. Your purpose therein mentioned of proceeding with Rear-Admiral Davis up the Paraguay river to Villetta is approved. You will forbear from presenting your credentials to the President of Paraguay until a satisfactory solution of the grievances which are the subject of my several instructions shall have been obtained, and you will in every case be governed by these instructions. This will not prevent you from opening and conducting in your official character as United States minister resident to Paraguay any correspondence which shall become necessary with

* For this enclosure see instruction to Mr. Webb, No. 238, November 17, 1868.

† For this enclosure see instruction to Mr. Washburn, No. 78, November 17, 1868.

the President of that republic, or with any other proper party in that country. All correspondence will thus be conducted by yourself, but it will be desirable that Rear-Admiral Davis should join you in the same.

This paper is necessarily hurried in order to avail myself of the mail steamer of the 23d.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

MARTIN T. McMAHON, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

Mr. Welles to Mr. Seward.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, November 18, 1868.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herein a copy of my instructions to Rear-Admiral Davis, of the South Atlantic squadron, prepared in conformity with the request contained in your letter of the 17th instant, and the advice given by you to the President.

It has been my practice to give as specific instructions as possible to our naval officers, and to impose upon them no greater responsibilities than the occasion demands. In all cases approaching this in magnitude and importance, they have been enjoined to act in conjunction with the minister representing our country at the government in question.

I see by the last arrival that General McMahon, our lately appointed minister to Paraguay, who left the country several weeks since on his mission, has arrived at Rio, and who, it seems to me, should at least be consulted in this matter.

I have great confidence in the judgment and ability of Rear-Admiral Davis, but should he not be relieved of some degree of responsibility which belongs appropriately and peculiarly to General McMahon, by consulting with and receiving the advice of that very capable gentleman, who is entrusted with that service, and is the selected representative of this government to Paraguay.

I deem it my duty, moreover, to add in this connection that while instructions can be given without difficulty to Rear-Admiral Davis, he may find it difficult, and perhaps impossible, to execute them with his present limited command.

Asuncion is 930 miles from Montevideo, up rivers which are tortuous and filled with sand-bars, subject to heavy rises and great depressions, which render their navigation difficult.

Rear-Admiral Davis has no vessels adapted to river service, and not exceeding four of the smallest could, under the most favorable circumstances reach Paraguay. He is without troops or supplies, and Lopez by the last accounts had fallen back from the river, and is wholly inaccessible to naval vessels. The demand for redress, if it cannot be enforced, ought not, it seems to me, to be made. To make the attempt and fail would be worse than if the attempt had not been made.

On a former occasion, when a demonstration was made against Paraguay, a naval force of light-draught vessels was sent out, and coal, provisions, and supplies were forwarded to Montevideo, Rosario, and Corrientes. The expedition was at that time duly prepared and cost the government several millions of dollars. As this subject seems to be entrusted to the naval officer on that station, instead of the minister, who is the selected representative, I would respectfully state that it will be necessary that Rear-Admiral Davis should be largely re-enforced, and

that the Navy Department be furnished with authority and means to enable that officer, in the last resort, to carry into effect the instructions which have been sent him in pursuance of your communication, and of the advice given by you to the President.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State.

Mr. Welles to Admiral Davis.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
November 18, 1868.

SIR: I have received from the Secretary of State a letter in relation to a controversy which has arisen between Charles H. Washburn, esq., late minister to Paraguay, and President Lopez.

In his communication the Secretary of State informs this department that—

Mr. Washburn's despatch conclusively shows that the situation of all foreigners, including United States citizens, at Asuncion, is greatly imperilled, and that, especially, Porter C. Bliss and George F. Masterman, United States citizens, lately in some way connected with the United States legation, have suffered personal violence, and have perhaps been murdered.

Mr. Seward further informs the department that Mr. Webb has had an interview with you, but is unable to inform the Secretary of State whether you would assume the responsibility of complying with a request which he (Mr. Webb) had made to you to send an adequate naval force to Asuncion to protect American interests, without special instructions from the State Department.

It has not been usual for the naval officers to receive instructions from that department, and I apprehend there has been some mistake in this instance; but Mr. Seward writes me that "the situation thus presented seems to me so critical that I have thought it my duty to advise the President that the rear-admiral should be instructed to proceed with an adequate force at once to Paraguay and take such measures as may be found necessary to prevent violence to the lives and property of American citizens there, and, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to demand and obtain prompt redress for any extreme insult or violence that may have been arbitrarily committed against the flag of the United States or their citizens."

I have nothing to add to the foregoing extract, further than to direct that, on the receipt of this despatch, you will proceed to act in conformity with the views and suggestions of the honorable Secretary of State in his advice to the President. Should you, in the discretion therein given, come to the conclusion to proceed or send to Paraguay to make the demand indicated, I regret that you have not more suitable and better vessels to enforce it, and supplies more ample than you possess.

Very respectfully,

GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

Rear-Admiral CHARLES HENRY DAVIS,
Commanding South Atlantic Squadron.

Mr. Seward to Mr. McMahon.

No. 8.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 27, 1868.

SIR: Mr. Washburn's despatch No. 102, of the 13th ult., has been received. Before writing to you at length upon the subject it is desirable that we should have his whole correspondence. We are in daily expectation of his arrival and report.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

MARTIN T. MCMAHON, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

Mr. Seward to Mr. McMahon.

No. 9.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 27, 1868.


SIR: Your interesting despatch from Rio de Janeiro, No. 6, of the 26th ultimo, has been received.


The instruction, No. 7, of the 21st instant, makes it unnecessary to write to you further upon the subject at present.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

MARTIN T. MCMAHON, Esq., &c., &c., &c.





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