THE BRAZILIAN SLAVE TRADE,
AND ITS REMEDY
SHewing
THE FUTILITY OF REPRESSIVE FORCE MEASURES.
ALSO,
HOW AFRICA AND OUR WEST INDIAN COLONIES MAY BE MUTUALLY BENEFITED.

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ERRATA.
Page 57, line six from bottom of page, read “£42,000” for “£52,000.”
Page 73, middle of page, for “Suggestion 11,” read “Suggestion 12.”
The Author of this pamphlet was appointed in 1838 to a vessel of war, stationed on the coast of Brazil, where, for the space of nearly three years, he had opportunities of becoming acquainted with the operations of the Slave Trade in that country—the causes tending to keep it up—the condition of the slaves—and, above all, of personally examining, in numerous cases, the state of the victims, on board captured vessels, brought into the harbour of Rio Janeiro. The consequence was, that on returning to England, in the latter end of 1840, he joined the expedition about to proceed to the River Niger, hoping to be able to lend his feeble share in the great cause of African regeneration. He continued on that service until the recall of the survivors, in August, 1842. During that period he was enabled to examine into the social position of many of the African tribes—their capabilities for improvement, and the circumstances militating against their redemption—much of which has already appeared in the “Narrative of the Niger Expedition,” by Captain Wm. Allen, R.N., and himself. Another period of service, on the coast of Brazil, in 1843 and 1844, afforded occasion for comparing the Negro, as a bondsman, with what had been previously seen of him in his native wilds; while a short visit of seven months to the East coast of Africa and Mosambique Channel, in 1846, made him further cognizant of the leading features of the Slave Trade. He can, therefore, claim some knowledge of the traffic, both on the coast of the vender and the buyer—the motives of both—and the probability of success, or otherwise, from coercive measures. He has only to say, that conscious of a disinter-
ested and sincere desire to benefit Africa, and save her children from the horrors and evils of the present misguided attempts at repression of the Slave Trade, he stands prepared for all the vituperation which will be heaped on him, by some well-wishers of that unhappy country, who, unfortunately for the objects of their philanthropy, allow their over-wrought zeal to keep "reason" away from this momentous question.

The "Brazilian Slave Trade and the Remedy" was to have appeared in the autumn of 1848; but the Author having been suddenly called on to proceed abroad, was obliged to defer the publication until his return to England, December 12th, 1849. The evidence of Sir Charles Hotham, C.B., has not been referred to, as it was considered better to substantiate the leading features of the "Repressive Force Failure" out of the testimony of the advocates for it.

Evidence quoted from 1st and 2nd Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, on the Slave Trade.
The Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston, M.P.
The Hon. Captain E. Denman, R.N.
Captain Edward Harris Butterfield, R.N.
Captain William Allen, R.N.
Commander Henry James Matson, R.N.
Commander Thomas Francis Birch, R.N.
Captain Christopher Wyvill, R.N.
Lord John Hay, Captain, R.N.
Captain George Mansel, R.N.
Captain Richard Henry Stopford, R.N.
James Bandinel, Esq., formerly of the Foreign Office.
John Carr, Esq., Chief Justice of Sierra Leone.
Rev. John Dunmore Lang, D.D.
Thomas Keogh, Esq., M.D.
John King, Esq., M.D.
William Smith, Esq., formerly Commissary Judge, Sierra Leone.
Macgregor Laird, Esq.
Thomas Berry Horsfall, Esq., African Merchant.
John Bramley Moore, Chairman of the Brazilian Association, Liverpool.
Rev. James F. Schön, Missionary.
Mr. Joseph Smith, African Merchant.
Mr. John Duncan, the African Traveller.
Mr. John Logan Hook, Government Service, Sierra Leone.
Captain Thomas Forsham, African Trader.
José E. Cliffe, M.D., a native of the United States, and a slave owner in the Brazils.

The numbers indicate where the evidence is to be found in the Parliamentary Reports.
INTRODUCTION

Perhaps history offers no parallel instance of a heartfelt and disinterested attempt at reparation for a great wrong, such as has been manifested, of late years, by Great Britain towards the afflicted and aggrieved children of Africa.

Blinded, alas, for too long a period by sordid interests, we regarded them only in the light of brutes, to be disposed of according to their physical qualifications for our purposes; nor stopped we to enquire, whether they possessed human emotions, or germs for improvement? Nay, worse than the very nations we now so unsparingly vituperate, we were “the foremost at one time in creating the cruelties;”¹ and “for a long course of years the British Government and Legislation steadily devoted their efforts to the extension of the Slave Trade: the settlements on the Gold Coast were formed, for this avowed object.”² We fostered and strengthened the traffic, and actually strove to become the great slave agents and carriers for the rest of the world, and “that from a base and very narrow motive; not even the larger motive that the slave holders had of benefiting by the labour of the slaves.”³  “We bought them in Africa and threw

² West Indian Interests and African Emigration. By the Hon. Captain Denman, R.N. Page i.
them” into foreign markets, just as we did with any ordinary commodity, and all this within the last half century.

Our country, therefore, owed a deep debt to the unhappy African race. “It was due by every principle, by the principle of retribution” “for a great crime—a crime of which England was one of the principal authors, and in regard to which this nation has some atonement to make.” Yes, Great Britain might, indeed, well feel that not “some,” but a great atonement was due to those on whom so great a wrong had been inflicted. Standing forth the most prominent of nations in all that was civilizing or great, the more aggravated was her share of guilty complicity—so larger in proportion the amount of restitution to be made in every way. If “a lamentable sacrifice of human life, and the expenditure of an enormous amount of treasure (in vain,)” are to be regarded as proofs of repentance, it can be claimed by our country: she has truly shewn herself to have been sincere in her penitence, and earnest in her attempts at reparation; but can we say with equal truth, successful in her endeavours? No, the painful impression is rapidly gaining ground among the best friends of Africa, that after all the unexampled exertions, by repressive force, by treaties, by an inconsistent concession, we have neither benefited the unhappy objects of our philanthropy, nor baffled the lawless slave dealer in his business; but have, on the contrary, increased the cruelties practised on the victims, and multiplied their numbers, while absolutely systematizing every step by which the object was accomplished. Errors so grave, on a subject of such importance to a large portion of our fellow creatures, and involving the character of other states, demand that the question should be fairly and impartially enquired into. Hitherto, it is certain, a mistaken policy has been followed. Wherein does this consist?


2 Petition of the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society, 1845.
Ist.—The question has been judged entirely by our national feelings on the subject, without reference to the condition of other states.

Very slow and gradual was the process by which Great Britain came to a perception of the injustice she was committing towards an unhappy people—to a knowledge of the awful example she was, as a Christian country, exhibiting to the rest of the world; but no sooner did these sad truths become apparent, than as much eager zeal and anxiety were displayed to efface the national share of the iniquity, as had been previously taken to strengthen and encourage it. Arrived at a sense of duty, ashamed and disgusted at our participation in the guilty transaction, the question was judged entirely by our recently acquired views and feelings; we expected others as suddenly to become converts, and to follow in our steps, meanwhile, forgetful, that what required so many years to bring about honest sentiments on our own part, would require, at least, a corresponding time and advancement in civilization, on the part of others. Moreover, in our precipitancy, we lost sight of the fact, that in the case of one of the states, which we hoped would pursue our example, there were apparent impossibilities against the immediate acceptance of our views. Brazil, instead of being a colony, trusting to a mother country bound to supply the means of labour, had become a nation, but still dependent on the "materiel," Negro labour, which had called forth its resources, and raised it to the commercial position it held. Being, for the most part, inter-tropical, where Europeans could not labour, even if they were forthcoming, it was entirely dependent on black labour, and must continue so until there is a sufficient number of half-castes and others to supply their place.

As to any immediate act of emancipation, by which free Negro labour could be commanded, the country was not in a situation, and, probably never will be, to meet the cost of
such an experiment. However anxious, therefore, that
government might have been, from prudential considerations,
to abolish the slave traffic, it was clearly impossible for them
to have done so, without some other channel was at the
same time opened, by which legitimate Negro labour might
be procured. It is true, they entered into treaties, to the
effect, that the Slave Trade should be discontinued; per-
haps, expecting thereby, to induce Great Britain to meet
them ultimately on fairer terms, with regard to the supply
of such labour. That has never been done; on the contrary,
while we have expected Brazil to commit an act destructive
to her interests, we have obstinately refused to accede to the
only measure by which a lawful substitute could be obtained.
Every person, who has visited Brazil, is aware that Negro
labour, in some form, is absolutely necessary for the cultivation
of the soil; and, without it, the resources must decline, and
at no distant date, it must lose its position, or become a
second St. Domingo. How preposterous, therefore, to know,
that what we decline to that country, we are allowing to our
own colonists, to a certain extent, (small or great, it matters
not, as far as the principle is concerned,) African emigrants;
and, after all, as if to approve of slave labour, we permit it
to compete against free, by the introduction of slave-grown
sugars on equal terms. No wonder such manifest incon-
sistencies surprise the Brazilians, make them question the
sincerity of our motives, and attribute (as shewn in evidence),
to our repressive force proceedings, a desire to injure the
prosperity of a rising state.

2nd.—The failure of our emancipation acts has shewn
Brazil that it cannot abandon the Slave Trade, without first
securing means of supplying other Negro labour.

When Great Britain liberated the slaves in her West
Indian colonies, it was fondly hoped by every well-wisher to
Africa, that the result of this costly experiment, would be
such an unprecedented success of free labour over slave
labour, that we should be enabled to direct the attention of slave-growing countries to so important a feature. Unfortunately, our desires were in advance of the actual state of the Negro, for no sooner did he know himself to be free, and in as high a position as he could hope to hold, and believing it to be impossible to attain to any of the importance which attached to his white master, than he quietly fell into a happy sort of indifference to further advancement, to which disposition the climate assisted him, by supplying, at little or no trouble, all his immediate wants, and almost every luxury. He could not be deprived of any of the freedom of action, conceded to him by the deed of emancipation; because it would have looked ill to compel him to do otherwise than suited his own purpose. Satisfied with his circumstances, and yet knowing that the sugar planter was dependent on him for the labour—without which all capital is unavailing—the ransomed slave became the master; and, after all our expensive efforts, we find the colonists now absolutely obliged to ask the mother country to grant them a supply of Negro emigrants to meet the necessity of their case, i.e., to stimulate the liberated slaves to labour on fair terms, by competition with immigrants. It was not that there was so much a scarcity of means, but that the liberated slaves declined to work, except on their own exorbitant terms, and at their pleasure; and our humanity prefers to allow them to be nearly useless members, rather than restrict their free character by any act obliging them to take a proper share in the labour necessary to the welfare of the country in which they are so happily located. All this has not escaped the observation of the Brazilians; they see plainly that our West Indian colonies have received such a shock, that unless Great Britain has the power to assist, and will do so, positive ruin must be the result. They are, therefore, more than ever prepared, by argument and motives of interest, to return as answer to our applications.
for additional measures to cripple the Slave Trade:—"No more suicidal agreements until you allow us, what your own great experiment has shewn to be necessary for a tropical country such as ours—Negro labour."

3rd.—While we have demonstrated to Brazil, that a certain "materiel" is absolutely necessary for her, as an intertropical sugar-growing country, we deny any legitimate way of procuring it, and hope all the while to be able to interdict it by the use of repressive force means.

We have already stated that Negro labour is positively essential to the present welfare of Brazil, and it must be forthcoming. As long as the demand for slaves exists without a substitution, it will keep up a system of unparalleled smuggling. Brazil must smuggle to uphold her present position, and all the reasoning, on the subject of its legality or illegality, will never stop it, unless we follow measures more consistent with the actual state of that empire. We are aware, we shall be told by those who trust to "repressive force," that although past and present attempts, may in some instances have been attended with different results to those looked for, yet, on the whole, it has fulfilled the expectations of its promoters; that, if it has indirectly been the cause of increased suffering and death to many, still it has saved many from foreign slavery; that, if it has not exterminated the Slave Trade, it has dealt a heavy blow and sad discouragement to it; and that there yet remain other and more stringent methods of applying coercive means. The very fact, that the advocates of repressive force are driven to this last point, shews clearly that previous efforts have failed—failed entirely. It is no use attempting to disguise the truth. Every year, as both life and treasure are being uselessly squandered away, stronger and stronger become the proofs, that each step we advance to crush the monster, the further it recedes from our grasp, the more Protean becomes its shape, the more complicated the mea-
sures used to elude our endeavours; and such is demonstrated by the admirers of the present futile system, now coming forward (as just stated,) to ask for additional aggressive powers, neither sanctioned by international law, nor likely to be entertained by the parties who have a voice in the matter. Such will never be conceded, and we may as well save ourselves the trouble of asking, and the mortification of a refusal; and, indeed, if the question is looked at impartially, we shall see that the evil is not to be overcome by any coercive means fairly within our reach, as long as we are resolved to deny that which can alone compensate for what we wish to destroy. It may, perhaps, be said, that whether Brazil or any other country suffers by the interdiction of slavery, it matters not to the question; that slave trading being contrary to the general usages of the civilized world, those who persist in it must be prepared for every ill consequence that results; and such is made the favourite argument for stronger proceedings against the Brazilian government. But, at the same time, we humbly submit that however anxious Great Britain may be to efface from the page of history her own participation in the traffic, she has no right to demand or expect from other nations compliances unjust or indefensible, and contrary to their established interests; the more so, as she was the first to give a great stimulus to the traffic and to incite others to it, by which it became in Brazil so incorporated with the prosperity of that country, as to be inseparable so long as they have no fair and legitimate way of temporarily obtaining the necessary labour. On this hinges all the difficulty to Brazil of seconding our "repressive force" views.

It will be seen by the evidence adduced, that the government of that country was anxious to suppress the Slave Trade; but that every endeavour on their part, and on the part of our own legislature, will prove fruitless unless a different view of the subject is taken and acted upon. Like
the wound of Telephus, the Slave Trade must be cured by the party that occasions it, and the sooner we obtain the hearty co-operation of the Brazilian government, by an appropriate concession, the more likely we are to arrive at a speedy and satisfactory conclusion.
CHAPTER I.

That all the attempts to extinguish the Slave Trade by repressive force measures have failed, and that the obstacles to its accomplishment are so numerous as to leave no hope of a successful issue by continuing the system of coercion.

That our endeavours, hitherto, have been “failures” (as admitted by Captain Matson, pamphlet, page i,) is not to be wondered at, if we consider the number of agents enlisted against us. On the one hand, there is a large and fertile country, almost entirely inter-tropical; it was raised to its present wealth by Negro labour; it has no redundant white population, or a mother country from whence to supply that want; no possession from which to procure Cooly labour; and yet by Negro labour alone can it hope to maintain its position. Our country declines to allow it the means of introducing free black labour, nor will we furnish any other to take the place of the slave. If free labour is not forthcoming, slave labour must be. The bonus is great; numbers embark in the traffic, and with every certainty of success; for this reason, it differs from every other description of illicit trade; inasmuch as we can put no other against it in the same field.

On the other hand, there is an immense continent where domestic slavery is one of the institutions throughout the numerous kingdoms of which it is composed; and whence, from the earliest period, even from the date when it was declared they should be “the servants of servants,” a large amount of the population has been led away into foreign servitude. There (as shewn by Birch, 2376; Matson, 1271, 1272, 1273,) the disposition to meet the views of the slave dealer remains as of old, with these new and terrible features, that the parents are now ready to sell their own offspring, and “all the women are slaves,” (Matson, 1467,
Thus there are two parties trying by every shift and expedient to accommodate each other, and defeat the arrangements of the third, viz., the suppressor. In aid of the former, at certain points, we have the authorities of a country (Portugal,) bound with us in treaty against the Slave Trade, conniving at, if not directly engaging in it (Butterfield, 575, 607.) The governments of Spain and Brazil violating their treaty engagements, “in connivance” (Viscount Palmerston, 66). On the coast of Brazil many of the local authorities protecting the disembarkation of the slaves (Despatch from the Commissioners in Rio Janeiro, 1838). Difficulties arising out of the foreign vessels of war acting in concert with us (Mansel, 4670). While the subjects of two other powerful allies co-operating with us by squadron, France and the United States, actually employ their national flags to screen and assist the slave trader (Bandinel, 3527; Viscount Palmerston, 57; Matson, 1675) and, moreover, a British vessel of war cannot touch a slaver under such flags, even though full of slaves (Birch, 2493).

Now, the coast on which we are attempting to suppress the illegal traffic, embraces about two thousand miles (Commissary Judge Smith, 3778; Mansel, 4611; Matson, 1254); and on all of this the trade is liable to be carried on. Well may Captain Mansel observe (4611), “what would twenty-four vessels be on such an extent of coast.” Over a considerable portion of this locality dense fogs prevail at certain seasons, which assist the slaver (Denman, 393, 394; Allen, 989). There are natural aids, in some cases, by immense lagoons, one running parallel with the shore for nearly three hundred miles, on a part of the Western coast (Hutton, 2541), where the Slave Trade is most active; and there are numerous rivers communicating by lagoons; and creeks with innumerable facilities for embarking slaves (vol. i, page 47), and obtaining supplies of water, provisions, &c. (Matson, 1290); and “by other creeks which intersect the country, slaves can be transported from one point to another” (Forsham, 4483). As we stated before the Committee (5058), “it seems to be an impossibility to stop up the numerous channels through which the slaves can come.”

No wonder, then, we find a mass of evidence against the
coercive measures. "It is a failure. I think it (the squadron) has failed in repression of the traffic in slaves:" "that it has failed with very deplorable results" (Commissary Judge Smith, 3771, 3772, 3773); and "the extinction of the Slave Trade is no nearer now than in times past" (idem, 3784). "However effective the squadron may be in checking the supply of slaves, it will never have the effect of destroying the Slave Trade" (Hook, 3900). "The repressive force system is worse than useless, it is positively mischievous" (King, 4059). "It is such an extensive line of coast," three thousand two hundred miles, "no squadron would be able to blockade it" (idem, 3995). "I am perfectly convinced that it would be impossible, by any extent of naval force, to suppress the Slave Trade;" "there is no multiplication of the number of vessels which would effectually repress the Slave Trade" (Mansel, 4610, 4613). "To repress the Slave Trade by a marine guard would scarcely be possible, if the whole British navy could be employed for that purpose" (Lord John Russell's communication to the Lords of the Treasury, 1839). "The squadron will never suppress the Slave Trade" (Horsfall, 4787). "Our present mode of putting down the Slave Trade is a most inefficient one;" "it is a useless expense, inasmuch as it (the squadron) has not effected the purposes for which it was sent and maintained, which was to put down the Slave Trade; it has not succeeded in that object; the trade is not put down; it is carried on to a very great extent" (Moore, 5532, 5364). "So far from being successful in stopping the Slave Trade, the squadron on the coast of Africa has been quite the contrary;" "I should conclude that the British squadron would never extinguish the Slave Trade;" "the suppression of that traffic could not be accomplished by any means that any nation possesses" (Stopford, 5577, 5578, 5593). "It would require treble the force, (at that time twenty-six, vessels) to affect the Slave Trade" (Birch, 2267). "That of late the Slave Trade has increased" (idem, 2229). "If we employed every pennant we have, on the coast of Africa, the Slave Trade would still go on;" "it is impossible to put it down by a blockade" (Laird, 2883, 2953). "The squadron would never effectually prevent the Slave Trade" (Duncan,
“not if even increased to double the present force” (idem, 3153); and “that it never could efficiently prevent it” (idem, 3164). “The squadron has not attained the object for which it was intended;” “it has not produced the effect of repressing the Slave Trade” (Allen, 998, 996). “The squadron is not able even to diminish the number of Africans that are demanded by the people of Brazil;” “the number is now as large as any other year—it is quite as many as they want” (Bandinel, 3244, 3286, 3246). “The force employed in suppressing the Slave Trade on the coast of Africa, has grown larger and larger up to a late period, and has increased to a very large force. The officers, throughout, have been some of the most distinguished in the British service,—Sir Robert Mends, Commodore Collier, Commodore Owen, Captain Denman, Commodore Jones, and Sir Charles Hotham,—and each and all, using their utmost endeavours, and sparing neither zeal nor talent for compassing their end—have not succeeded” (Bandinel, 3405). “The entire suppression of the Slave Trade, by the means heretofore employed, is an undertaking all but hopeless” (Letter of Commissioners at Jamaica, to Viscount Palmerston, 1848). “Your Petitioners have always been of the opinion, that the employment of an armed force for the suppression of the nefarious traffic, would prove ineffectual; and this opinion has been confirmed by indubitable facts” (Petition of British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society, 1845). “The Slave Trade is increasing in intensity in exact proportion with the additional means used by her Majesty’s government in attempting forcibly to repress it” (Petition of Glasgow Emancipation Society.

Before we conclude this part of the evidence, we must offer a few remarks on that portion of the Hon. Captain Denman’s plan, which refers to the destruction of the barracoons, and to which Captain Matson and others attach so much importance. In the first place, its legality in the eyes of the world is more than questionable, it is denied. In the second place, even if we had law on our side, it would not influence the Slave Trade. Barracoons, on the immediate coast, are not positively necessary for the maintenance of the slaves (Vide Birch, 2257); if they were, we all know
how easy it is in a tropical country, with abundance of wood and large leaved plants, to construct a barracoon or hut (Vide Birch's evidence, 2379). Captain Matson himself admits, "it is so very easy to build another barracoon" (1698). Captain Birch says (2373), "a native hut or barracoon is run up in a few days;" or "they might place the slaves in the huts of the neighbouring population;" and "that in some places the neighbouring villages are quite large enough to accommodate large numbers of slaves, if the barracoons were done away" (Birch, 2375). Now supposing our people could land and destroy those immediately on the coast—which proceeding is stated to be injurious to health, and subversive of discipline—(Lord John Hay, 3685, 3686; Captain Mansel, R.N., 4665, 4666, 4667), the only result would be, to cause the barracoons to be removed further inland where our sailors could not go (Lord J. Hay, 3687; Allen 961); for surely if they can march the slaves overland considerable distances, as shewn (Matson's letter to Admiralty, quoted 1290; Birch, 2247, also 2340; Sir Charles Hotham's letter, quoted 2367; and Butterfield, 661), they could do so from the barracoons stationed at a short distance inland.

A few miles' march through an African jungle is soon, and with impunity, accomplished by natives of that country; but what would be the effects of it on British seamen? As to the necessity of barracoons, stored with valuable goods, (the destruction of which, at several times, we shall shew was more prejudicial to British interests than to Brazilian,) there is now no necessity for them; there also our efforts have induced another and a safer plan, i.e., of shipping, in neutral bottoms (those of the United States especially), the articles necessary for the purchase of slaves. Lord Aberdeen's letter, therefore, which like a Banquo's ghost, haunts the troubled mind of Captain Matson, is innocent of all the evils attributed to it; for if it had never appeared, and the destruction of the barracoons had been continued, it would only have occasioned, at best, but a temporary embarrassment.
That the endeavours to suppress the Slave Trade, by coercive measures, have tended rather to increase it, and to systematize the efforts of the slaver.

The chief point we wish to insist upon throughout is this, Brazil must have Negro labour; we refuse, under any circumstances, to grant the right of introducing free blacks; therefore, the Slave Trade must and will go on. Let us put a case. If there was a particular commodity declared to be illegal, and yet positively necessary to our country, and which could not be replaced by the substitution of any other article, could we ever hope to repress the illicit trade? No; because in proportion as we damaged the trade by capture and other risks, if our efforts even were successful to a great extent, it would only raise the price of the commodity more and more, and still hold out the same or greater inducements for following the trade. One of the first consequences would be, that a traffic, previously conducted carelessly, would be systematized and strengthened. If we were trying such an experiment, even on our own coast, how hopeless it would be. What ought we then to expect when this is a case in which we operate against another country, unavoidably determined to have the commodity.

The Hon. Captain Denman (in his pamphlet, page 25,) says, "the blockade is the perpetual lopping of the branches as they prepare to throw out shoots, which will lead the owner to cut down the tree which continues unproductive, and replace it with one bearing more wholesome fruit;" but we should fear that instead of lopping branches, we are only pruning off the useless twigs, to give the tree more vitality, more durability. Our efforts against the Slave Trade are just producing the effects to be looked for.
Captain Denman admits, he "thinks there has been some increase of the trade" (208). "The vigilance of our cruisers creates a greater vigilance on the part of the slave dealers to get more slaves" (Allen, 998). "They (the slave dealers,) have employed other means; they have made roads; they have employed more boats; and their system is larger and better organized throughout" (Matson, 1350).

"Steam slave vessels began to be employed in 1844" (Matson, 1356). "Organized communications, by means of fires along the coast, to give warning of danger to slavers" (Matson, 1479 1380). "The Slave Trade has decidedly increased of late" (Birch, 2229). "The slave dealers were erecting barracoons on different parts of the coast, where formerly they never were before, (he believes) to the knowledge of any naval officer" (Birch). He also shews, (2245) that on a part of the coast, where according to Captain Matson's statement, the Slave Trade could not be carried on, that they have established factories, and he had visited them. "That at Cabenda the slave factories were numerous" (Birch, 2246); "but that the slaves were not shipped off there, they are driven down the coast." The slave merchants send out row-galleys fifty and sixty miles from the coast, to communicate and to convey information" (Birch, 2255). "The cruiser may be guarding in the vicinity of the well-known barracoons, and the slaves, in the meantime, be marched down the coast, and embarked thirty or forty miles to the leeward of the barracoons, which is done continually" (Birch, 2340). Sir Charles Hotham, in a letter to the Admiralty, 7th April, 1847, informs their lordships, that the slave dealers have adopted a plan of transporting masses of slaves from one point of the coast to another (2367). Mr. Hutton's evidence (2538) shews, that "one slave dealer was enabled to enlist the sympathies of a large district, and to get together a force of eight thousand men to assist his views." "He had fifteen sets of canoes and canoemen at his disposal, to cross the water and proceed to Lagos." "This crossing of the water refers to the lagoon which runs parallel to the sea coast" (Hutton, 2538). "I have very little doubt it has increased latterly" (Hutton, 2551). The Rev. Mr. Schön admits the Slave Trade has
been very active lately, i.e., since his leaving the coast of Africa, the year previous to his examination in 1848 (Schön, 2708). Mr. Duncan (3073) saw six hundred slaves put on board a vessel at Whydah, in one hour and a half. “I have known of a vessel being equipped and all her slaves on board, between four and five hundred, in twenty-four hours” (Matson, 1709). Within two years after the destruction of the barracoons at Gallinas, by the Hon. Captain Denman, it appears, by report from her Majesty’s Commissioners, that the slave factories were re-established there; having, in fact, only received a temporary check (3342). “The Slave Trade, during 1846 and 1847, was in a state of extreme activity” (Bandinel, 3350). In the case of the Pons, quoted by J. Bandinel, Esq. (3412), nine hundred and three slaves were embarked, together with their provisions and water, in eleven hours. “The parties (the slave dealers) change their tactics; where one system, by the activity and zeal of her Majesty’s officers, proves a failure, then they change their tactics and pursue another system instantly; their gains have been so great, that they have been enabled to pursue the system; and hitherto, their systems have been so ably conducted, that they have baffled the endeavours, from time to time, of the cruisers. When one system of the cruisers has been put in action, they have instantly put another in action, which has succeeded in evading the result which was expected from the efforts of the cruisers, however meritorious their efforts; and they have been meritorious in the highest degree” (Bandinel, 3439). “Never have the slave dealers so perfected all the appurtenances and appliances of their vile trade as at the present; never have they so organized the whole range of shore signals from St. Catherines to Bahia; nor established such facilities for landing their cargoes as now” (Lord Howden’s letter, February, 1848, Rio Janeiro, to Viscount Palmerston). “The Slave Trade is increasing in a great degree, which may be accounted for by the great temptations now held out to individuals to embark in this traffic, as small shares can now be obtained in the companies established here for that purpose” (Letter of — Porter, Esq., H.M. Consul at Bahia, 31st December, 1847). “There are joint stock compa-
nies in Brazil, for prosecuting the Slave Trade” (Birch, 2397). “There are companies in Rio Janeiro that manage the whole thing;” “slave trading companies they insure amongst themselves, and they form a perfect company to lighten the risk” (Wyvill, 3603, 3604). He also admits, that in 1842, thirty thousand slaves were taken away from the East coast of Africa (3623, 3624). In the case of the Pacquete do Rio, quoted by Mr. Hook (3921), the whole articles of equipment, and five hundred and forty-seven slaves were taken on board in the short space of four hours. “Since 1846 the Slave Trade has increased, at least there have been a greater number of vessels employed in the Slave Trade” (Hook, 3944). “There is no doubt the Slave Trade is increasing in extent;” “it is now more lucrative than formerly;” “being now conducted on something of a system;” “having formed something like a system of carrying on the trade;” “the organization of the Slave Trade in Brazil, is now much more complete and more effective;” “it is now reduced to something of a science; the system of introducing slaves is better understood, and the facilities or possibilities of bringing them in are now greater than they were in 1845;” “it was carried on, at the beginning, by each man in the worst manner that it possibly could, it is now reducing itself into something of a system” (Cliffe, 4105, 4110, 4122, 4123, 4162, 4341, 4351). “The number of captures is no proof that the Slave Trade is not going on with activity” (Mansel, 4606). “That the slave dealers intended to send over several vessels together to one point, and that all of them could not be captured” (Author, 4994). “The number of captures is rather a proof that the trade is going on with greater activity” (Idem, 5031). “There is no doubt the Slave Trade is going on with activity” (Moore, 5308). “There is greater security to the parties who enter into it now, because the slave dealers can insure their cargoes;” “there are insurance companies, or mutual assurances entered into, and the parties, therefore, do not care about losing a vessel” (Moore, 5323). If you increase the squadron, you will of course increase the difficulty of carrying on the Slave Trade; but the more you increase it, in all probability, the more you will
enhance the price of the slave, and increase the trade. Captain Stopford thinks the Slave Trade on the coast of Brazil has increased with the increase of the squadron (5591). "The dealers in Rio have placed a second powerful steamer in the trade; there may be others of which we know nothing; but, on a fair calculation, these two vessels will annually carry off at least ten thousand slaves from the coast of Africa, without, I fear, experiencing much chance of capture" (Sir Charles Hotham’s letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 14th March, 1848.) "There is not a sloop on the African station, that can compete in sailing with a well-found slaver" (Idem.) "The vessels equipped for the Slave Trade in the port of Bahia, are of the finest and most beautiful construction—stability, strength, and durability are all sacrificed to obtain speed" (Idem). Lord Palmerston admits (46) that worthless vessels are now employed as decoy ducks. "The vessel watches her opportunity, runs in straight to the slave factory, and is off in a couple of hours" (Denman, 473). Captain Butterfield, while chasing an empty vessel, a full one escaped. "They can now (in consequence of roads made) ship slaves nearly every twenty miles or so along that coast" (neighbourhood of Ambriz), (Butterfield, 647). "There is a point where the Slave Trade has been established, where it has not been known for a long time, at a place called Trade Town," between Cape Palmas and Liberia; "it is also re-established at the Gallinas" (Denman, 320); "also on the Sherbro’ river, near Sierra Leone" (Denman, 327). "The slave dealers were erecting barracoons on parts of the coast where they never were known before" (Birch, 2242). "Barracoons have been again established at the Gallinas; also, between Cape Mount and Monrovia" (Birch, 2336). "The Slave Trade, to the North West of Cape Palmas, is continually rising up in places where it had formerly been supposed to be extinguished, and was temporarily extinguished" (Bandinel, 3486). "On the Kroo coast where there had been no slaves shipped for the last twenty years, there are slaves being now shipped” (Letter quoted by Commissary Judge Smith, 3780). "That in consequence of the activity of the cruizers in the Mosambique, on the East coast, the trade
was opened up at Angozha, where it was previously un-
known” (Author, 5211, 5215). “That we are opening up
a series of new channels” (5217). “As the slave traders
find the difficulties increase at one place, they will remove
to another” (Moore, 5520). The bad effects of all this will
be shewn hereafter. “If you check it at one point it will
go to another” (Laird, 2953). “They don’t care how many
doors you shut, if you leave one open” (Captain Matson’s
pamphlet, page 59).

Can anything shew more clearly than the preceding
evidence, that our endeavours are but increasing the Slave
Trade, systematizing it, and giving it the character of a fixed
and lasting trade? and what is a serious consideration,
each year will see it become, under our repressive efforts,
more deeply rooted, and more difficult of ultimate extinction.
That the Repressive Force system has increased the horrors of the Slave Trade, and aggravated the sufferings and discomforts of the unhappy creatures we proposed to benefit.

Persons who look only on one side of the question, will lay all this to the charge of the government of the slave-growing state—but we contend it is referrible to “repressive” attempts. There is, unfortunately, in Brazil, no substitute for the commodity we wish to suppress, nor will we allow one while doing all in our power to crush its introduction. The consequence is, everything is sacrificed to elude our attempts; and, moreover, the Slave Traders reconcile the matter to their consciences by saying, “bad as we were formerly, yet we had an interest in doing what was most likely to enable us to land our cargoes in good health; now we have neither the opportunity nor the means of doing so; your efforts make us so much at home with human suffering that it brutalizes us, and it is felt on our living cargo.”

If, then, there be no other consideration which ought to make England pause and attempt other and more likely means of putting an end to the Slave Trade; it should be the bitter truth which is, alas, now so apparent, that we are unintentionally the cause of a frightful amount of human suffering. We know there is a most mistaken feeling, that it would compromise the dignity of a powerful nation like Great Britain to go back from a certain line of policy; because it would be an acknowledgment (most keenly painful to every Briton’s heart) that his country, which can accomplish almost anything it wishes, is baffled and defeated by a set of lawless slave-traders. We would even say, with one of the highest authorities examined, “we have such a horror
of the Slave Trade generally, that if we thought you could stop it entirely, by allowing, for a limited time, even exceeding horrors, it would be worth while” (Bandinel 3425); but, alas, it is so evidently impossible, by repressive force means, that we say, let us retrace our steps.

What a picture of horrors presents itself as we look over the evidence; it is sickening to dwell on; in vain may we endeavour to blind ourselves to the fact, by saying that the statements made on the subject “are exaggerated and doubtful; derived from hearsay or other defective sources.” The awful reality is plain before us. Captain Butterfield captured a vessel off Loando, she was only eighteen tons, having on board one hundred and eight slaves, all children (535, 536); their ages were from eight years down to three or four; they had no slave-deck to lie down, they were lying on casks” (554). Can anything more cruel be imagined? Is that case exaggerated, or from a doubtful source? On another occasion “eight or nine of these (on board a vessel captured by him) were suffocated on the morning we took the slaver. In the chase, I suppose they were pushed down into the hold: we pulled eight out dead” (Butterfield 556). Captain Wyvill (3580, 3588) captured in the Mosambique Channel, a vessel one hundred and forty tons, with four hundred and forty-four slaves on board, one-half of the number were children, the remainder half-grown up. There was no proper slave deck, yet this vessel was bound on a long and tedious passage round the Cape of Good Hope to the Brazils. A great number of the slaves were suffocated the first night of capture (Wyvill 3598). “The passage to the Cape of Good Hope occupied 55 days.” “A great number of the slaves died; there was great mortality; no less than one hundred and fifty died” (3599). Is this a doubtful or exaggerated case?

What saith Captain Matson, also, “I recollect boarding one vessel after a chase of a few hours; a great many of the slaves had confluent small-pox. The sick had been thrown down into the hold in one particular spot, and they appeared, on looking down, to be one living mass; you could hardly tell arms from legs, or one person from another, or
what they were; there were men, women, and children; it was a most horrible and disgusting sight” (1470). These must have perished, during the chase, for how will any one affirm that if the vessel had not been pursued, and the crew thereby fully occupied in trying to escape, these dead bodies would have been allowed to remain, self-interest would have prompted them to throw them overboard.

Here, again (Matson 1774), “the effort of a slave captain is to land as many slaves as he can on the coast of Brazil; but as it is not possible for the most practised eye to tell the healthy from an unhealthy slave, by seeing him in the barracoon, if the vessel could hold three hundred slaves moderately crowded, the captain would take half as many again, say four hundred and fifty, and cram them on board below, and on the deck, for the sake of putting them to the test, knowing that all those who were not likely to cross the Atlantic, would sicken during the first forty-eight hours. Then directly they show symptoms of weakness, on account of their weakly constitutions, they are put on one side of the deck; no food or water is given them, and they are allowed to die; they are then thrown overboard. Then at the end of the forty-eight hours, that man has a prime cargo of slaves of those who do not sicken.”

Herein we are presented with a new and horrible feature, apparently called forth by our efforts. In all the evidence ever before produced, there was never such a thing as this “weeding” shewn, nor was it necessary. The constitution of the African to bear fatigue and privation remains the same; therefore it is fairly attributable to our efforts. Horribile dictu! The slave trader, by our plans, is obliged to cram his cargo, so that at the end of forty-eight hours the weeding system may leave a “prime cargo.” Is this a doubtful case? Again, the presence of the squadron “has very much aggravated the horrors and the misery to be endured by those who are embarked, because all those who are embarked, whether they escape or whether they be captured, have to undergo a great amount of misery, greater than if the trade were open” (Matson 1485). “Then there is certainly more cramming in smaller vessels than there used to be;” “the sufferings have been in some
degree aggravated, I believe, by the fleeter class of vessels used;” “there are degrees of suffering, and my opinion is, that in some degree the sufferings are increased by the sharper vessels used;” “a practice now exists of embarking slaves without laying slave decks;” “this aggravates the sufferings of the slaves” (Denman 209, 211, 214, 217, 218). “That the sufferings of the slave in the middle passage are greater, but of shorter duration” (Idem 329). He (the Hon. Captain Denman, as appears, page 38, vol. i of evidence before select committee of Slave Trade) was concerned in the capture of the Maria de Gloria, she was under two hundred tons, and had originally four hundred and thirty slaves on board; the slaves were very closely packed; and although there was more than ordinary accommodation, there was no slave deck. The slaves were laid on casks, which produced great suffering from ulcers; one hundred and four of the slaves died on the passage to Sierra Leone for adjudication. This vessel had almost completed her middle passage, when she was captured by H.M.S. Snake; seven of the slaves only had died at the date of capture (how oddly this contrasts with the statement of Capt. Matson relative to the weeding system?) She was sent to Sierra Leone, and on the way one hundred and four unhappy victims died. Well might Captain Denman say (355), “this next middle passage was of course attended with accumulated disease, suffering, and misery;” and he admits there is sometimes much difficulty in taking captured vessels to Sierra Leone for adjudication, sometimes it is as long as eight or nine weeks, “that in particular cases the voyage is long and the slaves suffer much” (Denman 165). In the case of the Pons, (quoted Bandinel 3412) there was no slave deck; “upwards of eight hundred and fifty slaves were piled, almost in bulk, on the water casks below.” “The stench from below was so great, that it was impossible to stand more than a few moments near the hatchways. Our men, who went below from curiosity, were forced up sick; then all the hatches were off; what must have been the sufferings of these poor wretches when the hatches were closed?” “None but an eye-witness can form a conception of the horrors these poor creatures must endure in their transit across the ocean”
(Letter from Mr. Pakenham to Lord Aberdeen, 1846).

Another case (quoted Bandinel, 3413, as given by Mr. Cowper, Consul at Pernambuco, 1844: the Conceicao, of twenty-one tons, had taken on board ninety-one slaves. Mr. Cowper says, “I, who have seen the vessel or boat, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, conceive how the powers of human endurance could have supported twenty days in this floating hell.” In another case (quoted Bandinel, 3415): the Kentucky, in which there was an insurrection among the slaves, and in which there was a frightful detail of butchery: well may Mr. Bandinel (3418) lay some of the horrors to the charge of our repressive efforts. Case of Her Majesty's Brig Dolphin, mentioned by Commander Riley, R.N., where seven slaves were killed in the hold of the slaver by shots fired to bring the vessel to. “The Tentiva landed a cargo of seven hundred and twenty-six slaves at Bahia, December 16th, 1847, in a miserable state of starvation, one hundred and eleven poor creatures having perished on the passage from deficiency of water and provisions” (Letter of the British Consul to Viscount Palmerston, Bahia, 31st December, 1847). In a case related by Captain Butterfield (625, 629), out of between four hundred and five hundred slaves, no less then seventy died in eight days on their passage to St. Helena for adjudication; “and that while she was waiting sentence, sometimes six or seven a day died.” Case quoted on evidence of Mr. Pennel, British Consul, at Rio Janeiro in 1831 (Bandinel 3411), in which slaves were packed in casks. Case on authority of Commissioners at Sierra Leone, 1844, where the vessel was only eighty tons, and having five hundred and forty-nine slaves on board; one hundred and twenty of the slaves died between time of capture and the condemnation (3412). Case of the Grande Poder de Deos, only seven tons with thirty-nine full-grown slaves on board (3915), “When Great Britain abolished the traffic in slaves, and it became a smuggling system, they were crammed into smaller vessels, the ‘tween decks of which were not higher than my stick; the sufferings that the negroses underwent from malaria, confined as they were, so many hundreds in a small vessel down below, badly ventilated, with a small quantity of food
and less water, the exhaustion was frightful. I have seen them come into Sierra Leone myself; men of six feet high, were reduced to mere walking skeletons." "I should say from my own experience, that humanity has lost much, instead of being a gainer" (Commissary Judge Smith, 3785). Their sufferings are "frightful beyond all description" (Idem). "I have been on board of some (slave vessels) at Sierra Leone; I can compare the appearance of the Negroes on board to nothing but a swarm of bees settled upon the bough of a tree;" "they looked one black mass;" "I have seen the slaves reduced to such a state of emaciation as was frightful to witness" (Commissary Judge Smith, 3788, 3790). "I think the squadron has very much increased the horrors of the middle passage;" "I have had an opportunity of seeing many slave vessels when they have been brought into Sierra Leone;" "the spectacle was truly awful;" "the majority on board were little better than living skeletons; indeed, no language can describe the scene" (Hook, 3906); "it would be hardly possible to increase their sufferings" (Idem, 3911); "the packing of the slaves has been compared to the packing of herrings in a barrel" (Idem, 3913). "Sometimes there is great mortality in vessels captured and sent to Sierra Leone for adjudication" (Carr, 1944). "It, (the repressive force system,) has been the means of aggravating fearfully the miseries of the slaves;" "and that to a most incredible extent" (King, 3971). "The cruelties are aggravated by the attempts to escape the vigilance of the British cruisers" (Forsham, 4487). "I could not have supposed it possible that so many people could have been packed into a vessel, by any device, as I have seen packed in slave vessels;" "we captured a vessel not much larger than a river barge, a vessel of one hundred and twenty-seven tons; it had stowed between decks, in close confinement, four hundred and forty-seven slaves" (Mansel, 4648, 4649). Captain Mansel further states, "that as long as there is a demand for slaves in Brazil, and attempts continue to be made to intercept them, these horrors will continue" (4650); while the same high authority was off Gallinas, cruising, there was a large number of slaves collected at the barracoons, and as the rice
crop had failed, the poor creatures “were turned out on the beach to see if they could pick up anything in the shape of sustenance, and that the beach was strewed with their bones” (Mansel 4654). “Year after year I look upon it that the evils connected with the Slave Trade have been aggravated by our squadron being on the coast of Africa to prevent it;” “increasing the sufferings of the negroes.” “It is a most inefficient mode, and has added greatly to the cruelties practised, and made the middle passage worse than it was before;” “the more active and vigilant the squadron becomes the more cruel the traffic becomes” (Moore 5341, 5342, 5364, 5426).

“The Slave Trade is carried on under circumstances of very great cruelty;” “I think the vessels are more crowded than they would be otherwise;” “if the squadron were not so vigilant the vessels that come across would not be so crowded as they are now;” “I have seen the slaves put on board the Crescent receiving ship for liberated Africans, and they were the most wretched objects that one could imagine;” (Stopford, 5583). Mr. Horsfall says “no doubt the horrors have increased;” and that the preventive system augments the number of deaths (4796). “He received information from a mercantile friend, of a cargo of seven hundred and twenty-six slaves, having been landed in a frightful state of starvation; one hundred and eleven died on the passage” (4785). This is probably the Tentiva, already referred to. The Rev. Dr. Lang states, that the appearance of recently landed slaves, was “very miserable, very depressed, very emaciated” (4954, 4955); “and that the cruelties have been aggravated by the measures of the squadron” (4958). “The most cursory glance at official papers will shew that the greatest possible number of slaves are now crammed into the narrowest possible space; and that consequences, at which humanity sickens, are the necessary result” (Letter from Lord John Russell to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, 1839). What would his lordship say in 1849? Captain Birch is most decidedly of opinion “that the present system of suppressing the Slave Trade, by force, aggravates the sufferings of the slaves;” “they formerly went in better class of vessels;” “they are
very much crowded now" (2274). "That he (Captain Birch) once captured a vessel of two hundred and ninety tons, with five hundred and sixty slaves on board" (2282); "they were in a dreadful state;" "nothing to lie on, except the logs used for burning;" "upwards of two hundred of these were children" (2290). Is this a doubtful or exaggerated statement? In another case, the Beulah, of two hundred and sixty tons, there were five hundred and ten slaves on board; "among them infants of a few days old and upwards;" "some of these had been born on board" (Birch, 2310); "and a great number died on the passage to Sierra Leone for adjudication" (Birch, 2323). "The slaves suffer greater cruelty" (Stopford, 5591). "The Slave Trade continues to be carried on under circumstances of aggravated cruelty, increasing in intensity in exact proportion with the additional means used by her Majesty's government in attempting forcibly to suppress it;" "that while they have increased the cruelties of the Slave Trade, by making it a smuggling one, they have never yet been found to diminish the supply of slaves to the Brazils and Spanish West Indies" (Petition of the Glasgow Emancipation Society to the House of Commons). "Wilfully continuing to sacrifice thousands of valuable lives and millions of money, with the full knowledge that the only result of further efforts, will be fresh triumphs to the slave dealers, and the increased misery of their victims" (Despatch of Messrs. Macauley and Dogherty, Judges of the Mixed Commission Court, 31st of December, 1838). "A fearful increase in the ratio of mortality, in the number of unhappy victims shipped for the slave markets" (Petition of the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society to House of Commons, 1845). "The general horror of the thing is much increased, besides the increase of the suffering on the part of the poor creatures, who are so closely packed in fast sailing vessels;" "it has aggravated the horrors of the Slave Trade" (Allen, 997, 1011). "The slaves are made fast to ropes, and if the canoes are upset, they are hauled ashore dead or alive;" "it is villany and cruelty throughout, and makes one sigh and long for a remedy" (Letter quoted, Hutton, 2546). "Our efforts, I think, have produced more miseries;" "it
must have produced miseries to a greater number—1st, because it has produced a greater exportation;" "then it must have produced some more miseries, because the great pressure of the squadron would induce vessels to go off with their slaves, occasionally half equipped, without accommodation" (Bandinel, 3355). "The Slave Trade is now carried on under circumstances of very great cruelty;" "lately it has been carried on under circumstances of greater cruelty" (Idem, 3409). "When the embarkation does take place, it is distressing to reflect on the number which is thus taken on board; the poor wretches may literally be said to be stowed in bulk. The consequence is, that the number of deaths which occur, and the squalid, diseased, and deplorable state of the survivors, when landed, are shocking to humanity" (Commissioner’s letter, quoted Bandinel, 3410). "Previously to the restrictions put upon the trade, the deaths on the middle passage may, on the best evidence to be got, be fairly calculated on an average at thirteen per cent; that the deaths on the passage thenceforward to the present time (1848) may fairly be calculated at twenty-four per cent." (Letter of J. Bandinel, Esq. to W Hutt, Esq., Chairman of Slave Trade Committee)—so it would seem as if our efforts had nearly doubled the ratio of mortality.

"They must suffer much in being driven thirty or forty miles under a tropical sun" (Birch, 2369). "All the evidence goes to shew, that the cruelties are increased by the present system" (Laird, 2885). "The slavers now take a quantity of water and provisions quite inadequate to the voyage" (Idem, 2887); "and that there is consequently a very great increase of suffering and mortality" (Idem, 2888). "We have greatly increased the cruelties of the whole trade for the chance of doing good to a very small per-centange of it" (Idem, 3082). "They no doubt suffer greatly from being over-crowded in the vessels" (Duncan, 3085), This authority heard a captain of a slaver boast of having thrown slaves overboard, in casks, to prevent capture (3086, 3087). The suffering and mortality of the slaves are "greater, inasmuch as in addition to the general horrible treatment, the slave traders have an additional motive—the fear of being
taken—which induces them to start when their ships are
half provisioned;” and “the ships have been more loaded;”
and the slaves are often put on board in a diseased state
(Bandinel, 3420, 3421). “Sometimes slave ships put to
sea with the slaves without a sufficient supply of water and
provisions” (Birch, 2275).

Let us take some of the sufferings of the slaves by the
detention on the coast. That slaves, waiting to embark
and prevented by our squadron, suffer in consequence, from
want of food and from disease (Denman, 357). Captain
Mansell stated in a letter to the Admiralty, that upwards
of two thousand slaves were said to have been put to death
by a chieftain on the coast, while in a state of detention, it
being impossible to embark them (vol. i, 349); and this
Captain Birch believed really to have taken place; and it
was done because the barracoons had been destroyed (Birch,
2371, 2372; also Matson, 1696). “Generally, now, the
barracoons are very hard up for provisions, and they (the
slaves) must be in a very weak state;” “they must be in a
very weak state when they embark” (Birch, 2369). “They
are occasionally exposed to great sufferings and mortality
in the barracoons;” “if the slaves were kept in barracoons
and could not be shipped off, some suffering would be occa-
sioned;” “has heard of a case where the slaves were des­
troyed in the barracoons, because the owners would not be
at the expense of maintaining them” (Carr, 1900, 1902,
1903). “They (the slaves) were kept, day and night, in
the barracoons and not allowed to come out—that made
them sick” (Campbell, a liberated African, vol. i, 1107).
Campbell was himself confined one month in a barracoon,
and the reason the slave traders gave was, that the cruizers
prevented the embarkation (vol. i, 1083).

That large numbers of slaves, detained in the barracoons,
were in a state of actual starvation from the impossibility
of embarking them (Mansel, 4604). Captain Butterfield
states a case where five hundred and five slaves were detained
in a barracoon, at Ambiriz, fourteen months, in consequence
of the difficulty of shipping them (606); and after all, the
unhappy creatures were marched along the coast before they
were embarked (661). We need say little about the vessels
employed: they are stated to be "old vessels, unfit for any other employment, scarcely sea-worthy" (Birch, 2270).

The evidence already quoted prepares the mind for the horrible details of suffering which the unhappy slaves undergo by the end of the passage; we may style them the "bloody mysteries," which the slave dealer alone can divulge. Hear what Doctor Cliffe says:—"They (the slaves) are frequently hurried on board without a proper supply of water" (4204). "The sufferings of those who escape are almost beyond the powers of description. I have seen them, when brought on shore, when life has been reduced to the lowest possible ebb; "there was a complete wasting of the whole of the animal system, and a mere mass of bones, but still alive" (4210)—all attributable "to a long passage, to a want of sufficiency of food, and to the confinement and foul air" (4211). "They are packed in upon their sides, laid in heads amongst legs and arms, so that it is very difficult, frequently, until they become very much emaciated so as to leave room, for them to get up alone, without the whole section moving together" (4223). In one case quoted by Dr Cliffe, "ten only lived out of one hundred and sixty shipped, having previously been detained nearly three months in a barra-coon" (4239, 4240). "I believe there is nothing more that I can observe upon than that the sufferings are beyond the powers of description" (4249). Frequently the slaves that are more remote do not get any thing (food) at all, unless they can crawl up over the others and get nearer the hatchways" (4259). "He believes there have been cases in which the dead bodies of the slaves, before being thrown overboard, were in such a state of putridity that they could hardly be kept together" (4261). The most favourite cargoes now are little children of eight and ten years of age, "because they are smaller and pack more conveniently" (4269). "The knee-bones appear almost like the head of a person; from the arm you may slip your finger and thumb up; the muscular part of the arm is gone; it is a mere bone covered with a bit of skin; the abdomen is highly protuberant; * * * I am speaking of them just as they are landed" (4305). "From not having perhaps stood upright for a month or two, the muscles have lost the power of
supporting them;” “the eye is almost like that of a boiled fish” (4308, 4307). “Attended with horrors in its present details that even the old bucaniers, those fierce avengers of Spanish cruelty, would scarcely have practised; and all the attempts to suppress, hitherto, have actually produced an increased amount of misery and suffering that is unparalleled in the annals of crime, and that no language can adequately describe” (Cliffe, 4686). He states, that “in the old time they never suffered for want of water;” “that wholesale murdering for want of water” (4136). “There is a great deal of suffering in the barracoons that did not formerly exist” (4196); and that to command the landing of sixty-five thousand slaves in Brazil, one hundred thousand must have been taken away from Africa to make up for increased mortality and captures.
That the repressive force attempts increase the stimulus, or excitement on the part of the African chiefs, to continue the traffic.

On this point let us take a parallel case:—The importation of a certain article, positively necessary to the wants of our country, is interdicted, and force is established to prevent its introduction; the endeavours partially succeed, but the article must be had; the value will rise in proportion to the risk; it will become more a gambling transaction; it will call forth more smugglers. Now, we will suppose that our repressive force efforts were successful: what would be one of the first results? the value of the slave in Brazil would be raised; and with the numberless mines, and boundless extent of virgin soil (which so terrify some who know nothing of the resources of that country), this ought to be the sure result. There is greater difficulty in procuring slaves on the coast of Africa; labour is wanted in Brazil; the slave dealers will offer double, treble, nay, can make such offers as will render the temptation too strong for any native chief to resist; it will increase the excitement and stimulus, "for all experience shews, that with the African chiefs the Slave Trade is the favourite pursuit" (Hon. Captain Denman's pamphlet, page 7). Mr. Duncan states (3076) "that the capture of several slave vessels had a tendency to raise the price of slaves, at Whydah:" would not that be a stimulus to the native dealer? In our examination before the Committee (23rd May, 1848), the opinion given was, "that the squadron has a tendency rather to increase the Slave Trade; inasmuch, as, in the first place, it keeps up the excitement. The blacks, like other people, are fond of excitement; the great excitement to them is the
Slave Trade, as has always been remarked by persons who have visited the coast. The Slave trade “is now more a gambling transaction than it ever has been; it requires greater activity, and greater combination of means to effect the escape of the slaves and of the slavers from the coast; and altogether that has increased the excitement” (Author, 5033). “It is that sort of wild excitement which is most palatable to the African character, as you at present see him in his native country” (Idem, 5034). “The excitement, as well as the profit, has much to do with the prosecution of the traffic on the coast of Africa” (Idem, 5036). “If the difficulty of getting slaves away from the coast is greater, there will be more excitement in consequence of that, and a greater anxiety also to assist the slaver” (Idem, 5037). “Instead of being able, as they were under the former system, to ship their slaves off leisurely, at any time when the slaves were ready, they cannot do so now; all parties are kept in a state of excitement while there is a cargo waiting; both the slave seller (i.e., the native chief), and the slave buyer” (Idem, 5038). “The prohibition lends not only a charm to it with the Africans,” but “a direct stimulus” (Idem, 5043). “It (the Slave Trade) is a trade which excites men, and the immense profits that they derive from it, are a further inducement to them to carry it on” (Commissary Judge Smith, 3776). What says Captain Matson:—“There is a universal feeling’ among the chiefs to perpetuate the Slave Trade” (1271, 1272, 1273); “and they prefer it to legal commerce, in almost all cases, because it is so much more profitable” (1274). Now, in proportion as our efforts were successful, it would, as before stated, raise the value of the slave; there would be more money offered for him; the trade would be more profitable, therefore more preferable; and it would increase the stimulus to carry it on, and defeat our views. If the price of a slave in Brazil rises to £100, the slave dealer instead of now offering £4 to £6, would offer £8, £12, £20. Would not this be a temptation to a savage to break through any treaty? Even Captain Denman admits (453) that if legitimate commerce ceased to be profitable, the Slave Trade might revive at the very points where our legal trade is now most active. In fact, we know that
in some instances this temptation has already commenced. The king of Bimbia had a visit from a slave trader; but British legal trade is well established there. The difficulty of procuring slaves, is not yet so great, as to induce the slave dealer to offer enormous prices for slaves in their own country; and, therefore, we find in evidence, that the Bimbian chief (whose disposition we well know from personal acquaintance) sent the slaver away. But suppose it had been worth the slave captain’s while to have offered three, four, or five times as many fine jackets for a slave, as we could for a small quantity of palm oil, would the good king Will, of Bimbia, who is very fond of excitement and fine clothes, have acted as he did? We fear not. The effects of this excitement will be more evident when we examine the results of our suppressive efforts on legal commerce.
CHAPTER V

That legitimate commerce has been going on in Africa, and increasing, in spite of the opposition of the Slave Trade, and that it would yet do so.

Throughout the evidence of those who uphold the repressive force system, there runs an apparent wish to establish two important facts—viz., that because legal trade has sprung up and increased at certain points in Africa (chiefly rivers), it was in consequence of the Slave Trade having been first put down by force; and that if we withdraw our squadron, legal commerce will again decline. Now we beg humbly to submit, that from our earliest communications with Africa, even while the Slave Trade was most flourishing, we had also a trade in other commodities, which was gradually improving. Those who give to the repressive force measures all the credit of the present augmentation, forget that, throughout Africa as the rest of the world, (though, alas, in the former, very very small comparatively), there has been in proportion with increasing population and increasing civilization, a consequent increase of demand, and an improving taste to procure foreign articles, either necessary or as luxuries, which the energy and enterprise of our merchants have enabled them to meet at reducing prices: and as well might it be attributed to our attempts at suppression of smuggling of French silks, that there is now so very much larger a consumption of cotton or silk and other foreign articles, as to say that the suppressive force means solely have been the cause of the increase of legal trade in Africa; and we shall proceed to show how this is. In all that we can gather of Africa, we find the Slave Trade fluctuating in amount, according to the demand, and the quantity of capital disposable for that
purpose. Co-existing with this, and gradually increasing, there was also an export of ivory, gold-dust, palm-oil, and dye-woods; and for the convenience of carrying on both trades, the rivers were selected, inasmuch as the trade throughout Africa being conducted in a very dilatory way by the natives, requires that a vessel should be stationed for sometime in one place to effect any large sales. The rivers were thus also most suitable for the slaver in the then unorganized state of the trade, and both the legal and illegal trade were going on together, as admitted even by the Hon. Captain Denman (243); and the former even gradually improving in the face of such fearful antagonism. The facility of blockading rivers being so great, the slave dealer was necessitated to look out for new fields, where he could carry on his business with greater safety, and he deserted the rivers, even before our great repressive efforts in 1839 (Vide Matson, 1434), leaving them entirely open to legal traffic, which barrier to the revival of the Slave Trade we find to have been so effectual, that by the concurrent testimony of the naval officers examined, it became no longer necessary to keep cruizers stationed at these points. Now will any one venture to assert, in the face of these facts, that if legitimate commerce had not been made sufficiently inviting by the activity of our mercantile people in Africa, the Slave Trade would not have recurred? for there was nothing to intimidate or prevent it. Nor can we but believe that a legal trade, which could increase while co-existent with the Slave Trade, and while the natives were less dependent on European articles for gratification than they gradually became, and which required no protection afterwards against the competition of the Slave Trade, would have gone on increasing and improving, even had the Slave Trade continued in the rivers. In proof of this, we have the evidence of Mr. Hutton (one of the greatest advocates of a large suppressive force for protection of commerce), who shews that he has been able to establish legitimate trade at places where the Slave Trade was going on (2589); and also Mr. Duncan, that at Whydah, while the Slave Trade was in the greatest state of activity, legal trade was being carried on (3131, 3132); and although this has been the hotbed of slave-trading on the North Coast for
many years, Mr. Hutton states (vol. i, p. 3195), that ten years ago the export of palm-oil was only one hundred tons per annum, and now, in the face of the slave opposition, it has increased to one thousand tons annually; and Captain Forsham (trader to Africa), says, “the Slave Trade has no tendency to drive out legitimate commerce” (4494); also Captain Butterfield, who exemplifies (vol. i, page 678), “that if legitimate commerce supplies what the negro requires, he will prefer legal commerce to Slave Trade, even while the slave trader is present and anxious to purchase; he shews that an English merchant vessel thereby temporarily stopped the Slave Trade at one place, merely by having a supply of red jackets; yes, the red jackets, without flesh or blood in them, accomplished what all the “blue jackets” of the repressive force could not.

By Captain Matson’s shewing (1302), there were English factories near Cabenda and near slave factories, even while the Slave Trade was most active; also at Ambriz (1511), where five slave factories were burnt, there were “five, six, or seven” legal factories—English, American, German; and he quotes another case (1521) where a barracoon was destroyed by one of our cruisers, wherein legitimate trade was known to be carried on, and of which there was no positive proof of the Slave Trade being also co-existing, for no slaves were found in it; also of Captain Birch, that legitimate trade might go on increasing, even in competition with the Slave Trade (2419); also by the opinion of the Commissioners of Boa Vista, that in parts where the Slave Trade exists, still legitimate trade will beat it out (Bandinel, 3491); and that even if the squadron were reduced, the Slave Trade might be wholly prevented by the encouragement of commerce and agriculture (Duncan, 3154). Mr. Hutton attaches much importance to legal commerce, as a means of suppressing the Slave Trade (2574); and he admits that commercial intercourse, between this country and the coast of Africa, has been gradually and materially extending itself; that, on the Gold Coast, lawful commerce has been the instrument in suppressing the Slave Trade (2568); and now prevents any desire, on the part of the natives, for a revival of it. It is true, he lays much stress on the protection given
by the forts; but any one, who has visited that coast, is aware
the forts are at such distances from each other, that they
never would keep slavers away, if they found other places
closed against them by our cruisers, and which we shall
illustrate in another place. What says Mr. Joseph Smith,
a resident African merchant (2157):—“I find that where
legitimate trade is carried on, the natives are more disposed
to engage in it than the Slave Trade”; “and also, that on
the Fanti coast, there is a great desire to trade, and the Slave
Trade has disappeared altogether; although, as he observes,
“they (vessels of war) do not cruise much off there” (2115).
There are no cruisers regularly stationed there. “Moreover,” he says, “there has been an increasing disposition to
trade, on the part of the inhabitants of the interior, and there
is an improved demand for fresh articles from this country,
every year” (2175, 2176). “Legitimate commerce is increa­sing wonderfully” (Smith, 3795). Also, “that commercial in­tercourse between the coast of Africa and this country is on
the increase” (Forsham, 4488);” and that the import of
palm-oil into Great Britain, has more than doubled itself
within the last ten years. Now, in reviewing these facts,
we have only to bear in mind, that the activity of the Slave
Trade has not diminished, nor the number of slaves exported
diminished, but probably increased; and then to what must
this augmentation in legal commerce be imputed?—to a
better knowledge of what suits African tastes; to the
greater activity and enterprise of our merchants; to the
greater competition; the larger employment of capital; and
lastly, but most importantly, to the increased value of palm­
oil in this country, which enables the merchant to offer a
more tempting price to the producer.
CHAPTER VI

Injurious effects of the repressive force system on legal commerce.

It has been already shewn (chapter ii) that the endeavours to repress the slave trade by force, only systematized and strengthened it; and in proportion as we succeeded temporarily in checking it at one point, it would break out in another. Nay, what is more important, but at the same time most evident, if by our successes we could raise the value of the slave in Brazil, it would raise the value of the slave in Africa; and we do not hesitate to avow our impression, that even at the very places where our legitimate trade is most securely planted, the slaver would resort with temptations great in proportion to the want of Negro labour in Brazil, and such temptations as our commerce could not contend against. We have already quoted proofs of this, and out of the Honourable Captain Denman’s evidence (320, 321). It appears that at a place called Trade Town, where the Slave Trade had not been known for a long time, it suddenly re-appeared. Captain Denman says:—“ I saw a letter from the captain of a vessel that was trading there with palm-oil: his statement was, that the Slave Trade had broken out, and that the consequence was, his factory was utterly abandoned; that he could not get natives to come near him; and that his voyage would be prolonged, he could not say for how many months, in consequence of the Slave Trade having taken away his custom.” It also appears (letter from Mr. Hamilton, merchant, quoted by Commissary Judge Smith, vol. ii, 3780) that legal trade had been going on prosperously at Trade Town for many years, and no slaves had been shipped from that part of the coast for twenty years. Now, surely nothing can be clearer than this—
a legal trade is established at a certain locality with every prospect of success, and there are factories formed for legitimate commerce; our squadron interferes with the well known and usual resorts of the slaver; he is driven temporarily to other places to look for slaves, and, probably, he just falls (as in this case) on localities where legitimate trade was appearing. What is this but driving the slave trader from one point to another, and making new fields or re-opening up old ones? “The vigilance of the British cruisers, acting against the Slave Trade, has occasionally annoyed and obstructed the legitimate operations of commerce” (Moore, 5536). “The presence of the blockading force has a tendency to bias the minds of the black man against the British subject:” “legitimate commerce has frequently been obstructed by the suppressive squadron; frequently vessels have been impeded, and have been stopped for some hours” (Horsfall, 4859, 4902). That our interference with the Slave Trade creates ill-feeling on the part of the native slave seller against our merchants, and such is injurions to legal trade (Hutton, 259, 2600). “The operations of legal commerce have been annoyed and obstructed” (Horsfall, 4903); “and it has been a matter of frequent occurrence on the coast of Africa” (Idem, 4904). J. B. Moore, Esq., states a case (vol. ii, 5539, 5540, 5542), where a vessel, the Guiana, belonging to his firm, and engaged in a legal voyage, was seized and condemned; and he says (5529), this is a case in which the most diligent search has been made in Sierra Leone (where she was adjudicated); there is no sentence forthcoming at Sierra Leone; there is no sentence to be found at the Admiralty; there is nothing to shew that the vessel was even properly condemned. The equipment article “has been detrimental to commerce.” Under it “there is not a vessel now (out of twenty thousand tons of shipping) on the coast of Africa, but what might be seized at this moment” (Horsfall, 4859, 4901). He shews (vol. ii, 4860, 4862), how the equipment article operates against legitimate commerce. By the equipment article the Lady Sale, a vessel belonging to his firm, was seized and condemned while endeavouring to open up legal trade in the river Congo, to the south of the equator (4871),
where previously there had been no British trade attempted. This vessel was condemned, although the English Commissioner at Loando declared her to be lawfully navigated. In consequence of this seizure, the Messrs. Horsfall abandoned trade to the south of the equator. How oddly it reads, that in this very river, where Mr. Horsfall wished to introduce the civilising effects of commerce, but was defeated, within two years afterwards a large armed steam slaver fired on the boats of one of our vessels of war, and escaped with one thousand four hundred slaves on board. After the illegal seizure of the Lady Sale, by the Portuguese authorities, assurance companies declined to insure vessels going to the south part of Africa, except with a special clause, providing against seizure by Portuguese vessels of war (Horsfall, vol. ii, 4911). Our measures, therefore, operate most prejudicially against the enterprise and energy of our merchants, who, though prepared to compete, by legal commerce, with the slave trader, cannot withstand such ruinous drawbacks as the illegal seizure of vessels and cargoes. After such cases as those of the Guiana and Lady Sale, will the people of Great Britain be prepared to sanction a law, by which “no person can bring a suit for any damages, for any alleged wrong, arising out of measures for the suppression of the Slave Trade.” The destruction of the barracoons at various places on the West coast of Africa, has elicited marked approval, on the part of those, who deceive themselves by supposing that a widely extended and deeply ramified evil, is to be overcome by the burning of a few slave stations. If the losses, occasioned by such proceedings, fell on the slave traders, we might be prepared to admit, that, to a limited extent, such would temporarily dishearten them; but we know they were not the losers, although suits were commenced by them as the ostensible sufferers. Captan Matson, in his statements on the subject, admits (vol. i, page 104) that the greater proportion of the goods destroyed at the barracoons were English goods; “and in one factory (where the goods were valued at £80,000) they were almost entirely English goods” (1505). Now, any one at all acquainted with the English commerce in Brazil, is aware, that
there is a general system of credits, followed up and allowed towards the Brazilians. Brazilian merchants scarcely ever come with ready money to purchase; it is almost entirely by long credits. The goods, thus purchased by the Brazilian merchants, are either employed by them, or resold (on credit to others) to be engaged in the Slave Trade, as far as that traffic is capable of carrying away British manufactures out of the market. The English merchant thinks no more of asking his purchaser how he is going to employ the commodities, than the tradesman in London would of asking his customer what he is about to do with the articles he is purchasing; he only looks to being paid for them. It would just be as preposterously absurd in one case as the other, for the vendor to catechise and read a lecture to the purchaser. A certain and large amount of British property is thereby unavoidably made use of in the Slave Trade, for Captain Matson (1683), and Captain Birch (2415) admit “that as the same articles are common to both legal and illegal commerce, the British merchant cannot possibly know how they are to be employed. The more successful our endeavours, therefore, to capture the slave vessels, and the more successful in destroying barracoons, the more frequently will the English merchant in Brazil receive this answer when payment of accounts is demanded:—‘Your cruisers have captured the vessel or destroyed the barracoon, by which your debts were to have been liquidated.’ The English merchant knows he has no redress, as justice is administered in that country. The first loss is the best loss, and he almost always lets it pass to the bad debts of the firm. This we have had from the sufferers themselves on the spot; for as they used to say, on the arrival of captured slavers, into Rio Janeiro (in 1838-9-40-43-44) “we are the real losers, for these captures will be made the excuse for repudiating our just debts.” The greater part of the losses, occasioned by the destruction of the barracoons, would therefore probably fall on our own merchants, who knew as much about the destination of the goods, at the time of sale, as the men who made them in Manchester and Birmingham; and, moreover, have to endure the imputation unjustly cast on them, of “knowingly aiding and abetting the Slave Trade”—imputations which
they bear with a calmness and equanimity, worthy of being imitated by some who traduce them. That this is a true view of the case, is confirmed by the statement of Captain Matson and other naval officers, that within a very short time afterwards, the parties who had been driven away by the burning of the barracoons, returned to resume the stations; one of two things is thereby very plain, either the loss fell on other parties as we have shewn, or else the Slave Trade must be more lucrative than it has ever had the credit of, to enable a De Souza or a Pedro Blanco to meet such reverses. By Captain Matson's evidence, another error was palpably committed; all the merchandise contained in them was distributed, gratuitously, among the surrounding chiefs and their dependents (1324); and this in places near where there were several factories for legitimate commerce, and whose business must have been entirely stopped, by this worse than all underselling systems. We read, that they, the legal traders, chuckled over the destruction of the slave traders' stations, but we should suspect, when they witnessed the liberal gratuitous distribution of merchandise, they would be much like the school-boy who is getting his hand playfully squeezed, and is trying to laugh, although the tears are, at the same time, starting out of his eyes. Legal traffic was competing with the slave traffic. We interfere to benefit: how? to glut the market with goods at the taking. Well might Captain Matson innocently admit (1542), "yes, the goods in Africa were at that moment a drug as it were." Let us have the opinions of others on this point:—"The destruction of the barracoons at Gallinas frightened away legal trade as well as the other" (Bandinel, 3342). "It frightened away the legal traders, because it produced a spirit of hostility to all European traders" (Idem, 3343). Mr. Jamieson, one of the most philanthropic and enterprising of our merchants trading

1 The Author begs humbly to suggest to the distinguished individuals who have so long and so unsearingly vilified that respectable body of gentlemen, the English merchants in Brazil, that it would be more consistent with their high position and their intimate knowledge of law, if, instead of "shooting their arrows at a venture," they were to cause criminal proceedings to be instituted against the parties said to be guilty of slave trading. With the powers which the law now affords on that point, it seems not only unjust, but undignified, to cast such random aspersions on any respectable class of our countrymen.
with Africa, in a letter to Mr. Bandinel, thus expresses himself:—“To supplant slave traffic, therefore, and make friends of the Africans, you must give them legitimate trade; and every act preventive of its introduction, when the traffic exists, is an act against the good of Africa, and the violent destruction of the barracoons is one of these, inasmuch as it exasperates the chiefs against us, and so hinders the introduction of our own honest calling” (vol. i, 3346).

We have rapidly glanced at some of the evils arising to our commerce from the ill-judged attempts at repressive force. Let us look at the matter as regards our political relations with the Brazils:—One after another our ministers are despatched to Rio de Janeiro, and return with the humiliating reply—no treaty, no treaty. Every year sees our commercial intercourse more and more fettered by the government of that country, and all because we refuse to them what they have every right to demand—the substitution of a lawful labour for an illegal. Had it not been for the inconsistency of our measures, which, on the one hand, demands an abolition of the Slave Trade; and, on the other, offers a premium on it, by allowing it to compete with the free-labour produce, the English merchants in Brazil would have been ruined by accumulated exactions. In the case, philanthrophy versus cheap sugar, the defendant has obtained the suit, and thereby enabled the Anglo-Brazilian merchant to hold up his head in the troublous waters by which he is surrounded. But while we flatter ourselves that all is well, because our merchants in Brazil cannot, and will not just now, exclaim against bad policy, let us not be blind to a certain and assured consequence, that every year, which, for want of a treaty of commerce, they are kept in the background, will witness an increased import of German, American, and other manufactures into that country, where, heretofore, we had almost entirely monopolised the trade, and might have continued to do, but for our mistaken views. We need not say, that in national mercantile affairs, as in any other, it is difficult to regain a lost position.
CHAPTER VII.

That Brazil can, and will command as many slaves as are required, in spite of the repressive force endeavours.

If any confirmation were required of the assertion, that the repressive efforts have failed, it is to be found in the acknowledgment, that in the face of all our endeavours, Brazil has been enabled to procure so much of the prohibited commodity, that the value has even fallen, and this, at a time, when we had offered a premium on it, by allowing it to compete against a legal commodity. We shall, no doubt, be told, that the fall in value is owing to transfer of slaves from coffee to sugar plantations, and vice versa; to commercial depression; to anything, indeed, but the real cause, i.e.—as shewn by Lord Howden’s letter—that sixty thousand slaves were imported into Brazil, in 1847; or in other words, just as many as were required by the demand:—“I have the honour to inform your lordship, that according to the best estimation I have been able to make, above sixty thousand Africans have been imported as slaves into Brazil, during the year 1847” (Lord Howden’s letter to Viscount Palmerston, dated Rio de Janeiro, 9th February, 1848). “In 1846 and 1847, the Brazilians imported as many as they apparently required; our squadron did not seem to have been able to restrict the importation;” “our squadron was not able to prevent the importation (into Brazil) of as many as were wanted;” “the supply has been governed by the demand;” “there is now as great an importation as is demanded, and that there would not afterwards be more;” “there are as many slaves imported into Brazil as are demanded in Brazil; the British squadron has no effect in preventing the amount of importation” (Bandinel,
“The demand for slaves will always create a supply” (Commissary Judge Smith, 3774). “The supply has been almost equal to the demand;” “it is not possible to suppress it at all, so long as there is a demand for slaves on the other side of the Atlantic;” “as long as there is a great demand for slaves there will be a supply” (King, 3969, 3986, 3982). “So long as there is a demand for slaves they will be procured from the coast of Africa, from some point or another” (Forsham, 4485). “The export of slaves (from Africa) is more regulated by the demand for labour in the Brazils and Cuba;” “the demand in Brazil is the ultimate regulator of the export from Africa” (Horsfall, 4789, 4801). “It is a curious fact that the price of slaves is now (in 1848) much what it was in the year 1778;” “our efforts have caused the price of slaves to lower;” “the price of slaves has fallen from £100 to £50” (Bandinel, 3357, 3358). “The supply is entirely governed by the demand;” “the supply was quite equal to the demand” (Rev. Dr. Lang, 4940, 4942). “The depreciation of value of a slave is now very considerable;” “in 1845 the price of a slave in Brazil was from £75 to £85, now (in 1848) it is from £45 to £50;” and this is attributable “to an increased supply” (Moore, 5310, 5311, 5312, also 5354, 5355). These statements are confirmed by the evidence of a slave dealer—Doctor Cliffe—who shews (vol. ii, 4103), that the price of a slave was reduced from 600 milreis to 400 or 450 milreis, *i.e.*, from £75 to about £50. “Last year (1847) the price of slaves came down thirty per cent., and this year (1848) no doubt it will come down twenty-five per cent. more” (Cliffe, 4121). “Whatever the amount to which you increase that squadron at the present time, so long as it (the Slave Trade) is a profitable article of commerce, and we have the means of fitting out vessels, you will never check it” (Idem, 4129). From all the foregoing it is very evident, that either the supply must have been greater than the demand, viz., to cause rather a fall in the value than a rise, or else there is no truth in the phantom which haunts the imagination of some repressive force advocates, that the boundless extent of virgin soil and innumerable mines in Brazil, would increase
the number imported from Africa. Surely if labour to an enormous extent is required for those purposes, would it not have operated that year, as well as in any future one, to keep up the price of slaves? and particularly with the encouragement we have given of late years to invest capital in sugar plantations.
CHAPTER VIII

That the profits of the Slave Trade are so enormous as to insure it against any risks, we could ever bring against it by repressive force measures.

A palpable error, on the part of the advocates for the repressive system, has been, expecting to put down the Slave Trade by the use of means to cripple it, in the hope that such would operate against it; as aggressive measures do, in time of war, against the legal commerce of a country we wish to defeat. The cases are unfortunately as diverse as possible. In that of legal commerce, every capture made, and every obstacle in the way of its easy prosecution, is a great loss to the parties engaged, inasmuch as—take the most lucrative of legitimate commerce—the outlay is large and the profits comparatively small. Every capture, therefore, is a loss to the commerce of the country, to the amount of nearly as many thousand pounds as the cargo was valued at. From twenty to thirty per cent. profit on a cargo of merchandise in time of war, would be accounted an enormous profit. Let us have the two cases—the legal cargo costing £20,000, is expected (if fortunate) to realise a profit of £4,000 to £6,000; the slaver’s cargo of five hundred slaves, which, together with vessel and every incidental expense, could not at the outside be put down at a greater outlay of capital than £5,000, is expected to realise (at £50 each slave) a profit of £20,000. If both are captured, the legal trader suffers a real loss of £20,000, hoping to have realised £4,000 to £6,000; the slave trader suffers a loss of £5,000, hoping to have realised £20,000. In one case, the capital risked is four times greater than the other, to realise (if fortunate) a fourth or sixth of the capital employed; in the other the capital risked is one-fourth, to.
realise (if fortunate) four times the amount of capital employed. Our merchants would be able to laugh at the attempts of France—and those of France at the attempts of Great Britain—if, in time of war, they could do business on the same terms as the slaver. Not twenty or thirty per cent. profit on the investment, but four hundred per cent. on the investment. These are not imaginary views; they are borne out by facts; and although there is reason to believe that it is attempted to cast doubts on the correctness of the statements we made before the Committee, relative to the enormous profits of the Slave Trade, we will prove that every particle of evidence is confirmed by the testimony of others. The Hon. Capt. Denman admits, in his memorandum for the suppression of the Slave Trade:—that, by the statement of slave traders themselves, "if five vessels out of six were captured, the enormous profits of the successful vessel would more than cover the losses incurred by the slave dealers, by the capture of the other five." What says Capt. Matson, (memorandum to the Admiralty in 1843):—"the profits of the trade are so enormous, that if one vessel in six escapes, it repays the loss of the other five," *i.e.*, equal to five hundred per cent. Also, in his pamphlet, page 60, "a vessel of fifty tons will often have four hundred slaves on board;" so if three hundred land alive, and are sold at £45 each, the cargo will realise £13,500; but how trifling the outlay? "Expense seems no object"; *i.e.* to the slave trader, (Hutton, 2546.) "The slave dealers themselves admit that when one vessel out of five or six effects its purpose, they are more than indemnified for the loss of the others" (Mansel, 4606). "They (the slave dealers) considered the gains of the traffic were so great, that if they escaped on so many voyages out of any given number, it would amply remunerate them for all risk," (Rev. Dr. Lang, 4940). "There is ample remuneration at the present (reducing) prices to induce parties to carry on the trade" (Moore, 5358.) "From what I hear from the officers, and from what I have seen myself for a short time, I should say, that it just keeps up the price of slaves, and makes it worth while for the people to run slavers" (Stopford, 5613). "It is more lucrative than formerly, being now arranged on
something of a system” (Cliffe, 4110). “That sometimes there is a net profit of £65 each on slaves, minus the deaths,” (Idem, 4356). “Their gains are so great they have been enabled to pursue other systems (Bandinel, 3439). “The actual money which is disbursed is nothing;” and “they (the slave dealers) do not care whether they are lost or not” (Birch, 2268). Mr. Hutton gives in evidence, (2537) where a slave dealer was enabled to take as part of his presents to the King of Dahomey, 1,000 doubloons, (nearly £3,500) to propitiate that chief to continue, and to assist the Slave Trade. Must not the profits be indeed large to admit of such donations? “The slave traders use vessels of very little value” (Bandinel, 3438). Mr. Duncan shews (3082) that the vessels used are sometimes scarcely seaworthy, and cost from 3,000 to 4,000 dollars, about £700 to £750. Sir Charles Hotham admits, that “stability, strength, and durability are all sacrificed to speed.” “The vessels are of a very inferior construction;” “they are vessels unfit for any other employment;” “mostly leaky vessels;” “the vessels they sail now-a-days are so worthless;” “scarcely seaworthy,” (Birch, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271). “The crew of a slaver get no pay if the vessel is taken” (Birch, 2459). “The price of a slave at Cabenda was between 20 and 25 dollars, i.e. to say, from £4 to £4 10s.” (Birch, 2249). “The Brazilian slave merchant buys an old vessel for a mere trifle; a small crew can navigate her, as she is always in fine weather; on her return she is crammed full of slaves,” (Matson, in pamphlet, page 15). According to the same authority (who gives at page 60, the mean of the full slavers captured by him), there would be in these “old vessels, worth a mere trifle,” an average of 6.2 slaves to each ton. Thus an old vessel of one hundred tons would bring over a cargo, minus the deaths, of about four hundred and fifty to five hundred slaves, or equivalent to about £22,000: but what is the loss if she is captured? a trifle. The evidence we gave on the subject was to the following effect (5002, 5003, 5004, 5005) (on information obtained from the commanders and crews of several slave vessels); and we think a review of the statements of others will show that the estimates are correct.
ITEMS OF EXPENSE.

1. Cost of a vessel capable of packing from four hundred and fifty to five hundred slaves from £700 to £1000, say £1000. £1000 0 0
2. From fifteen to twenty men as a crew, each at 100 Spanish dollars, or 200 milreis, per trip 416 10 0
3. Victualling the crew for ninety days 100 0 0
4. Pay of the commander, 400 Spanish dollars, or 800 milreis, per trip 84 0 0
5. Cost of four hundred and fifty slaves, at £3 each per head 1350 0 0
6. Feeding four hundred and fifty slaves on passage 112 10 0
7. Luxuries and comforts for the captain 50 0 0
8. Different contingent expenses 150 0 0

£3263 0 0

If we have therein put the price of the slaves rather below what is usually given—as it appears by Captain Birch that from £4 to £4 10s. is the price at Cabenda—the other expenses are calculated higher than will now be the case, as it is more systematically followed out than formerly. Let us, for the sake of putting the question beyond dispute, allow £4 10s. for each slave taken on board; thus, in round numbers, a vessel receiving a cargo of four hundred and fifty, costs £4,000; suppose she succeeds and lands three hundred and fifty—losing by packing, scarcity of water, provisions, &c., one hundred slaves—the three hundred and fifty slaves may range at from £40 to £60 each, say £50 each, thereby realising £17,000, or minus the expenses incurred, the vessel (item first) being still forthcoming, a clear profit of £14,500, or equal to the loss of about three and two-thirds such vessels with four hundred and fifty slaves on board; or the loss of at least eleven empty vessels—the slave goods, provisions for slaves, &c., being sent in neutral bottoms, according to the new system, and the captain and crew forfeiting their wages if captured; leaving only items one, three, seven, eight to be lost to the slave trader in event of capture when empty, or a sum of about £1,300. Thanks to our efforts, which have (as already shewn) systematized the traffic, a slave trader can insure on his adventure as well and securely as any legal trader: such profits enable him to pay a heavy insurance and yet far distance any legal merchant. Just take the following case:—Lord Howden, in a letter to Viscount Palmerston, dated Rio de Janeiro, Feb-
ruary 9th, 1848, states, “it is a well known fact here, that a vessel, belonging to this port, made five voyages to the coast during the last year, and landed in safety all her cargoes: at a moderate computation this single ship must have brought from two to three thousand slaves;” we will say two thousand five hundred; suppose each slave realised £50, that would amount to £125,000; or at £30 each, £75,000; or equivalent, in first case, to thirty-one well equipped full slavers, or ninety-six empty slave vessels; or, in the second case, eighteen and three-fourths well equipped full slavers, or fifty-seven and a half empty slavers. The Honourable Captain Denman, in his pamphlet, page 23, says, “when we hear of a single cruizer (H.M.S.V Styx) having captured twenty-nine slave vessels, it must be at least admitted that the losses have been enormous.” How enormous? Twenty-nine prizes captured in a commission of two years! And here we have a single slaver realising as much by one year’s success, as would almost cover the losses of all the captures made in any one year by all the cruizers.

While on this subject, we would remark on another mistaken notion, viz.,—that, as the naval steam power of Great Britain is so large, by exerting it actively against the Slave Trade, it must succeed; that the poorer must give way before the richer, the weaker before the stronger; but this will not be the case. Great Britain can not spare, nor has she a sufficiently large steam navy to crush such a hydra-headed traffic. Already the use of steam power against the slaver has called forth the use of steam power by the slaver; and, moreover, it will succeed with the latter better than any system heretofore employed. We read of a steam slaver distancing a man-of-war steamer, the Grappler; and of another, the Providentia, that took away one thousand four hundred slaves at one trip; the value of this cargo would, at £50 each slave, be £70,000, at £30 each slave, be £52,000. Lord John Hay, in his evidence, states, that a steam vessel, capable of stowing four hundred slaves, could not be fitted out at less expense than £18,000; but the Brazilians can and will obtain very fleet second-class vessels that are capable of carrying one thousand to one thousand four hundred slaves by the "repressive packing
system, at from £10,000 to £12,000.¹ A single voyage, like the Providentia’s, would pay for the loss of, at least, five of such steam vessels; but that is not calculated on, for it appears that, in one case, it was stipulated, that the slaves shipped by her were to be landed in Brazil at £17 per head. But even if it were possible to harass the Slave Trade by means of steam, a very common artifice has succeeded, and would again succeed. A steam vessel can only, like any other vessel, chase one slaver at a time. The Brazilians will bring against you, as heretofore, decoy ducks of no value (Viscount Palmerston, 46), or so far legally navigated that they are not capturable; and while the vessel of war leaves the station to chase one, the others will escape. If boats are left to protect the spot, and it comes to the worst, the slavers will act, as they have already had the audacity to do in the River Congo, fire into our boats, and then steam off. Lastly, even supposing we had the steam power necessary to keep up a chain of steam vessels of war over a distance of two thousand miles; for how many years will Great Britain be prepared to do so? For, as Captain Matson unfortunately admits (pamphlet page 59), “they (the slave-traders) don’t care how many doors you shut, if you leave one open.”

¹ The Author has lately inspected a remarkably fine merchant steam vessel, of nearly seven hundred tons, which, it is well known, can distance any steam vessel in Her Majesty’s navy, except the Banshee, and a few others, built expressly for mail packets. This vessel cost only £22,000 when new, and the owners estimate that at the age of eight to ten years, she will only be valued at from £10,000 to £12,000. According to the repressive packing system, this vessel would carry, with facility, upwards of one thousand five hundred slaves, together with water, and provisions for that number, and fuel for ten days, at full steam power. The slave traders will have no difficulty in procuring from America and England any number of cheap second-hand vessels, of the above class.
CHAPTER IX

That the repressive efforts frustrate the views of the enlightened portion of the Brazilians, who are anxious, from prudential reasons, to see the slave traffic put an end to.

Not fifty years ago, how small was that party in England, headed by Clarkson and Wilberforce, who had the boldness to tell their countrymen that they were committing a great national sin in prosecuting the Slave Trade, and that it was a duty to withdraw from the vile practice, as well as atone for the evils they had perpetrated on mankind. Slowly, very slowly and unwillingly did our Christian country receive the truth, even from the lips of those eloquent pleaders. Had a foreign power just then called on us by threats and coercive measures to abandon it, at the same time doubting England’s sincerity, is there a nation under the sun which would more unanimously have exclaimed—“We will not entertain the question.” The voice of the country would have scorned the interference. Let us place ourselves in the case of the Brazilians; their country is only rising into the scale of nations; there is a difference of a century between us in point of civilization; but we exact from them the acknowledgment of convictions which are not yet fully developed. Still there are some on whom our example has left its influence, and they are anxious to take a step that might avert an evil certain to be destructive of the best interests of their country. This party is as large in Brazil as the anti-slavery party was, fifty or sixty years ago, in England; it has been headed by names which would be honourable to any country—Orlando Cavalcanti, the brothers Andrada, Barbacena, Doctor Saturnino, and others, who have long been attempting by every means within their power to win
round their countrymen, to take a proper view of the question. In Brazil, as in England, all must be carried by the popular voice, through their representatives, and we find just what might be expected, that our aggressive measures harass and annoy the great mass of the Brazilians, while our openly expressed doubts of the sincerity of the government lead even the moderate party to act against us. Could Wilberforce and his friends ever have achieved their great object, if a strong European power had acted towards us as we are acting towards Brazil? Common sense and English feeling will answer, No. What is said on the above subject in evidence? "They (the Brazilian Government) tried very hard in 1839 and 1840 to cure it (the Slave Trade); they succeeded in repressing it very much; the administration fought against it, but they risked their popularity; they risked their power; they risked their place, and lost it all; they lost their place and were obliged to give way; they could not carry their measure;" "they tried it two or three times and it has failed" (Bandinel, 3284, 3285). At one time "the Brazilian Government were very earnest in their endeavours to put down the trade" (Idem, 3292); "but the people of Brazil would not second their endeavours" (Idem, 3294); "the administration goes against our squadron" (Idem, 3286). "Many of the better classes of Brazilians are exceedingly anxious that the trade should be put a stop to. With respect to many intelligent Brazilians, that I am well acquainted with, I know nothing would please them better than for some effectual mode to be adopted to put an end to the trade. I may mention such men as Doctor Saturnino," "who is a member of the Brazilian Chamber of Legislature," "also Orlando Cavalcanti. I believe they would do anything in their power to co-operate to put a stop to the trade; for they not only look on the evil in a political point of view, but also on the higher ground of morality." "Some of the administrations of the Brazilian Governments have been exceedingly desirous to co-operate to put it down; and if they had the power," "would do everything to co-operate with us." This is from the testimony of J. B. Moore, Esq., Chairman of the Brazilian Association, Liverpool, and many
years resident in Brazil as a merchant (5330, 5331, 5420). “The two brothers, Andrada, and Senor Cavalcanti particularly distinguished themselves by their firmness and energetic measures against the Slave Trade. Although at the risk of sacrificing their popularity, and while the elections have been in progress, they have not hesitated to adopt measures well calculated to crush the trade in Africans” (Mr. Ouseley’s letter quoted, Bandinel, 3325); but as shewn by the same letter, the Brazilian Government sacrificed its popularity. “There is decidedly an increasing desire among the more intelligent Brazilians to abolish the Slave Trade;” “and those feelings exist amongst a considerable number of the deputies,” i.e., “the members of Parliament there” (Moore, 5346). “I know that the Emperor is opposed to the Slave Trade being carried on, and would co-operate with the legislature of this country, in any possible plan which could be devised for its suppression: because I know that he is opposed to it himself, both on political grounds and the higher grounds of morality;” “public opinion has thwarted all the endeavours of the sovereign, of the ministers, and perhaps of his chambers” (Moore, 5503, 5504). “I have also witnessed the efforts of enlightened Brazilians to awaken abhorrence of that crime, and prove its impolicy to be equal to its inhumanity and injustice” (Lord Denman’s pamphlet on the Slave Trade). Here we have abundant evidence to prove that there was a desire on the part of the Brazilian Government to suppress the Slave Trade, and that there were many anxious to further those views; but how in the name of common reason could we expect them, to contend against a party enraged and annoyed by our policy, while, instead of strengthening those in our favour, we tell them plainly, we doubt their sincerity so far, that we will not even listen to a treaty to benefit our own commerce, without they first take a step which would compromise their own dignity. When (not so many years back) Great Britain liberated the slaves in her West Indian possessions, it sounded well to the world that we paid for our philanthropy the sum of twenty millions of money. But though much of the credit of that unexampled act was due to the highest feelings of human nature; yet,
as the papers of that time fully demonstrate, there was also another incentive in the matter—Our slaves had gradually become alive to their position; they were beginning to entertain a unison of feeling on the greatest of all questions to them— their freedom—and already had there been indications, that the smouldering sense of wrong would burst out into a flame, which might ultimately terminate in something worse than a series of Maroon wars. A similar prudential consideration—if no other would ever operate—will slowly but surely be forced on all slave-growing countries. Men, though slaves, cannot long be kept under bondage where their numbers preponderate largely over the free, as they do in most slave states. Connexion with civilized people teaches them that they are men, not brutes; they gradually acquire a knowledge of their power; and if their position be not voluntarily changed by their oppressors, they will do it themselves by insurrection. Like the Spartan Helots, they only require the whisperings of a Pausanias, to render them disaffected.

We all know, how much this interested motive, had to do with the discontinuance of the foreign Slave Trade in the Southern States of America. It is clearly exerting its influence in the case of Cuba; nor need we insert any of the evidence of Viscount Palmerston, Capt. Birch, R.N., J. Bandinel, Esq., M. Laird, Esq., J. B. Moore, Esq., and others, to shew how much it has had to do with the already decreasing Slave Trade of that Island.

In Brazil, likewise, such a consideration has been acknowledged, and it would continue to modify the actions of that government, if not prevented by our unhappy attempts. We have quoted the evidence of a very well informed authority (J. B. Moore, Esq.), to shew that the Emperor and some administrations of Brazil, are opposed to the Slave Trade, partly on political grounds (5331, 5503), and it is regarded as a political evil "in apprehension of getting too great an excess of black people in the country" (Moore, 5332). In 1834 the Brazilian government was anxious to remedy the increasing number of slaves. "They became more anxious to prevent any Africans from arriving there, because a very serious insurrection of the blacks had taken place in
Bahia, which frightened the government very much. It frightened the whole government of the Brazil, lest the whole of the slaves should rise upon them” (Bandinel, 3303). “In a very short time they would be so overcrowded with slaves in Brazil, that they would become frightened there from the preponderance of the slave population over the free, and that the government themselves would prohibit it” (Idem, 3830). In the northern provinces of the Brazilian empire, the blacks have so much influence as even to have a majority of votes for the legislature” (Idem, 3511). “These (the governments of Brazil and Cuba) well know that a period will arrive, when, in their respective countries, the white race will disappear, either by a gradual black amalgamation, or a more sudden extinction from violence” (Cliffe, vol. ii, 4686). “Those feelings (of apprehension) already exist very much in the northern parts, from repeated attempts on the part of the Negroes to revolt” (Moore, 5352).

There is yet another prudential consideration of vast importance, and which is felt, and must be still more strongly felt in Brazil. It is this:—That the slaves can operate in aid of the aggressive efforts of some of their neighbours, not always on the best of terms with them. We allude to the feasibility of either the Argentine or Oriental Republics, using them as a means of overturning the Brazilian empire. A few years ago, in conversation with some of the best informed friends of Don Manuel Rosas, President of Buenos Ayres, the question was put, whether he ever contemplated taking measures against Brazil, in the event of being enabled to place Oribe in the government of the Oriental Republic of the Rio de la Plata? The answer was—“Don Manuel is perfectly aware, that as soon as he puts Oribe in possession of the Eastern side of the river, he can then transport his troops across the river and march them overland in a few days, and reach Rio Grande—the most southern portion of the Brazilian territory, and where the people have long been in a state of revolt; all he would have to do on reaching that place would be to declare all the slaves free; it would re-echo over the country in a short time, and his handful of troops would be fairly carried through all difficulties, in a tumult of slaves.”
It would, therefore, be the direct interest of Brazil to adopt the measures most conducive to its safety, on this great question; and they would be adopted—self-interest alone would oblige all parties to be united on it—if our intervention did not exasperate them, and absolutely make them lose sight of their eventual good, in determination to resist our unjust demands. We repeat, let Great Britain change places with Brazil, and then ask, would any concession ever be granted by coercion?
THE REMEDY

After so many proofs as have been presented of the futility of repressive force measures, it would be superfluous to discuss, how far any of the different modifications of it suggested, would be successful. The destruction of the Barracoons, has already been shewn to be worse than useless; that to frustrate us on that point, several ways are open to the slaver. 1st. Sending the merchandise or money for the purchase of the slaves in neutral vessels, and, unless the rendezvous is clear, keeping them on board until a suitable occasion offers. 2ndly. By building the Barracoons farther inland (vide Birch, evidence, 2339,) where our crews could not be employed against them, and from whence the slaves could be transferred by long marches overland, or through lagoons by means of canoes, as already demonstrated, even by the testimony of some of the advocates for the "repressive" system. As to the other propositions—steam force, and fleeter vessels in greater numbers, variously stationed—we would ask, as has been so frequently done by others, "What force is equal to such a line of coast (two thousand miles) from whence the slaves can be procured, and for how many years would this country be prepared to keep such up?"

The most certain of all the suggestions has been, the power to declare the Slave Trade "Piracy," and to inflict on the prosecutors of it, such punishment as the case intrinsically deserved, and in this we coincided in the evidence given before the committee; but now, as then, we qualify it by asking, whether we have the right to demand
from Brazil, under present circumstances, such a concession? We may ask, but the reply can be anticipated on the part of Brazil. "We will never meet your views on this or any other question, relative to the suppression of the Slave Trade, until you allow us, what we unavoidably require—Negro labour, in some shape?" Will Great Britain endeavour to wash out the stain of her own participation in the Slave Trade, by the commission of hostile acts against a weak, but rising nation? Will such an inconsistency be tolerated, that those who were erst the greatest slave dealers and promoters of the slave traffic, should, within so short a period of their conversion to right views, be the first to proclaim war on others they had stimulated to it? We need not answer the question; the evidence of all agrees on that. *We have no right to demand, therefore we may never hope for it.*

There is another point on which much stress has been, and still is, laid; viz., That we have grounds to justify the use of further aggressive measures, because the treaties have been violated. We admit the truth of all this; but when we look at the circumstances under which that country has been placed—the difficulty on the part of the government of acting against strong popular feeling, kept up in some degree by our misguided attempts—we are assured that step also will never be contemplated by Great Britain, especially in the face of cases that have occurred lately throughout Europe, where treaties, involving the freedom and happiness of our fellow creatures, in which we were bound, have been openly and with impunity violated. What we have hesitated to do against the powerful, will we perpetrate against the weak? Acting on the feelings with which we personally regard the Slave Trade, we would be among the first to declare—let no consideration of risk—let no consideration of expense, tempt our country to go back from the completion of that act of atonement we
owe to the African race, but let it not be done at the sacrifice of other countries; let it not be done at the sacrifice of the national character for justice and consistency; but on the other hand, if, as alas! we find too truly, that the expanded and poisonous Upas, we wish to uproot, only becomes the more firmly secured, and its fibrils more widely extended, the ruder the blast we bring to bear upon it; we would say, let us abandon our Sisyphian undertaking, and try whether the olive of Minerva will not prove more successful than the horse of Neptune. Let us go back to and try "if other and gentler means" (Bandinel, 3280,) will not sooner attain the object we have in view. What say others on this point? "Your petitioners respectfully yet urgently, entreat your Honourable House to confine its exertions in future, to the employment of such means as are of a pacific character" (Petition of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society to the House of Commons, 1845). "The Slave Trade would be likely to be put down better by other treaties, without force, than by the present treaties, with force, in regard to the Brazils, (Bandinel, 3494). "Seeing that every attempt has hitherto failed, and that all our efforts have only increased the sufferings of the Blacks, I think that some other means ought to be resorted to;" "I should turn my attention to see if I could not devise means likely to be more effectual, without the sacrifice to European life, and at a lesser cost of money; and these means may be found" (Moore, 5413, 5529). The views we expressed before the Committee were—"That if other means (than repressive force) were substituted, although it would be an extremely gradual thing, yet we might be coming nearer a favourable result than by the present proceedings" (5262). What we then timidly hinted at, we would now, suppported on a review of the evidence of others of authority, (as Messrs. Bandinel, Moore, &c.,) propose; and here we find it proper again
to revert to the case so frequently insisted on, viz., that the commodity we are determined to suppress, (i.e., Negro labour,) is essential—at present, and must be for some time to come—to the interest and stability of Brazil. Let us then take a parallel case. Great Britain cannot do without cotton, it is an article absolutely necessary to our wants, and cannot be substituted—our own possessions cannot supply enough—it must be had, we do not hesitate to purchase it and to employ it—although so much of it is the produce of slave labour. Brazil is dependent entirely on Negro labour—the commodity cannot be substituted—it must be Negro, or half-caste labour; and in this we are borne out by a reference to the prosperity of all inter-tropical climates, our own Colonies especially. Yet with all this standing plainly forth in the question, we expect Brazil to liberate her slaves—we call upon her to abolish the traffic in slaves; and while demanding an act suicidal to her direct interests, refuse to grant the only substitute that is open to her—the right of introducing free African labour—THAT SUBSTITUTE IS THE ONLY REMEDY, and it is the only one that Brazil will accept.  

It has already been more than once asked for, as appears on the testimony of our political Agents in Brazil; but it has been always met by a flat refusal, because there are supposed to be so many grave objections to it. These we trust to be able to overcome, after we offer some of the suggestions on which such a measure may be safely conceded—"FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF FREE NEGROES, AND THE GRADUAL EXTINCTION OF SLAVERY IN THE BRAZILS."

Suggestion 1st. That no emigrant should be brought to Brazil except in vessels registered and licensed by proper authority.

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1 This "Remedy" was arranged before any of the Reports of the Slave Trade Committee were published, and was to have been offered (as is well known to many interested in the question) soon after the author's examination before the Committee in 1848.
2nd. That such vessels should be of size suitable for the accommodation of the number licensed to be embarked, and have on board a proper amount of food, together with medicines and medical attendance for the voyage.

3rd. That before leaving the ports of Brazil, such vessels should be examined by proper authorities to ascertain whether they are in a fit state to undergo the voyage, and duly completed in provisions and stores; also on their return from Africa to be re-examined, so as to find out in what condition the negroes have been brought over.

4th. Only a limited number of ports in Brazil to be open to such admission of Negro emigrants.

5th. A proportionate number of female Negro emigrants to be introduced.

6th. Every Negro, on inspection after arrival, to be registered, and every precaution adopted to prevent their becoming amalgamated or lost sight of in the mass of bona fide slaves.

7th. That persons guilty of attempting to substitute an emigrant for a deceased slave, or to take away from him the free character under which he is to land in Brazil, are to be punished by severe penalties.

8th. The demise or desertion of an emigrant Negro to be certified to on the oath of at least three credible witnesses, before a local authority, otherwise the party to be held to have attempted to infringe suggestion 6.

9th. That at the end of a stipulated period of servitude—say five, six, or eight years—the Negro emigrants are to have the option of returning to Africa. The Brazilian government binding itself to find them a free passage.

10th. That during the servitude of the Negro emigrants, the persons employing them will bind themselves, under certain penalties, to afford them means of acquiring more or less religious and other education.

11th. That with a view of enabling the Brazilian govern-
ment to control the number imported, which prudential considerations would induce them to limit, they be allowed to demand from each person hiring such "emigrants," a sum suitable for the average of the term of labour; such sum to be paid to the emigrant in various useful commodities, previous to his return to his native land.

12th. That under such a concession, slavery is to cease entirely in Brazil, after such a term of years—as striking the averages of life of the slaves then in Brazil, would reasonably be supposed necessary for them to die off.

13th. That after such concession, all persons found guilty of attempting to introduce any Negro otherwise than in the properly registered vessels, to be treated as pirates, and punished summarily according to the nature and degree of the offence.

14th. All persons resisting the lawful measures of the cruizers to examine their vessels or boats, to be treated as pirates, and punished according to the offence.

15th. If considered necessary, certain reservations as to the localities in Africa, where legal commerce has superseded the Slave Trade, and where partial civilization has already commenced.

16th. Suitable municipal laws for the protection and well being of the Negro emigrants, while serving in the Brazils.

We are prepared to be opposed at once by numerous arguments against such a plan. We shall be told, that as there are only a few places on the coast of Africa from whence bona fide voluntary emigrants could be met with, and at these it would be impossible to procure a sufficient number for the wants of Brazil without paying the chiefs so much per head for engaging them, it would be as it were, carrying on the Slave Trade in another form. While we admit the force of this to a partial degree, we would wish it to be borne in mind, that unless we make a
commencement to change the system, *the African Slave Trade* and *perpetual slavery*, will continue unmitigated as long as there is a demand; and with this sad feature, that out of the multitudes who now leave that coast and are fortunate enough to survive, after "running the gauntlet," to which we expose them on the passage, scarcely one ever returns to his native soil; there is a continual drain on the population, but no reflux. Now by the measure proposed, the Negro, who by the shewing of the advocates against it, would have been, at best, a slave in his own country, and liable to be shipped off at any moment, under the inhuman "packing system," would—although purchased as it were on the African shore as a serf or slave—be on reaching Brazil, what he never would have been again in his own country—a free man. There he would have opportunities—fewer or greater according to circumstances—of becoming civilized, of learning useful arts, and, what is most essential to the well being of Africa, he would acquire greater intelligence, together with certain tastes and habits, which, on his return to his native wilds, would produce a great and beneficial influence on his countrymen. At the same time those who insist that the African ought never to be engaged, unless as a voluntary party in the contract of servitude, will have the following considerations to console them, and bear us out in the proposition.

According to the evidence of one of the most urgent of the "repressive force" advocates, Captain Matson, R.N.¹ We find that of the slaves brought from the south coast, (which according to the same authority embraces almost

¹ Who, "during a period of six years visited the greater part of the western Coast of Africa, having been a considerable distance up every known river, from Sierra Leone as far south as a slaver ever shewed herself; having passed several days and nights on some of the rivers, seventy or eighty miles in the interior; having visited many dozen African towns and villages, where he lost no opportunity of endeavouring to gain some information respecting the social and political condition of the people."—Vide Pamphlet by Capt. Matson, R.N., on the Slave Trade, page 21.
all the Slave Trade,) "nearly one-half are children or young people, sold by their own parents; that a fourth part are criminals guilty of various offences;" and "the remaining fourth, debtors who have sold themselves, or have been sold by their creditors" (Matson, 1467); very few or none being procured by war. Now, any person who has visited the Brazils—where on the whole the slaves are remarkably well treated, and much better off than in their native land—will agree that it would be infinitely preferable to be in the condition of the worst slave in that country, to continuing with a parent who does not possess the feelings, common to the lower orders of the brute creation. We hope Captain Matson has been mistaken on this point; for if we could credit it, (which we cannot from our knowledge of African character,) we would say, alas! at the bottom of this worse than Pandora’s box, there is No Hope! We only use it, if true, as an argument put into our hands by those who are supposed to be so well acquainted with Africa. If again the second statement be correct, that a fourth part are criminals, then, surely the chiefs have as much right to expatriate them, as we have ours. There are few nations but would be pleased to get rid of their delinquents on such easy terms; moreover, the philanthropist would be enabled to rejoice that they were going out, not as, alas! ours too often do, to demoralise others, and become more demoralised themselves; but to improve by association with better and more civilized people.

As to the remaining fourth, who either sell themselves or are sold for debt," can it be a hardship to the former to fulfil that which they bring on themselves; while in the case of the poor creatures who forfeit their freedom by getting into debt, it is no more than is happening every day in our own blest land; nor do we remember hearing so much of sympathy for our own poor debtors, on whom, alas! (as the records of our prisons attest,) in too many
cases, perhaps, for half their lives the only ray of heart-enlivening sunshine that ever streamed on them, was through the bars of a prison window.

The next great objection that will probably be laid against our proposal, may be—and here we frankly admit that even some (as J. B. Moore, Esq.,) who are favourable to the measure, do fear it—that, although the African would be free on reaching Brazil, he might in a few instances, become incorporated and lost sight of amid the mass of slaves, which could not always be detected. To some slight extent, this may be true; but where is there a system, however beneficial to mankind, that is without defects. With all our laws for mutual protection, there will be found persons who attempt to break through them, and so in Brazil; but we could guard against that by a suitable registration, and stipulations to counteract it, besides, the evil will have a limit, for, according to suggestion 19th, the subterfuge must cease within a given period, which would never be hoped for with the Slave Trade. Nor need there be any apprehension that the Brazilians would wish to keep the emigrants to become permanent residents in the country; for it has been already shewn, that prudential reasons alone—especially if the entire surveillance of the system be a government consideration—would operate against their attempting it, for even Don José Cliffe, an interested party, who is well acquainted with the state of feeling in Brazil, confesses, that they do not wish to have any additional number of blacks to settle permanently in that country, because all are aware of the ultimate danger of such a step. We would fain hope, for the honour and humanity of Brazil, that a probability of the risk of giving the blacks a permanent interest in the soil, may have been a great reason why, instead of introducing an equal number of the sexes, and trying thereby to keep up the stock, they have acted
on a plan, cruel but more consistent with their present and future safety, i.e., working the slaves off. Again, it may be asked, "will not the Negroes on their return to Africa be liable to be re-shipped off by the chiefs?" We say, No; on the contrary, the latter are very anxious to detain them on account of their superior intelligence; and we know, on the authority of Mr. Duncan and others, who met with some few who had been enabled to return from Brazilian slavery, that they were not only safe, but looked on with greater favour than any others. If such be the fact with a very few, how much safer and better it would be, if there were large numbers instead of isolated cases; besides, all having acquired in their servitude a knowledge of English or Portuguese, they would be able to represent the wrong, (if attempted) to the proper authorities.

Lastly, we shall be told, that with the boundless extent of virgin soil, and countless mines in Brazil, there will be such a demand for labour, that the numbers exported from Africa would be greatly increased, and those who lean favourably to this measure of Negro emigration, do state their impressions that there might be a temporary increase. It seems to be overlooked, that by the "repressive force" system—which instead of benefiting the African rather keeps up the excitement to continue the slave traffic—one hundred thousand slaves, at least, are required to keep up the supply of sixty thousand to seventy thousand per annum;—thirty to forty per cent. perishing by the most miserable of deaths; and of all the number who reach Brazil scarcely one in thirty thousand ever returns to his native soil, instead of going back, as the majority would do by the plan proposed, more or less improved and civilized. But we cannot even go with them on the subject of "temporary increase of numbers," for we speak with some knowledge of Brazil, when we assert, that there is not sufficient capital, much less surplus capital;
and until that talisman is forthcoming, the tempting riches of the glittering mine will remain unexplored, and the flowers of the magnificent forests which cover this "virgin soil" will long continue untrodden by the foot of man, "to waste their sweetness on the desert air." In proof of this we would again ask, how is it that with all this boundless extent of rich and fertile soil, even with the premium we have given by our new tariff to cultivate sugar, the price of slaves has absolutely lowered? No; the want of those great essentials, capital and enterprize, will keep the Brazilians so great a period in the back ground, that long ere they have arrived at such a state of prosperity as to be dangerous to us as rivals, slavery in every form will have ceased, and prudential reasons, together with the equable substitution we propose to allow them, will for ever prevent its being again attempted. As to the supposition that the United States would endeavour to re-open the foreign Slave Trade by this measure, it is a mere bugbear, eloquently enough pleaded in some quarters, to keep public attention from being properly directed to this question. America is too well aware of the danger of such a step, nor does she require it; indeed, the argument is so absurd, that we may be pardoned for inserting the witticism of that respectable authority, Mr. "Sam Slick the Clockmaker," as containing as much of grave refutation as it deserves:—"When the British wanted our folks to join in the treaty to chock the wheels of the Slave Trade, I recollect hearin' old John Adams say—'We ought to humour them, for,' says he, 'they supply us with labour on easier terms, by shippin' out the Irish,' says he, 'they work better, and they work cheaper, and they don't live so long.'"

In entering on the remedy proposed, we consider that the carrying out of the details ought, under proper supervision on the part of Great Britain, to be entirely placed
in the hands of the Brazilian Government, for various reasons.—1st. That they may be enabled to have such a control over the matter, as acting from prudential motives, will enable them to limit the numbers imported, and at the same time make them the more responsible for the due return of the negro at the end of his servitude. By means of the suggestion at No. 11, they would always be able to regulate the numbers, either by raising or lowering the price to be paid for the labour of such free Negroes; observing that it was never to fall so low as to deprive them of at least a certain sum agreed on; also, if raised that the Negroes should benefit. 2nd. By thus shewing greater confidence in the Brazilian government, we should have better grounds for demanding reparation for any infraction, however slight, of the agreement. The chief point in making such a concession to Brazil will be manifest; hitherto we have demanded from that State acquiescence in measures suicidal to its own interests; by this step we shall conciliate the great mass of the Brazilian people, and incite them to co-operate with their Legislature, instead of acting against and paralysing it; at the same time, we shall for ever take away from the government the excuse for violating treaties; we shall then have good and just grounds on which to take other and stronger measures. We shall have conceded to them what we are now doing for our own West Indian colonies; and what we must still further carry out, to save them, and benefit the African race. Like Brazil, it would never be the interest of our colonies, to retain the negroes beyond their term of servitude, for it appears they are no longer useful members of a civilized community, after a due control over them is lost; but by obliging them, after a stipulated term, to return to their native land, they will take back with them tastes and habits, which, however low, when compared with more enlightened people, will be a great and
glorious foundation for the superstructure of another order of things in Africa. As we stated before the Committee, (5270) "hitherto the blacks, by comparing themselves one with another, have had no proper standard by which to rise; even the chiefs on the coast have no inducement to advance one beyond the other." They have only the white as a standard for a superior order of things, and their impression of him, is, that he is exalted too far above the black, for the latter ever to arrive at: their feelings are just those which probably entered the minds of the ancient Britons who, when they saw the gallies advance, filled with the plumed and helmeted followers of Cæsar would regard their invaders as holding a superiority, which could never be attained by barbarians like themselves; and yet, by long and free intercourse with other nations, calling forth a spirit of emulation, our country is now in the high position it holds. The deadly nature of the climate,¹ has hitherto prevented us from carrying into Africa that which was so necessary to their redemption; our influence, our example—that impenetrable bar will ever continue, and it only remains for us to use the natives themselves—negro and half-caste—to bring about the great change. Let us give up attempting an impossibility, and see whether by making greater efforts to educate them, and to elevate the standard of the African character, we cannot stimulate them to rise above their present degradation. Every negro who returns to his native country—able to read, to write, to work in any art or science, will shew to his countrymen that he can compass what the "prestige" in favour of the white man had previously conceded to him alone. The more, therefore, we let the negro commingle

¹ The Author has just received another confirmation of his views on this point, in the death of Mr. John Duncan, the African traveller, lately appointed Vice Consul at Dahomey, West Africa. Perhaps no European was ever so well qualified, by strength of constitution and indomitable courage, to resist the fatal influences of that pestiferous climate.
with civilized people, and even bring him out of his native land at the present time, so much the better for Africa, if we but faithfully guard, that he does return, with the fruits of his labour. By the step proposed, we should hear no more of "packing," "cramming," "weeding," "suffocations in the chase," "starvation from scarcity of provisions and water," "miseries in the barracoons," "wholesale murderings, because it was too expensive to maintain the victims," "wholesale shipments of infants and helpless children from three or four up to eight years of age," because they "pack better," and the other innumerable horrors of the repressive force system. Nor would philanthropists be obliged any further to do injustice to their good sense and feelings, by saying that the statements made on the subject of aggravated cruelties "are vague and general judgments derived from hearsay or other defective sources," or "at least exaggerated and doubtful." The negroes would then leave their country (not as slaves but as free men), in such a peaceful, recognised manner, open to the surveillance of all parties, that legal commerce— that great handmaiden of civilization—would be enabled steadily and undisturbedly to pursue her onward path. If lawful trade could compete in opposition to the Slave Trade at all the chief rivers, nay, even go into its choicest haunts to compete (as we have shewn it did at Whydah, the most favoured nest of the Slave Trade on the North Coast, and Cabenda and Ambriz on the South Coast), will it not go on and increase with ten-fold vigour, when the native chiefs find, that instead of trying violently to uproot an institution almost as ancient as their race, we are making even the criminals tend to the great object of their country's redemption? As in the course of years the emigrants return in large bodies from their servitude, the moral effects of such masses of improved and civilized people, would be felt far and near throughout the land;
and by degrees the impression would gain ground, that it would be more profitable to employ their labourers at home, and ad interim, we may reasonably suppose many would be induced voluntarily to engage in a contract of foreign servitude. The missionary would then no longer have to enter with an almost desponding heart on a sphere of duty, wherein nothing but the darkness of superstition reigned; he would meet at every step with numbers who had become acquainted with the leading truths of the Christian religion; by such examples, such influences united, the feeling of veneration so deep in the African character, but now, alas, monopolised by the fetiche and juju, would turn into its true channel, and "instead of the brier would come up the myrtle."

What then prevents us retracing our steps, and deserting a path which but leads further away from the object we desire? Is it a dread of acknowledging that our endeavours have been defeated? or the prospect that other countries may deride, or impute to us other than disinterested motives? A nation holding the proud position Great Britain does, and which has sacrificed so much on this momentous question, is in a situation to regulate her actions by a sense of duty. If taunts and insinuations on the part of foreigners could have had any weight, we should not be living under the form of government we now do. That same determination to regulate our actions on principles of duty not impulse, will, we trust, be henceforth more evident in our treatment of the Slavery Question. Had it been dealt with impartially at the first, and with reference to the situation and feelings of other nations, we should not now have been obliged to repeat, after an interval of so many years, the words of the most eminent authority ever quoted, as applicable to the present day:—"This contraband trade in slaves is attended by circumstances much more horrible than anything that has
ever been known in former times; it cannot be denied that all attempts at prevention, imperfect as they have been found to be, have tended to increase the aggregate of human suffering, and the waste of human life in the transport of slaves from the coast of Africa. The dread of detection suggests expedients of concealment productive of the most dreadful sufferings to a cargo; with respect to which it hardly seems ever to occur to its remorseless owners that it consists of sentient beings. The numbers put on board in each venture, are far from being proportioned to the capacity of the vessel, and the mortality is frightful to a degree unknown since the attention of mankind was first drawn to the horrors of this traffic” (the Duke of Wellington at the Congress of Verona in 1822).

Let this question be treated as every other is, in the present day, by our enlightened countrymen. It involves the public opinion of other states. The arms of Great Britain may overcome any physical difficulty, but cannot force other nations to change their sentiments prematurely, on a great question, and to their own immediate ruin. The longer we continue our repressive efforts, and treat Brazil like another Cassandra, in doubting her sincerity and truth, the larger the host we shall array against us, and the more impossible for that government to check or control the Lernæan Monster. Since at every stroke of Hercules’ club, additional heads do but spring forth, let us take as our Iōlas, what we would use in other questions—plain reasoning apart from impulse—and we may then hope to sear the Hydra.

We cannot allow this opportunity to escape, without offering a few plain suggestions as to other measures connected with the amelioration of Africa. We are aware it has been recommended to build additional forts; make trading stations with due protective force; to enter into treaties with the native chiefs; and, lastly, to subsidize
them. The greater number of these, pre-suppose a large additional expenditure, and the upholding a retinue of Europeans, who are at best, unfitted by the climate, for the active duties they ought to fulfil. We would say plainly, if the legal commerce in the great rivers, Bonny, Old and New Calabar, Camaroons, Bimbia, and the legal trading posts at Whydah and Cabenda, near Ambriz, &c., required no other protection on the spot, than that which it could afford itself by its own influences, together with the occasional visit of a vessel of war along the coast, there will be no necessity for additional military posts or stations. The trading places will be found to spring up as they have hitherto done, without the local guardianship of guns and batteries; and such peaceful resorts of legitimate commercial enterprise, would be, to those who go forth with the glad tidings of salvation—the surest and safest avenues for the introduction of their important labours.

On the subject of treaties with the African chiefs, it is palpable, from what has been stated in evidence, that they are valueless; unless we can, at the same time, give them an equivalent to what we expect; for, as Captain Matson himself admits, "it is not to be supposed that any chief in Africa will keep faith with us any longer than it suits his interest to do so" (Parliamentary Report, vol. i. page 88, and pamphlet page 76); and he shews that at Cabenda and Ambriz, where treaties were entered into, the chiefs repudiated them, as soon as it suited their purpose to do so, and refused to receive the presents sent them as subsidy by our government (1270), and others doubt the probability of native chiefs ever observing treaties made with us (2014). We would, therefore, only endeavour to bring them into our views, by asking a concession of such points as they would voluntarily enter upon, and which they could reasonably be expected to fulfil. In any
part of the coast of Africa, the captain of a vessel of war can have a treaty, however preposterous, granted, his vessel being off the port, and a few barrels of gunpowder and some muskets, or any trifling articles, being thrown into the agreement as a *dash* or present; but are such treaties worth a straw? or if broken, could we *conscientiously* demand reparation for their infraction? We must first let them become gradually sensible of the importance of keeping on good terms, and seeking our friendship—not by threats or violence—but from a feeling of the advantages they derive, through commercial intercourse with us. When we want to repel aggression, physical force becomes necessary, but where our earnest desire ought to be, to inspire confidence, and to draw out any latent good there may be in the African character, the quieter and more frankly we go to work the better. Sir Charles Hotham’s remarks, in his letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 14th March, 1848, shew that he at least did not keep his eyes closed, during his connexion with Africa. Referring to requests made him by the masters of legal trading vessels, to assist in enforcing payment of debts, he says, “wherever our flag flies, and especially among savages, it is our interest to trade in the most legal, quiet and pacific manner; it is through this course having been long pursued, that the English name and character reign paramount in Africa; it is through a contrary course having been pursued, that suspicion and dislike pursue the French.” On the question of subsidies, there is this much to be said: an African chief always looks for presents from the white man; and he has been accustomed to receive them whenever the European has visited him, or solicited a favour: to a certain extent, it may be useful to lay out in that way, some of the large sums which might be retrenched by reducing the squadron, and this we would
glance at. It appears from the evidence generally, that so large a force as we have at present, is not necessary for the protection of legitimate trade; and Sir Charles Hotham, the highest authority that can be quoted, admits that twelve vessels of war would be sufficient. We anticipate, that the repressive force advocates, will plead the danger to our commerce on the coast of Africa of using any other than that method, on account of the number of pirates which would be called forth; and Viscount Palmerston well observes (97) "people know the difference of habit and character between the smuggler, and the waggoner who carries a cargo of legal goods. The nature of the occupation prepares the minds of those engaged for acts of violence and plunder." Surely, it never could have occurred to his lordship, and to those who hold similar coercive views, that every step we took, would vastly increase the number of such smugglers; for in proportion to the increase of captures, the slave trading companies would have to incite an additional number of persons to become smugglers, to keep the traffic equal to the demand; but our repressive system goes further, it makes the slave trader so acquainted with every shift and device that would be necessary to elude detection, and so familiarized with every description of human suffering, that he has become the most vigilant of pirates, with the remorseless cruelty of a demon. Our efforts are every year bringing out an additional number of these demons, who must eventually be scourges to our commerce. By the measure of concession proposed, Brazil would gladly enter into agreement to declare it piracy, with severe punishment, to those attempting to introduce Negroes, otherwise than as emigrants, or in other than duly registered ships, and under suitable surveillance; as also for all acts of resistance to the officers, in their duty of examining the
vessels, &c. It would be as much the interest of Brazil, as of our own country, to grant every assistance, in putting down the horde of worse than pirates, that are now, as it were, being fostered and encouraged, under our endeavours.

There is yet one point, urged by the repressive force advocates, and on which we must remark; viz., that the squadron is just as well employed on the coast of Africa, as on any other; or better than the average of service on the home station, in guardships, &c., &c.; and they deduce this, from the high state of discipline, in which the squadron has been kept by Sir Charles Hotham. All we need say, is, that it would be a very bad squadron, and on a very bad coast, if that distinguished officer did not make the people equal to their work; but a ship's company with broken down constitutions, would be a very poor materiel in an action, and, a squadron of aguish seamen from the African coast, a slender defence if stationed, as they would unavoidably have to be, in time of war, winter and summer, in the Channel and North Sea. We have served on both the East and West coasts of Africa, and have been messmates with many who have been similarly employed; but we scarcely ever met with an officer or man who had served there, whose constitution was not more or less shaken by it.

It is true that Sir Charles Hotham, by doing away as much as possible with boat service, and by other wise measures, diminished the ostensible mortality. But what say the invalidings? We cannot do better than conclude with a quotation from the evidence of Captain Mansel, an officer who held the command of the African squadron for some time:—Question 4660, by the Chairman—“Will you explain in what respect you consider it (the African station) unfavourable? Capt. Mansel’s answer:—“Because, although
you are subject to violent tornadoes upon the Coast, they give such ample warning, and are so irresistible, that when the warning is given you have nothing to do but to take in every sail before it comes upon you; and those who know the coast particularly well, are most particularly careful about it, not only on account of securing their spars and their sails, but as one of the great means adopted to preserve the health of the men, is to keep them dry, as this is always accompanied with torrents of rain. But with the exception of the tornadoes now mentioned, and which never last more than three hours, you have never a gale of wind; you never have occasion to reef your sails in bad weather; you have never any occasion to exercise the men in those little ways, which in Northern climates make the best seaman. On the contrary, your men get into the habit of doing this with great facility and ease; and when they come into a Northern climate they find a material difference. It is not only a bad school, but those sailors who have become from practice, good and first-rate men, are, I believe, unfortunately more liable to be affected in health by the climate, than those who are younger than themselves: the consequence of which is, that you lose the service of really good seamen, and you do not make any in return.” “I do assure you that upon my return to England three months’ ago, when my ship, (which I flattered myself was in very good fighting order), was inspected by the Commander-in-Chief, the men were so perfectly paralysed by the change of climate, that I looked upon them with astonishment” (4661).

A diminution of the “repressive force,” therefore, would not only be advantageous to the public service, but it would be more so to the African race; because out of the sum erst fruitlessly expended, but then retrenched, we should (not to speak of the innumerable ways in which
the sum of £300,000 or £400,000 per annum, might be usefully employed) be able to reduce the duty on West Indian and African produce, and thereby—as well as by other measures—give a stimulus in the right direction. Thenceforth, Britannia, instead of being represented like the uncertain Hygeia—squeezing a snake with one hand, while with the other she held the cup to feed it—might take the less anomalous position of a Grecian Pitho, and although prepared to hurl the defying thunder-bolt, would more readily guide by the attractive caduceus of Reason and Persuasion.

T. R. H. THOMSON.

Douglas, Isle of Man, January 2, 1850.
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